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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Water scarcity is a severe and growing global challenge. Given the threats of 
large-scale conflict, increased poverty, and significant environmental degradation, the 
stakes are high for finding viable solutions to critical water shortages. Over the last 50 
years, water withdrawals have tripled due to economic development and rapid population 
growth, placing serious pressure on the planet‘s water systems.  By 2030 almost half of 
the world‘s population will be living in countries facing high water stress, and areas that 
face critical water scarcity are expected to witness the displacement of anywhere between 
24 and 700 million people. By 2050, population growth is projected to reach nine billion, 
further exacerbating the threats posed by water scarcity (UNESCO 2009). 
Agriculture remains the most significant consumer of water, accounting for 
approximately 75% of all global water use.
1
 In the next three decades, the demand for 
irrigated water is expected to rise by approximately 14%, with a corresponding increase 
in competition for water between industrial, domestic and agricultural sectors. Millions of 
rural agriculture-dependent farmers in Africa, Asia and the Middle East already face 
devastating shortages of irrigation water, a situation that will have severe implications for 
food security and economic development across the globe. Efforts to improve irrigation 
are thus crucial, yet attempts to engineer large increases in supply are no longer feasible. 
Therefore, efficient irrigation water management will be critical to sustain and enhance 
water quality and meet the growing demand for water resources (Pomeranz 2009; 
UNESCO 2009).  
The World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
and the Asian Development Bank have invested billions of dollars in irrigation 
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 Industrial and domestic water use accounts for approximately 20% and 5% of global water consumption, 
respectively (WWRD, 2009).  
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management across the developing world. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, irrigation 
schemes in many developing countries were centrally governed, and massive technical 
infrastructure projects were planned and pursued by the development community (Tang 
1992). However, a lack of funds for operation and maintenance, as well as poor state-led 
outcomes such as continued water shortage concerns, irrigation deterioration and water-
use conflicts, motivated the gradual shift to a community-driven development approach 
to irrigation management. In particular, many countries adopted the policy of Irrigation 
Management Transfer which delegated control of decisions, authority and responsibility 
for irrigation to local institutions of irrigators known as Water Users‘ Associations 
(Garces-Restrepo, Vermillion, and Munoz 2007).  
The assumption guiding Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) is that the 
establishment of Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) and introduction of an irrigation 
service fee will motivate efficient and equitable irrigation management (Degnbol, 
Gislason, Hanna, Jentoft, Raakjaer, Sverdrup-Jensen, and Wilson 2006). The Water 
Users‘ Association (WUA) thus represents the necessary institutional structure and 
democratic foundation for water governance, while the irrigation service fee is a tool 
designed to incentivize efficient and equitable distribution of water, and to ensure the 
collection of adequate cost-recovery funds for operation and maintenance of the system. 
Since water users must pay the irrigation service fee for water delivery or risk losing their 
access to water, it is expected that they will efficiently manage water to avoid paying for 
supplemental water supplies.  
Therefore, the predominant policy discourses on irrigation reform view WUAs as 
central to the growth and viability of the irrigated agricultural sector in developing 
countries. However, important theoretical and empirical challenges have been raised 
concerning community-driven development. Although natural resource and development 
scholars agree that local institutions work better than ―top-down‖ rules not seen as 
credible by resource users (Acheson 2003), many have questioned both the benefits and 
success of community-driven development (Ensminger 1990; Mosse 2003; Platteau 
2004; Ruddle and Hickey 2008). Scholars argue that this community-based approach has 
not had the intended effect on community involvement, and has actually promoted local 
elite capture of benefits. Moreover, the problems with community-driven development 
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have often been attributed to the ―blue-print‖ approach, wherein donor-funded efforts 
turn control over to residents (Nagendra 2007; Ostrom 2007b).  This blue-print approach 
generally engages a small group of leaders during the implementation of development 
projects and establishment of local associations, and fails to involve the broader 
community in the process. In addition, the quick set-up of local institutions usually 
precludes any substantive efforts at institutional development and capacity building 
(Platteau 2004). 
Research has also shown mixed results for Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT). Many WUAs are failing to achieve their fundamental mandate to improve 
irrigation management outcomes (Garces-Restrepo, Vermillion, and Muñoz 2007; 
Meizen-Dick 2007). This dissertation focuses on WUA performance in Kyrgyzstan, 
where, despite the theoretical expectations that IMT will succeed, there is extreme 
variation in the effectiveness of WUAs. In many instances, they are failing to overcome 
the fundamental collective action dilemmas inherent in irrigation systems. In Kyrgyzstan, 
numerous water users are not paying irrigation service fees or contributing to critical 
maintenance and rehabilitation projects; violations of irrigation schedules are a frequent 
and expected occurrence; and damage to the already dilapidated infrastructure continues 
unabated in many areas.  The inability to stop farmers‘ pursuit of ―water-maximizing‖ 
behavior has had an especially deleterious effect on farmers at the end of the canal 
systems, and conflict over irrigation water during the water season has become the norm 
in many areas (Abdullaev, Jumaboe, Kazbekov, and Manthritilake 2008; Sehring 2007; 
Wegerich 2006; Zavgordnaya 2006).   
This dissertation seeks to advance our applied knowledge of irrigation water 
management by answering a basic yet critical question regarding natural resource 
governance. Did a specific policy intervention help to support local institutions and 
ultimately encourage better irrigation outcomes in Kyrgyzstan? To achieve the research 
objectives, the study investigates the impact of community-driven development on 
irrigation outcomes. More specifically, the study undertakes a rigorous program 
evaluation of an international development project dedicated to improving the 
performance of Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) in the small, poor, post-Soviet 
country of Kyrgyzstan. The program of interest represents a correction strategy to the 
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blue-print approach for establishing WUAs. Thus, the program is designed to foster the 
capacity of WUAs through institutional development, social mobilization and 
participatory rehabilitation efforts that are intended for all categories of water users. 
 
Research Setting 
Kyrgyzstan provides an excellent context to examine the impact of international 
development efforts on irrigation outcomes for two primary reasons. First, irrigation is 
crucial for the agricultural sector. Second, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Kyrgyzstan has emerged as the poster child for Western development intervention in 
Central Asia. Demonstrating a high level of accommodation to reform pressures from 
international organizations, the country aggressively embarked on economic and political 
reforms in the early nineties. In contrast to its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan welcomed outside 
influence, including a large influx of United Nation‘s programs, private organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other international organizations.  
Similar to many developing countries, the livelihoods of millions of Kyrgyzstan‘s 
rural population are heavily dependent on irrigation, and the country faces increasingly 
severe challenges to the productivity, growth, and viability of its agricultural sector. 
Along with gold and rare earth minerals, such as mercury and uranium, in the country‘s 
vast mountain ranges, water serves as the country‘s most important natural and economic 
resource (CIA World Factbook). Two tributaries begin in Kyrgyzstan – the Naryn and 
Kara Darya – and flow into the Syr Darya, one of the two main water sources for Central 
Asia.
2
 Among the countries in the Aral Sea Basin, Kyrgyzstan represents an upstream, 
water-rich state with a yearly average of 10,000 cubic meters of water per capita. In 
contrast, the downstream countries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan face extreme water 
shortage problems. With 700 and 200 cubic meters of water per capita respectively, these 
countries are well below the 1000 cubic meter baseline used to determine ―water-short‖ 
countries (Envsec 2005).  
With an average elevation of 2750 meters above sea level, only 6.55% of the land 
in Kyrgyzstan is suitable for agriculture. Nevertheless, agriculture represents a critical 
economic sector, accounting for 25% of gross domestic product (GDP) and employing 
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 The other is the Amu Darya which originates in Tajikistan.  
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48% of the country‘s workforce (CIA World Factbook).3 Over two-thirds of the 
population live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture. Due to the arid 
continental climate, it would be impossible to cultivate much of the country‘s agricultural 
land without irrigation. Thus, over 90% of the country‘s water use is dedicated to 
irrigated agriculture, and some of the largest irrigation systems in the world begin in 
Kyrgyzstan and extend into Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (ADB 2004; Envsec 2005; 
Sehring 2007).   
However, despite this abundance of water in Kyrgyzstan, many areas of the 
country face increasing problems concerning both the quantity and quality of irrigation 
water. While the arid climate is partially responsible, this water scarcity has been 
primarily driven by poor management, including the inefficient usage and distribution of 
available water resources and deteriorating infrastructure (Envsec 2005). Kyrgyzstan 
inherited many of these management and infrastructure problems from a Soviet period 
characterized by corruption and extremely inefficient water distribution, resulting in 
average water losses around 50% (Thurman 2000).  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan acquired this dilapidated 
irrigation system without the financial or human capital means to properly manage it and 
reverse the degradation. In many areas, canals and drainage systems have not been 
cleaned or repaired since the mid-1980s. Most canals have significant structural damage 
and missing or broken sluice gates, which makes water regulation highly difficult or 
virtually impossible in some locales. Thus, water supply has become increasingly erratic, 
especially for water users located at the end of canal systems; due to this situation, many 
communities have lost thousands of hectares of arable land (Envsec 2005; WB 2003; 
Sallaku, Kristo and Burton 2003). Under increasing economic strain, independent 
Kyrgyzstan adopted Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) in 1999, and the international 
community began the task of implementing Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) 
throughout the country to address these deficiencies.  
A substantial amount of donor funding and development work has been devoted 
to irrigation management reform in the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
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 The country‘s main agricultural products include cotton, tobacco, wool, and meat. Only cotton and 
tobacco are exported.  
6 
 
including projects to establish WUAs and foster their development. As the international 
community hoped to promote Kyrgyzstan as a model of economic and political reform, 
multilateral aid flowed into the country along with a host of Western NGOs, international 
organizations and scholars. My dissertation represents the most sophisticated attempt to 
determine if and how development intervention worked in the critical arena of irrigation 
water management. 
Kyrgyzstan‘s receptivity to Western policies and the influx of Western actors and 
agencies have been driven by a critical need for financial assistance, along with 
insecurities associated with its geographic position between far more powerful countries 
such as Russia, China and Uzbekistan (Schoberlein 2000). The country is small, 
mountainous, very poor, and landlocked between China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. With an area of approximately 200,000 square km, Kyrgyzstan is slightly 
smaller than South Dakota, and besides Tajikistan, is the poorest country of the former 
Soviet Union. Forty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and the 
unemployment rate hovers around 18%; these economic indicators put Kyrgyzstan in an 
economic development category with countries like Ghana and Benin (CIA World 
Factbook).
4
 
The significant donor support for Kyrgyzstan has been motivated by its symbolic 
and political significance for western countries. In the decade following independence 
from the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was described as an ―island of democracy‖ in Central 
Asia. Kyrgyzstan allowed political opposition, an independent media, the development of 
civil society, and followed Western prescriptions for deepening economic reform. These 
attempts stood in stark contrast to the records of its more authoritarian neighbors 
regarding human rights, free-market and democratic reforms (Schoberlein 2000).  
While on the one hand, Kyrgyzstan has been perceived as a 'laboratory' 
demonstrating that democracy and international aid could work in Central Asia, geo-
political concerns have also greatly informed Western policy towards the country. For the 
United States, the strategic importance of Kyrgyzstan is linked to the Manas air force 
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 In contrast to the CIA World Factbook and other sources, the US Department of State cites the 
unemployment rate at 11.1% as of 2008.  
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base in Bishkek Kyrgyzstan, which represents a critical supply line for U.S. and NATO 
missions in Afghanistan (VOA 2009).  
However, despite two decades of Western attempts to transform Kyrgyzstan into 
the ―Switzerland of Central Asia,‖ Kyrgyzstan has experienced a large increase in 
poverty and social stratification. Similar to their counterparts in the region, extravagance, 
corruption, and nepotism characterize the country‘s leadership. In April 2010, against the 
backdrop of rising state repression, corruption and economic grievances, an increase in 
utility prices sparked a violent political rebellion that forced President Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev to flee the country (Reeves 2010).  The uprising against the Bakiyev regime was 
closely followed by costly and destabilizing ethnic violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan 
between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz. Overall, 2010 observed a 3.5% contraction of 
the Kyrgyz GDP, along with an estimated 2.6 billion USD increase in the country‘s 
external debt (Khamidov 2011). The country‘s economic and democratic prospects are 
bleak, and the success of the Western model seems doubtful. 
The results for Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) are also mixed. The 
capacity of local, regional and national actors to continue the policy without further 
substantial support from the international aid community is highly questionable. At the 
local level, there is extreme variation in the effectiveness of Water Users‘ Associations 
(WUAs) across the country. In Kyrgyzstan, the inability of WUAs to collect irrigation 
service fees from water users and conduct the necessary operation and maintenance on 
their canal systems translates into an acute threat to the viability of the irrigation system. 
Additionally, because of the inter-related nature of the extensive Central Asian system, 
the continued deterioration of the infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan has important 
consequences not only for Kyrgyzstan but for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well (see 
Chapters 2 and 3).  
It seems unlikely that the international community will continue to provide 
Kyrgyzstan with levels of funding comparable to those received during the past two 
decades. The end of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan will have serious implications for 
Kyrgyzstan‘s strategic importance. Moreover, although international donors promised 
over one billion USD in aid and substantial loans following the events of 2010, there 
have been significant delays in the release of these funds due to the country‘s record of 
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corruption and historical misuse of aid. Consequently, it is becoming ever more important 
for development agencies to efficiently and effectively utilize a limited stream of funds 
for natural resource management.  
 
Approach 
This project seeks to provide a better understanding of the variation in 
performance outcomes for Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs), as well as explain the 
processes linking a development program to these outcomes. To achieve the research 
objectives, I conduct a program evaluation of an international development project 
committed to improving irrigation management in Southern Kyrgyzstan. My research 
focused on the Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP), a project dedicated 
to building the capacity of WUAs.  In many ways, the Water Users‘ Association Support 
Program (WUASP) fulfills the prescriptions for an intervention to improve irrigation 
management outcomes. The program methods of social mobilization, institutional 
development, and participatory rehabilitation are congruent with factors argued to 
promote desired behavioral changes among water users. By pursuing an impact 
assessment in a region defined by communities that exhibit significant variation in water 
scarcity, economic equality and historical experience with irrigation, I am able to explore 
whether the influence of the development program was mediated by these three factors. 
WUASP is implemented by Winrock International and funded by the United 
States Agency for International Aid (USAID). Winrock International is an American 
NGO that specializes in development work related to irrigation and agriculture. In the 
language of program evaluation, WUASP represents the ―treatment,‖ and the WUAs – 
where WUASP implemented the program – represent the treatment groups. 
Correspondingly, WUAs where WUASP was not implemented serve as ―control‖ sites or 
groups.
5
  
Research on collective action in natural resource management has long posed 
significant methodological problems. The plethora of causal variables and complex 
linkages between these factors make it exceptionally difficult to develop a specific causal 
path linking a variable to a collective action outcome and to isolate the effect of that 
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 Both treatment and control sites also received basic World Bank institutional development and support. 
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variable (Agrawal 2008; Dolšak and Ostrom 2003; Ostrom 2009). Consequently, my use 
of rigorous quantitative research methods represents a significant methodological 
intervention in the field of collective action studies. Specifically, a panel data set of WUA 
performance indicators is analyzed with the use of regression techniques to test the effect 
of WUASP. Additionally, survey data from a large N probability survey is evaluated to 
explore the program‘s association with four individual behavioral mechanisms that link 
the program to better common property resource outcomes.  
Furthermore, my quantitative methods are informed and complemented by 
qualitative methods. Agrawal (2001) has criticized research on common property 
resources for ignoring how power dynamics are played out in natural resource 
governance and devoting little attention to historical or macro-social processes.  Thus, I 
seek to explore variation in WUA outcomes at the micro level through a dynamic 
approach that does not lose sight of the political, social and historical context. While 
econometrics enables me to measure whether and how much a variable mattered to an 
outcome, qualitative research allows me to explain why it mattered, by providing the 
context for the empirical analysis. The qualitative data includes focus group reports, 
interview data, and field notes gathered during nine months of field research in 
Kyrgyzstan. Hence, attention to sociological and historical processes plays an important 
role in this study and helps to generate a more precise understanding of the factors 
hindering irrigation system governance in Southern Kyrgyzstan.   
I carried out the majority of this work as an academic researcher within the 
international aid community. At the beginning of my field work, my access to interviews 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan was linked to my positions as a research fellow at the Social 
Research Center of the American University in Bishkek and as a part-time intern with the 
Foundation for Tolerance International. Moreover, my access to interviews and data in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan often depended upon my ties to Winrock International and the 
Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP).   
I observed the work of the Winrock International staff for twenty-eight weeks in 
the summer of 2008 and winters of 2009 and 2010. This involved visiting twenty WUAs 
and villages in the Jalalabad, Osh and Batken provinces of Kyrgyzstan, where the 
Winrock staff had implemented or was in the process of implementing WUASP. The 
10 
 
field visits included semi-structured interviews with the WUA Director and/or Council 
Chairman, in addition to informal conversations with farmers. In all but five cases, these 
interview sessions also involved other individuals who had affiliations with the WUA, 
such as the accountants and engineers.
6
  
A significant portion of my field research took place as a volunteer ―program 
evaluator‖ for Winrock International. This institutional affiliation helped me gain access 
to communities and data that would never have been possible as an independent 
researcher with a restricted budget. For example, I was able to acquire World Bank panel 
data and oblast level economic data because of the ‗good reputation and work of the 
project.‘7 Winrock provided my transportation to and from many of the field sites and 
helped me secure a reliable research assistant and competent survey research team. Thus, 
I was heavily dependent on Winrock for many aspects of my research. Winrock provided 
information, logistics, contacts, and help with data collection—all critical requirements 
for my study.  
Furthermore, I spent a tremendous amount of time with the Winrock staff in both 
professional and social settings. In particular, I had an office in the Winrock headquarters 
in Osh during the field study. During the three months of the official volunteer mission, I 
even shared an office with the country director. Not only did I work in the same building 
and accompany the staff on field visits, I also ate lunch with them, attended their weekly 
meetings, participated in their office parties, and lived with a staff member for almost 
three months during my second field visit to Southern Kyrgyzstan.  
I am aware that this personal relationship with the staff both complements and 
biases my work. It allowed me to study the program implementation in a very personal 
manner; as such I gained privileged and private insights. However, due to my close 
relations and reliance on the staff for a large portion of the data collection, I am aware the 
objectivity of my work must remain a constant concern. I have done my best to present 
the work as a relatively objective observer, given my personal ties and dependence on 
WUASP for funding, logistics and data.  
                                                 
6
 All discussions with farmers were conducted with the help of the Winrock staff. While I could sometimes 
ask questions in Russian, the farmers felt comfortable replying in Kyrgyz, Uzbek or a mix of Russian and 
the local language. 
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 This was a compliment I often heard on field visits and during interviews with NGOs and IOs about the 
Winrock project.   
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Furthermore, my association with the program clearly influenced the way I was 
perceived by the population and the conversations I had with community members. 
During my site visits I was seen as a Winrock staff member and as an American who 
could bring resources to the community. I believe that social desirability effects and fear 
of losing the Winrock project support affected many of the interview responses from 
WUASP-supported Water Users‘ Associations. I am sensitive to these contextual issues 
and aware of potential biases. Therefore, while my qualitative data provides important 
information, my claims are based heavily on the quantitative data analysis.  
 In addition, although the data from my informal conversations does not offer a 
full representation of the processes occurring at the village level, my participant 
observation of Winrock did enable me to acquire a first-hand account of implementation 
problems. I was in a privileged position to obtain a great deal of information about the 
day-to-day successes and failures of the project. Indeed, my focus on the WUAs often 
shifted to WUASP‘s office politics, staff problems, problems between the Osh staff and 
Winrock headquarters or USAID, as well as an attempt to understand whether and how 
the program had deviated from its program theory. This understanding of implementation 
problems facilitates a better analysis of the program outcomes.  
I completed the data collection in February 2010. Since the WUASP project in 
Kyrgyzstan was set to close in the spring of 2010, my program evaluation was due to 
WUASP in April 2010 for use in their final project report for USAID. Given the very 
short time-span for the evaluation, I completed a relatively quick impact assessment of 
WUASP with the help of a PhD student in the Department of Economics at the 
University of Michigan. Since the submission of the ―condensed‖ program evaluation to 
Winrock, there has been no ongoing interaction or influence from Winrock/USAID in the 
dissertation.  
 
Findings 
The program evaluation comparing WUASP-supported Water Users‘ 
Associations (WUAs) to control WUAs implemented by the blue-print approach strongly 
suggests that the project has, in fact, improved the performance of WUAs. There is 
evidence of positive results regarding institutional development, social mobilization, and 
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canal infrastructure, as well as some improvement in financial indicators. Nevertheless, 
the evaluation results do not meet certain expectations concerning the treatment‘s 
influence on several objectives. The quantitative results indicate that WUASP failed to 
improve communal relations over water, and did not have a consistently positive impact 
on women and water users located at the end of the canals. The qualitative findings 
further indicate that cooperative outcomes such as equitable water distribution and 
community involvement in the rehabilitation process were only evident in a sub-set of the 
treatment sites.  
My research supports arguments concerning the critical role that social capital 
plays in collective action for natural resource governance. Despite WUASP‘s rhetoric and 
program theory, the program failed to develop this essential pre-requisite for cooperation 
in treatment sites.  The program‘s ‗social mobilization‘ did not build social capital assets 
and improve communal relations; in some instances, it likely worsened them.  Thus, the 
success of WUASP in motivating broad-based collective action was contingent on 
program involvement in communities that already had a foundation of ‗good‘ communal 
relations. I identified a pattern of this positive community dynamic in WUAs with a large 
Uzbek population, as well as areas where there was a relatively equal wealth or financial 
dynamic. 
In order to describe why WUASP either failed to improve social capital or 
worsened it, I maintain that structural social and economic inequality motivates 
significant resentment over resource distribution in some communities. In addition, there 
were implementation problems with the program. WUASP social mobilization meant 
different things for different population groups: the ―genuine‖ social mobilization 
focused on the leadership and active farmers, whereas attempts to ―mobilize‖ the 
remaining water-users for rehabilitation projects functioned as a separate task. This form 
of mobilization included efforts to achieve a quorum of members to approve 
rehabilitation projects and to ―mobilize‖ the community to contribute labor and funds for 
implementation. However, since this second approach did not effectively empower these 
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individuals, rehabilitation benefits may have provided even greater power and advantages 
for local elites and privileged groups.
8
 
In particular, given the significant structural inequalities in some communities, the 
program did not possess the capacity to make a positive difference in such a short time 
period. Meaningful change was especially difficult due to historical processes that created 
large, unexpected challenges to the program theory and implementation. In particular, the 
borders and territory of a WUA generally coincide with those of the former state and 
collective farms. As a result, Sehring (2009) argues that WUAs are ―replacement‖ 
institutions that reproduce the power structures of the Soviet organizations. In addition, 
the manner in which land reform was conducted in the early nineties means that 
inequality was not only reproduced but was reinforced and exacerbated. Uneven and 
inequitable land distribution created or increased the gap between wealthy farmers (or 
family farms) with large landholdings and water users with small tracts of land in many 
areas.  
Hence, I conclude based on my research that, although there are circumstances 
under which community-driven development has a real and substantial positive impact, 
this approach still faces many of the same concerns and threats to success as the blue-
print approach. In particular, there is a clear distinction between WUASP‘s effect on 
WUA performance outcomes and its impact on community-wide cooperation for 
irrigation resource management. I argue that positive performance outcomes for WUAs 
do not necessarily reflect improved collective action among a broad population of water 
users in a service area.  For example, in the context of Kyrgyzstan, a small group of 
wealthy individuals or families can support and subsidize the work of a WUA, thereby 
producing positive outcomes for some aggregate indicators. Thus, the program may 
motivate better collective action among a subset of the community to the detriment of 
broader cooperation goals and long-term success of a WUA. WUASP‘s efficiency gains 
among select population groups, such as local elites, may have been at the expense of 
equity and efficiency gains for average water users. Overall, my project offers evidence 
to support both the positive effects of community-driven development as well as essential 
                                                 
8
 While I believe that the general population of water users might have received some residual form of 
genuine social mobilization prior to 2008, this was not the case for the cohort of treatment WUAs selected 
for WUASP in 2008. 
14 
 
criticisms that have been raised about equity versus efficiency concerns associated with 
this approach.  
 
Road Map 
Chapter 2 provides an historical overview of irrigation in Kyrgyzstan and 
summarizes the macro-social and political processes that affect how irrigation 
management unfolds at the local level. This overview examines the impact of Soviet 
policies on traditional irrigation practices and highlights important land reform processes 
that occurred in the early 1990s, following Kyrgyzstan‘s independence. In addition, the 
chapter presents important background information concerning irrigation reform – 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) – which transferred the operation and 
management of Kyrgyzstan‘s irrigation system to hundreds of locally-based Water Users‘ 
Associations (WUAs).  
Chapter 3 examines the primary constraints faced by WUAs in Kyrgyzstan at the 
local, regional and national level. It also provides detailed background information about 
the methods and theory underlying the Water Users‘ Association Support Program 
(WUASP).  
Chapter 4 describes how WUASP affects the variables argued to promote 
collective action. I develop hypotheses about the program effect on four individual 
behavioral mechanisms, which function as precursors to improved collective action.  
Behavioral mechanisms represent micro or individual level processes linking the program 
to the performance outcomes of interest; these help to explain the presence or absence of 
variation in cooperative capacity and the performance of WUAs. The following 
mechanisms are explored in this study: (1) knowledge regarding the WUA and irrigation 
management, (2) participation in the WUA, (3) attitudes concerning WUA capacity and 
ownership roles, and (4) social capital.  
Chapter 4 also discusses some of the important contextual factors that may 
mediate the program effect. These include a WUA‘s population and land size, social and 
economic heterogeneity, as well as ecological scarcity. Each of these variables represents 
important factors of interest and debate for natural resource scholars.   
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The majority of Chapter 5 is committed to a discussion of the panel data analysis 
used to examine WUASP‘s impact on WUA performance outcomes. I also describe my 
tests of the interaction effects between WUASP and ecological scarcity, social and 
economic heterogeneity, as well as population and land size.  
Whereas Chapter 5 focuses on outcomes, Chapter 6 fulfills the dissertation‘s 
second major research objective by examining the processes linking the program to 
WUA performance outcomes. Survey data is used to test for an association between the 
program and four individual behavioral mechanisms developed in Chapter 4. Given the 
divergent historical experiences with irrigation and agriculture among ethnic Uzbeks and 
ethnic Kyrgyz, I also compare outcomes for the mechanisms among these two social 
groups. Finally, to provide a more comprehensive investigation of claims that 
development work often sacrifices equity for efficiency gains, I assess WUASP influence 
on individual behavioral mechanisms for disadvantaged groups, including women and 
water-users located at the end of the canal system (tail-enders).  
Chapter 7 places my study and findings in relation to existing academic, policy 
and methodological discourses on international development policy and collective action 
research on natural resources management.  
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Chapter 2 
Research Setting and Historical Overview of Irrigation Management 
 
 
This dissertation is a contemporary study focused in the Southern Kyrgyzstan 
provinces of Batken, Jalalabad and Osh. Chapter 2 explores some of Kyrgyzstan‘s 
historical circumstances that influence contemporary policies, habits, expectations and 
beliefs concerning irrigation water management. The first half of the chapter situates the 
study in Southern Kyrgyzstan and provides an historical overview of irrigation 
management. The second half of the chapter focuses on irrigation reform in independent 
Kyrgyzstan and concludes with a discussion of Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs).  
To avoid some of the anthropological complications, ‗traditional‘ is defined here 
to denote practices that have some degree of historical continuity among a group of 
people.  
 
The Research Setting: Southern Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan is a relatively new state that gained its independence from the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The country is characterized by a sharp division between the North and 
South. This split is reflected in the significant economic and cultural differences that 
define the two regions and is reinforced by the Tien Shan Mountains, which divide the 
country starkly and significantly hinder interactions between the regions.
9
 The North is 
heavily influenced by its longer history of interaction and cooperation with the 
Russians;
10
 it is economically and politically more powerful than the South. It consists of 
Chuy, Talas and Naryn oblasts and is home to the country‘s industrial base. The 
                                                 
9
  The physical geography makes travel by car between the two parts an arduous trip. Also, there is not a 
rail system linking the two regions, and the cost of a flight from Bishkek to Osh is prohibitively expensive 
for a majority of the population. 
10
  Following the conquest of the North, resistance continued in the South.   
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population is Russified, educated and relatively modern/secular (Bond and Koch 2010; 
Megoran 2010).  
On the other hand, Southern Kyrgyzstan is defined by a rural, agriculture 
dependent population that is less educated and more socially conservative than the North. 
Its cultural and economic makeup has been shaped by its location on the edges of the 
Ferghana Valley. The Ferghana Valley is one of the most fertile, culturally diverse and 
densely populated areas in Central Asia, surrounded by the Ala-Tau Mountain Range in 
the north, the Tien Shan Mountains in the east and the Alay Mountains in the south. 
While the majority of the central part of the Valley is in Uzbekistan (Andijan, Namangan 
and Ferghana provinces), parts of the northern and eastern sections of the Valley are in 
Kyrgyzstan (Batken, Jalalabad and Osh provinces) and a small portion of the west and 
southeast lies in the territory of Tajikistan (Sogd province) (Abdullaev et. al, 2008: 4).  
Before Central Asia‘s conquest and incorporation into the Russian empire in the 
19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, the current geographic boundaries and modern state structures 
were not part of the population‘s daily life.  It was not until 1936 that the Soviets finished 
carving out the present-day republics of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as part of the process of national delimitation. These republics 
supposedly reflect the ―ethnic‖ composition of the region.  
However, given the shifting, contradictory and complex manifestations of 
identity, scholars criticize both the official ethnic labels applied during the national 
delimitation process, as well as contemporary scholarship that assumes the accuracy and 
historical continuity of these identities.
11
 Instead, the ethnic identity categories that define 
the population of Southern Kyrgyzstan – and Central Asia – are new and unequally laid 
over the groups.  Central Asia is a culturally diverse region characterized by centuries of 
population movements and mixed marriages that have produced an area where languages 
and groups are completely intertwined. Thus, attempts to categorize the Central Asian 
population into discrete and enduring groups of ‗Tajiks,‘ ‗Kazakhs,‘ ‗Turkmen,‘ 
‗Uzbeks‘ and ‗Kyrgyz‘ are highly problematic (Schoberlein-Engel 1994).  
                                                 
11
 For example, during the imperial era, the group known today as Kazakhs were called Kirgiz or Kirgiz 
Kaisak. Following the Soviet‘s national delimitation project in 1924, the Kirgiz and Kirgiz Kaisak were 
renamed Kazak. Also, please refer to Schoberlein-Engel (1994) for a detailed study of the complexity of 
Central Asian identities.  
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Nevertheless, despite their modern creation, ethno-national sentiments have been 
made real and powerful by Soviet state policies that constructed and shaped these 
identities (Northrop, personal communication, 2011). In particular, through the twentieth 
century, the Soviets undertook extraordinary efforts to promote national identities 
through administrative, educational and cultural methods. For example, ―passport 
nationality‖ required the declaration of national identity on passports and museums were 
established throughout Central Asia to show the historical development of the ethnic 
groups in the region. These efforts, in conjunction with an economic system which 
distributed resources on the basis of national identity, helped to make these identities real 
and meaningful for people (Hirsch 2005). Furthermore, these identity categories have 
been hardened by violence between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1990 and spring of 2010.  
Therefore, despite the artificial nature of the boundaries, borders and identities, 
these features are essential for understanding contemporary Southern Kyrgyzstan.  The 
two main social groups in Southern Kyrgyzstan are ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks; 
these affiliations are crucial for individual identity and hold great significance in people‘s 
lives. The association of ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks with very different traditional 
lifeways is important for my research because it implies a fundamental distinction in their 
experience and expertise with water management. Uzbeks are associated with a 
historically settled population of oasis dwellers; this includes agriculturalists that 
practiced irrigation and produced crops of grain, fruits and vegetables (Geiss 2003; 
Thurman 2000). In contrast, Kyrgyz are linked to a nomadic tradition. For millennia prior 
to the Russian conquest of Central Asia, nomadic groups lived on the edges of the oases 
and in the mountains. They produced meat, dairy products, skins and wool for 
subsistence (Campbell 2011; Michaels 1998).  
The perception of a cultural difference between settled people and nomadic 
people is strong among Central Asians (Schoberlein-Engel 1994). Since I seek to explore 
whether and how varying levels of historical experience with irrigation impact 
contemporary irrigation management, I assume some historical continuity with ethnic 
Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz. Thus, while I am aware of the complexity and dynamics of 
identity in Central Asia, the empirical portion of my dissertation examines and compares 
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irrigation outcomes in geographic areas associated with a large population of ethnic 
Uzbeks to areas that correspond to ethnic Kyrgyz communities.  
 
Historical Overview of Irrigation Water Management 
Rivers provide the means for settled life in Central Asia. As long as people have 
been in the area, the manipulation of the region‘s water for irrigation has been a critical 
concern. Evidence from early source material and archeology indicates that sedentary 
agriculture and gardening has been practiced in the oasis cities of Central Asia for 
thousands of years. The khans constructed extensive and complex irrigation systems to 
support the major cities that existed far from the mountains, including Bukhara, 
Samarkand, and Khiva (Ohara 2000; Thurman 2000). 
Prior to the expansion of the Russian Empire into the area, political structures 
were known as khanates; Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva are three that have a have a 
history of attempting human settlement and asserting control over the population. All 
khanates used certain broadly regional institutions to administer authority over irrigation 
water. The structures set in place for sedentary populations included mirabs (water 
masters), aksakals (white beards) and ashar (community labor). Although these water 
institutions took on new forms under the Russians and Soviets, they remain highly 
important for contemporary water management in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, these 
institutional legacies represent one critical point of difference in the historical legacies for 
nomadic versus sedentary groups that will be discussed later in this chapter (Ohara 2000; 
Thurman 2000). 
Pre-tsarist water management was hierarchically organized under the khans with 
mirabs and aksakals managing the daily operations of the system. The ―mirab bashi‖ 
(head water master) controlled scheduling, managing water distribution and infrastructure 
maintenance at the main canal level while, at the secondary canal level, these tasks were 
the responsibility of local mirabs. Mirabs were elected by individual water-user 
communities –  ketmen – and paid ―in-kind‖ by a tax known as ―kipsen,‖ which was 
based on the population‘s satisfaction with the mirabs‘ work. In water scarce areas, there 
were more mirabs and a higher kipsen rate because it required greater effort to regulate 
water. The incentive structure created by kipsen and the election of mirabs by the 
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communities helped ensure the accountability of mirabs to local water users (Thurman 
2000: 46-50). 
The institution of the ―aksakal‖ (white beards) is another key position in the 
administration of the local irrigation system. The term ―aksakal‖ signifies both a leader 
(respected elder) and an older male. Aksakals were the leaders and decision-makers for 
the ketmen. Local aksakals supervised the overall process of irrigation in the community 
and resolved contentious issues; the ―aryk aksakal‖ (canal aksakal) managed more 
specific sections of the canal system (Bichsel 2009: 70-2). Aksasals also held essential 
leadership positions in nomadic groups; although they were not responsible for irrigation 
management, they were respected elders with significant decision-making and conflict 
resolution powers (Geiss 2003). Thus, aksakals represent an important institutional link 
between sedentary and nomadic populations.  
The third important institution is a form of community labor known as ―ashar‖ (or 
―hasher‖). Although it can be voluntary, ―ashar‖ was often associated with the annual, 
non-voluntary maintenance of an irrigation system. The amount of ashar that an 
individual, family, or community contributed depended on the advantages received from 
the system. This made it similar to a tax. Hence, villages on or near rehabilitation sites 
were expected to contribute more labor or resources since they would reap the greatest 
benefits (Bichsel 2009: 73-5; Ohara 2000: 373).  
In 1876, the Russian Empire took control of the Kokand Khanate and 
incorporated this area into Russian Turkestan. Although daily operations continued under 
customary management procedures, from 1876-1917, the Russian military government 
was officially responsible for irrigation management and introduced several important 
changes to the three traditional water institutions. Specifically, the ―mirab bashi‖ and ―ark 
aksakal‖ were integrated into the colonial system and became employees of the tsarist 
administration. This meant that these positions were no longer paid by water users 
through the kipsen system. As the mirabs became responsible to the military government 
and less accountable to local water users, the power balance between the mirabs and 
water users was fundamentally altered to the detriment of the latter. Also, ashar was 
integrated into the colonial system. Whereas traditional village-level ashar was not 
subject to major changes, attempts to implement large-scale ashar became riddled with 
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corruption (Thurman 2000). Therefore, while pre-colonial irrigation linked water users‘ 
duties and responsibilities (i.e. costs) to benefits from a successful system, the Russian 
system weakened the link between water users and the authorities in charge of water 
management decisions. As the state role and centralization of irrigation continued to 
grow during the Soviet period, this link between benefits and duties would further 
deteriorate (Thurman 2000).  
Furthermore, imperial Russia considered the nomadic lifeway to be economically 
inefficient and socially primitive. In contrast to the work habits associated with sedentary 
agriculture, the deficiencies linked to animal husbandry and mobile pastoralism included 
depravity, laziness, and ignorance. The nomadic lifestyle did not coincide with the 
Russian Empire‘s economic objectives or view of governance in Central Asia– tying 
people to a specific territory was important for exerting control over colonial subjects. 
Ultimately, the large scale transformation (or destruction) of nomadic communities in 
Central Asia occurred under the Soviets who, in comparison to the colonial 
administration, had the bureaucratic apparatus and coercive force to more effectively 
realize their economic and governance plans (Campbell 2011). 
 
Soviet era (1918-1991) 
During the Soviet era, irrigation was administratively centralized and focused on 
river basin management among the five Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. For approximately 70 years, 
Moscow (in theory) organized, managed and subsidized the Central Asian irrigation 
system. The region represented the Soviet ―cotton belt,‖ and cotton cultivation required 
the development of an extensive, integrated and highly sophisticated irrigation system 
across the arid Central Asian states (Ul Hassan, Starkloff and Nizamedinkhodjaeva 
2004).  
Soviet policies sought to destroy the traditional institutions of Central Asian 
groups and completely redefine the population as socialist citizens. While the process of 
―civilizing‖ and ―sedentarizing‖ the nomadic groups began under the Russian Empire, it 
accelerated rapidly with the Soviets. In particular, Soviet ‗land reform‘ and 
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collectivization involved an aggressive process of forced relocation and sedentarization 
of Kyrgyz and Kazakh nomadic populations (Bichsel, 2009: 18; Ohara 2000: 375). 
The Soviets also sought to remove water management from traditional institutions 
and eliminate customary law (Bichsel 2009: 72; Ohara 2000: 375). However, while the 
roles of the mirabs and aksakals were ―officially‖ abolished, these village-level water 
authorities simply became subject to approval by Soviet officials, promoting government 
oversight and control in local affairs (Oneill 2003: 72-75). The institution of ―ashar‖ 
became ―subbotniki‖ – collective labor projects organized by the collective and state 
farms that took place on Saturdays. Therefore, the three water institutions were 
transformed in the Soviet period but survived and remained highly important. 
From 1918-1991, the amount of irrigated land in Central Asia increased by 
approximately 4.9 million hectares (Ohara 2000: 369). Developments in technology 
enabled the Soviets to divert and store water from the region‘s two main rivers (Syr 
Darya and Amu Darya), and to extend canal systems into the foothills of the mountains 
(Bichsel 2009: 60-1). From 1950 to 1985, there was a 130% increase in irrigated areas 
associated with the Syr Darya and a 150% increase in the areas corresponding to the Amu 
Darya (Envsec 2005: 26). In 1991, 90% of the region‘s water was used to irrigate eight 
million hectares of land (Abdullaev et.al, 2008). 
The Soviet legacy is critical to understanding irrigation management in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan. The divergence between Western and local perceptions of the 
Soviet period reflect the dissonance in that legacy. A majority of the population in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan received an adequate and relatively constant water supply 
throughout much of the Soviet period (Ohara 2000: 376-7). Hence, the Soviets are 
associated with the provision of a stable water supply, as well as capital and technical 
expertise for the management of the irrigation system. Therefore, given the insecurity that 
many communities face today regarding the timing and quantity of water supplies, 
individuals often express a strong sense of nostalgia for the Soviet period (Bichsel 2009: 
53-4).  
In contrast, Western evaluations emphasize the inflexibility, inefficiencies and 
unsustainable nature of the Soviet system. Although irrigation schedules and water 
distribution were officially based on scientific norms, there was tremendous divergence 
23 
 
between planning and implementation. Indeed, the engineering feats that ensured a stable 
supply of water across Central Asia were ultimately based on severely depleting the 
region‘s water sources (Ohara 2000: 376-77; Sehring 2009: 70).  By the 1930s and 40s, 
the efficiency of Soviet water management was estimated at 50% due to the constant 
supply of water and absence of incentives to coordinate water distribution (Thurman, 
2000: 219). The large amount of water waste, in conjunction with furrow irrigation on 
uneven fields resulted in water-logging and the salinization of an estimated 40% of the 
land in the Ferghana Valley (Thurman 2000: 172).  For example, towards the end of the 
Soviet era, approximately 16,000 cubic meters of water was used to grow one ton of 
cotton, although only 10,000 cubic meters was required. The extensive ecological 
damage from this highly inefficient water use caused significant land degradation and a 
reduction in crop yields (Thurman 2000: 240). 
Moreover, scholars argue that the population of Central Asia developed a ―Soviet 
mentality‖ concerning natural resource governance. The behavioral implications 
associated with this mentality pose serious challenges to post-Soviet irrigation reform. 
First, the constant supply of water through unsustainable means distorted the population‘s 
conception of water as a scarce resource that should be efficiently managed. Second, the 
Soviet‘s provision of the funding and expertise for the system motivated a culture of 
dependence that reduced the population‘s sense of ownership and responsibility for the 
system (see Ohara 2000; Sehring 2007; Thurman 2000).  
Furthermore, Central Asian scholars emphasize the essential role that clintelism 
and patronage played in resource management during the Soviet era (Collins 2002; 
Cummings 2002; Geiss 2003; Ishiyama 2002; Sehring 2009). Although patronage and 
hierarchical social traditions were important in pre-Soviet society, Sehring (2009) argues 
that ―the context of patronage changed in the Soviet Union and allowed self-interested 
resource exploitation on a much bigger scale‖ (p.71). By the 1930s, patronage networks 
at all levels of the irrigation system were crucial to securing access to resources, and 
corruption became a part of the informal rules for guaranteeing water delivery (Thurman 
2000).  
Specifically, since collectivization and forced settlement patterns resulted in state 
and collective farms that encompassed entire sedentary communities and/or nomadic kin 
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groups, networks based on kinship, as well as informal institutions such as mirabs, 
remained powerful and important for resource allocation (Sehring 2009: 87; Wegerich 
2005).  
Throughout the Soviet period, the problems linked to land degradation, inefficient 
water management and corruption grew increasingly challenging.  By 1985, the irrigation 
system was in critical need of rehabilitation, and by 1990, the system was so dilapidated 
that the area of land under irrigation reverted back to the 1970s level (Bichsel 2009: 18).  
 
Figure 2.1. Homemade water-gate (WUASP 2010)           Figure 2.2. Deteriorated canal (WUASP 2010)  
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Kyrgyzstan 
In 1991, the newly independent state of Kyrgyzstan was left with responsibility 
for the infrastructure within its borders, as well as a significant degree of control over the 
water originating in its territory. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow‘s 
financial backing for the system disappeared along with a significant number of ethnic 
Russians who held technical and management positions. Along with the history of 
corruption and substandard management practices, Kyrgyzstan inherited a dilapidated 
system and considerable technical problems, yet, it lacked the resources and expertise to 
manage and repair the system (Envsec 2005).  
Therefore, following independence, the Kyrgyz government was unable to 
effectively support the operation and maintenance of its irrigation infrastructure. The 
 
A farmer points to a deteriorating section of 
a secondary irrigation canal.  
Given the absence of a water-gate to 
regulate water, a water user demonstrates 
how the community uses stones, scrap 
metal and boards to control water flow. 
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country quickly found itself fully dependent on, and indebted to, international donors for 
funding the necessary services and rehabilitation. Since the majority of the burden for 
irrigation management was quickly transferred to international aid agencies, scholars 
maintain that the culture of dependency, which developed under the Soviets, has been 
perpetuated by international development projects that are perceived as the new sources 
of funding and expertise (McGinnis 2000). 
 
Irrigation Management Transfer 
Under pressure from international donors, and in order to reduce the financial 
burden of irrigation governance on the national budget, Kyrgyzstan initiated a 
comprehensive reform of the irrigation sector in 1999. This process, known as Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT), entails the complete devolution and transfer of 
management, maintenance, and irrigation investment tasks from government institutions 
to private community-based farmers‘ organizations known as Water Users‘ Associations 
(WUAs) (World Bank, 2007).The other key component of the reform involves the 
introduction of irrigation service fees (ISF) that Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) 
collect from the water users within their service areas. The irrigation service fee (ISF) is 
divided into two components: (a) a fee for water delivery and (b) a fee to cover the 
salaries for the WUA staff, taxes, daily operation expenses, rehabilitation costs, as well as 
payment for any donor credits/loans received. 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) is the international model for irrigation 
reform; since the 1960s, it has been implemented in over sixty countries. Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) seeks to improve water governance through institutional 
reform, and it has ultimately replaced top-down technocratic approaches (Garces-
Restrepo et. al, 2007: 1-6).  While the core objective of IMT is more effective irrigation 
management, cost-recovery represents the primary impetus for the policy‘s adoption. The 
following excerpt from a speech by a World Bank official highlights the significance that 
cost-recovery concerns have played in this shift from centralized to local irrigation 
management: 
The final necessary step has been to throw ourselves full force into 
developing Water Users’ Associations.  I must confess that in the old days 
I used to wonder why developing a strong centralized irrigation authority, 
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which honestly and competently delivered water according to the 
schedules posted on the big billboards at junctions of country roads, 
wouldn't work better than mucking about with hundreds of cantankerous 
Water User Associations.  I saw the debate between the two as largely 
ideological, which means philosophically appealing on the one hand to 
Indian Civil Servants in Lucknow, or on the other to some bearded 
anthropologist living in Bethesda. Well, when you have virtually no 
money, the debate is over.  With no money we may as well forget about the 
impressive Malaysian Drainage and Irrigation Department of the 1970s. 
We need farmers' money, we need their shovels, we need them to operate 
gates and police their neighbors' abstractions, we need their oversight of 
contractors, and we need them to take over their irrigation systems 
(Goldberg 2004).  
 
The two key pieces of this irrigation reform – WUAs and irrigation service fees 
(ISF) -are expected to ensure cost-recovery, as well as more efficient and democratic 
water management. It is assumed that the participation and empowerment of water-users 
in local WUAs will create an incentive structure that motivates farmers to take on the 
high cost of irrigation management (Garces-Restrepo et.al, 2007: 1-6). Additionally, 
irrigation service fees (ISF) are seen as the main tool of WUAs for incentivizing 
cooperation, coordination and rational water use. A fundamental assumption behind IMT 
is the efficient and equitable use of water when it is expensive; the fees serve as a 
mechanism to both promote cost recovery and encourage economic water use by making 
it more costly for users to waste water.  
In particular, ISF is anticipated to ensure a degree of dependence between 
downstream and upstream farmers. To support cost-sharing with downstream farmers, the 
ISF incentivizes upstream farmers to manage water more efficiently so that downstream 
farmers receive an adequate water supply and subsequently make a financial contribution 
to the WUA. Hence, in theory, upstream farmers will refrain from taking more than their 
allocated amount of water to guarantee that costs are more evenly distributed across 
farmers (Baxter 2008).  
As summarized by an agronomist,  
If water costs can be defrayed by maximizing the number of members 
within the WUA, the head-end user will have a strong financial incentive 
to keep tail-end-users happy and contributing funds to the WUA (Baxter 
2008)…If a head end farmer can obtain water at little to no cost (labor or 
money), he will have no interest in sharing water with downstream users, 
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and he will have no interest in cooperating with a Water Users‘ 
Association. In fact, he may work to destroy cooperative efforts of 
downstream users to obtain water – water that he might lose control of 
(Baxter 2005).  
 
Water Users‘ Associations 
A Water Users‘ Association (WUA) is a non-governmental, non-profit association 
of farmers or water users that is charged with the operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation and drainage network within its territory. The boundaries of the overwhelming 
majority of Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) in Kyrgyzstan correspond to the 
administrative boundaries of the district governments and former boundaries of the 
collective and state farms.
12
 The World Bank On-Farm Irrigation Project (OIP) 
coordinates Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and the creation of WUAs in 
Kyrgyzstan. To date, over 500 WUAs have been established in Kyrgyzstan.  
Since water resources are state property, WUAs are independent organizations 
that must purchase water from the Kyrgyz government (Kyrgyz Water Law 2000). The 
WUA must ascertain the amount of water needed for water users within its command 
area through demand aggregation. Specifically, before the irrigation season begins in the 
spring, each farmer is required to develop and sign a contract with the WUA for the total 
water needed; it is generally the responsibility of the WUA‘s mirabs (water masters) to 
collect these water requests. There are standards or norms as to the number of irrigations 
a particular crop should receive during the irrigation season, and these are reflected in the 
irrigation service fee (ISF). The WUA aggregates this information into one water contract 
and submits the contract to the district water department (RayVodKhoz). The 
RayVodKhoz delivers (or distributes) water to the WUA at a charge of 3 tyn
13
 per cubic 
meter.
14
 After water delivery, the mirabs distribute the water within the WUA. From 
about mid June through September, most of Southern Kyrgyzstan is on a ―strict watering 
                                                 
12
 From an ecological perspective, this is problematic because water management systems should be based 
on hydrological principles and not administrative or territorial boundaries.   
13
 One hundred tyn is equal to 1 Kyrgyz som and, given the current exchange rate, 45 Kyrgyz som equal 
one U.S. dollar.  
14
 WUAs that do not receive water from the RayVodKhoz do not pay this fee; this includes WUAs that rely 
solely on a ―natural‖ water source such as river.  
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schedule‖15 due to water scarcity, which requires additional water rotations to ensure the 
allocation of water throughout the service area (IWRM 2003).   
In Kyrgyzstan, the members of a WUA are those individuals who own the land 
that they cultivate; individuals who rent land are legally restricted from WUA 
membership. WUA members must pay ISF, care for the equipment used or owned by the 
WUA, adhere to the irrigation schedule, and contribute to the costs of repair or 
replacement for any damaged equipment (IWRM 2003).  
In theory, WUAs are designed to be community-based associations that operate in 
a democratic and transparent manner. The institutional model of the WUA requires a 
separation of power between the management and governing body. The unpaid positions 
of zonal representatives and Council members represent the ―governance‖ side of the 
WUA and are the community‘s mechanisms of ownership and control.  
WUAs are divided into ―zones‖ based on the size and distribution of the population along 
the canals within their command area. Each zone elects zonal representatives, and the 
number of zonal representatives depends on the population within the zone. A zonal 
representative is responsible for representing their zone‘s interests in the WUA meetings 
and electing approximately ten Council members, a dispute resolution committee, and an 
audit committee.
16
 The Council is the governing body of the WUA. It employs and 
supervises all salaried staff that manage the daily operation of the system.  These 
management positions include the WUA director, mirabs, accountant and hydro-
technician. The audit committee is in-charge of monitoring the financial transactions of 
the management. The dispute resolution committee mediates irrigation conflicts between 
farmers (IWRM 2003).  
The General Assembly is the annual mandatory meeting of zonal representatives. 
During the Assembly, representatives evaluate the work of the WUA leadership, conduct 
elections and discuss the budget and rehabilitation plans that have been prepared by the 
staff of the WUA. Also, the budget for the following year must be adopted by at least 
                                                 
15
 However, in some areas, March, April and May represent the most water scarce months because the 
snow has not yet melted in the mountains. 
16
 In WUAs with a small membership, the members will directly elect the Council members. 
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60% of the zonal representative;
17
 by law, the budget should be posted prior to the 
meeting for review by all WUA members (Kyrgyz Water Law 2000).  
WUAs can be characterized as a modern day form of the ―ketmen‖ associations 
that organized resource management in sedentary communities prior to the Soviets. 
Furthermore, while many components of the WUA represent new structures for water 
management, the traditional institutions of mirabs and ashar have been formally 
incorporated into the WUA. In accordance with the historical function of mirabs, in a 
WUA, the mirab holds the keys (literally) to the water gates that control the flow of water 
into and throughout a WUA‘s canal system.  They distribute water according to an 
irrigation schedule with specific dates and times for watering. Similar to the pre-colonial 
water management system, mirabs are once more responsible and accountable directly to 
the population that they serve through elections and the payment of ISF.  
Figure 2.3. WUA committee meeting (WUASP 2010) 
In relatively well-functioning WUAs, 
ashar has also re-emerged in a form that more 
closely approximates its pre-colonial past. 
Ashar is, once again, voluntary or non-
voluntary labor at the local level for irrigation 
work that takes place at least once per year. It 
generally consists of cleaning the canals or 
repairing sections of the canals in the spring before the irrigation season. Furthermore, 
ashar has been integrated into the ISF system; a labor contribution represents one method 
for paying ISF.  
Moreover, the institution of aksakal (white beard) remains highly significant in 
villages throughout Southern Kyrgyzstan. ―Aksakals‖ are community leaders, mediators 
and judges, and although they do not have to be elderly, they represent the respected men 
of the community. Aksakals continue to play an important role in mediating irrigation 
conflicts in certain communities. However, unlike mirabs, aksakals no longer hold a 
prominent formal leadership role in irrigation management. In more developed 
                                                 
17
 In  WUAs with a small membership, the members will participate directly in the General Assembly.  
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(institutionally strong) WUAs, aksakals have been integrated into the WUA structure 
through their election into the dispute resolution committees.  
In theory, the institutional design of WUAs represents an appropriate solution to 
the irrigation management problems facing Southern Kyrgyzstan. They are designed to 
be democratic and community based with a system of checks and balances for the 
leadership. Also, they officially incorporate the respected traditions and institutions of 
mirabs, aksakals, and ashar. 
 
Figure 2.4. Water-gate (WUASP 2010)                                        Figure 2.5. Field irrigation (WUASP 2010)  
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, despite the predictions of better irrigation outcomes from IMT, the 
deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure has accelerated in the post-Soviet period 
(Bichsel 2006; Envsec 2005; WB 2003). Correspondingly, empirical studies have 
identified considerable variation in the effectiveness of WUAs, revealing the failure of 
most to collect irrigation service fees (ISF) and achieve their mandate to provide 
adequate, timely, and equitable water supplies to all water users within a command area 
(Abdullaev et. al, 2008; Mott MacDonald 2005; Sehring 2008).  
To describe and illustrate these institutional weaknesses and failures, I prove a 
brief qualitative assessment of WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan along a set of institutional 
design principles developed by political scientist Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1990). These 
institutional design principles are often used as a standard for evaluating institutional 
capacity by common property resource scholars. This assessment is based on my field 
research that corroborates the studies undertaken by (Abdullaeva et. al, 2008; 
 
A WUA Director stands near a water-gate 
along a secondary canal. The mirabs 
regulate the flow of water by opening and 
closing these gates.  
This picture illustrates irrigation at the 
field level.  
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Abdulmidohvna 2004; Sehring 2007; Ul Hassan, Starkloff and Nizamedinkhodjaeva 
2004; Weigerich 2006; Zavgordnyaya 2006). 
First, institutional design principle one – Clearly defined boundaries – declares 
that a stable common pool resource regime will exhibit ―clearly defined boundaries‖ and 
the ―effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties.‖ In Kyrgyzstan, this means that 
water users should know the responsibilities and authority of the WUA management and 
have an understanding of the specific canals and irrigated land under the management of 
a WUA along with basic water use and property rights.   
Nevertheless, basic knowledge about WUAs and irrigation management is 
conspicuously absent in a majority of communities throughout Southern Kyrgyzstan. In 
many cases, individuals either do not know of the existence of the WUA or they do not 
understand its role and purpose. Whereas the WUA leadership is usually relatively 
informed, the general population is often not aware that the WUA functions as an 
independent, self-sufficient and voluntary organization. Water users often do not 
understand their voting rights and capacity to participate in decision-making concerning 
irrigation management (Aimbaeva 2004). 
Second, institutional design principle two – Proportional equivalence between 
costs and benefits – states that the rules and costs of resource appropriation should be 
based on the local ecological and social context.  This principle does not hold in many 
WUAs. In Kyrgyzstan, there is often no guarantee that an individual will receive 
adequate and on-time supplies of water. In many cases, ISF payment or nonpayment does 
not correspond to predictable or sufficient water delivery. In areas where there are weak 
or failing WUAs, water users cannot rely on the WUA to order the correct amount of 
water and to effectively distribute this water across the entire service area. The poor 
condition of canals compounds this problem. Also, given the prevalence of water-theft in 
many areas, individuals who do not pay the WUA can still acquire water through illegal 
means, thereby reducing other users‘ incentives to adhere to water distribution rules. 
Thus, the cost of water and the rules governing water distribution are not often perceived 
to be fair and consistent.   
Third, design principle three – Collective-choice arrangements – asserts that 
collective choice arrangements should be designed to allow the democratic participation 
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of a majority of resource users during rule creation and modification. By law, all WUAs 
are designed to operate in a democratic and transparent manner and should adhere to the 
required elections and meeting procedures. However, most community members are not 
aware of their status as WUA members, along with election and meeting procedures. 
Furthermore, the capacity of the WUA to actually adhere to the required election and 
meeting procedures is not feasible in many cases.  
Fourth, design principle four – Monitoring – stresses the need for effective 
resource monitoring by individuals who are accountable to the appropriators in order to 
detect rule violations.
18
  However, most WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan lack the capacity 
to effectively monitor their canals during the irrigation season. Mirabs are usually 
responsible for monitoring the extraction of water because it is not financially feasible to 
institute a water measuring system for individual farmers. However, given the size of 
most WUAs and the large number of small land plots in Kyrgyzstan, it is virtually 
impossible for a mirab to simultaneously monitor the water extractions of all farmers 
within his designated service zone. Moreover, the prevalence of ineffective and/or 
corrupt mirabs exacerbates this situation. During times of water scarcity, it is common for 
water allocation to be guided by bribery and personal contacts. Thus, many households in 
Kyrgyzstan choose to guard water gates and fields in order to detect violations in water 
extraction during periods of high water stress.  
Fifth, institutional design principle five – Sanctions – requires clear rules with 
differentiated sanctions to reflect varying levels of rule violations along with the 
consistent sanctioning of defectors in order to halt rule violation. Among WUAs in 
Kyrgyzstan, the potential sanctioning methods include: reducing water supplies for 
individual canals, stopping water supplies for individual canals, imposing fines, delaying 
an individual‘s ―irrigation turn‖ for misconduct, and community shaming. Nevertheless, 
effective sanctioning is notably absent among most WUAs due to their weak institutional 
capacity. In addition, there are social incentives for the WUA staff to avoid sanctioning 
offenders; kinship ties and intervention by village elders have been shown to limit or stop 
                                                 
18
 Monitoring is affected by the size of the area under supervision, distance between individual resource 
users, frequency of interactions between resource users, monitoring agents (or technology) and the 
homogeneity of resource activities by users. 
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the application of punishment to defectors. Also, the absence or weakness of monitoring 
in many WUAs throughout Southern Kyrgyzstan compounds the problem of sanctioning.   
Sixth, institutional design principle six – Mechanisms of conflict resolution are 
cheap and of easy access – maintains that affordable and accessible conflict-resolution 
procedures and mechanisms must be in place in order to ensure cooperative outcomes. 
The financial and social costs associated with conflict over irrigation resources are high. 
These conflicts can arise in a variety of situations and circumstances including, water 
scarcity, water theft, unequal water distribution, and arbitrary or inequitable conflict 
resolution, etc.  WUAs are legally required to have a ―dispute resolution committee‖ that 
provides farmers with a platform for voicing their concerns and resolving tensions. Also, 
a competent WUA staff is expected to supply another avenue for mediating tensions.  
Yet, many WUAs lack a well-trained staff and formal committee for dispute resolution, 
thereby damaging the perception of the WUA as a legitimate institution for conflict 
resolution.  
Seventh, institutional design principle seven – the self determination of the 
community is recognized by higher level authorities – highlights the importance of 
independent decision-making and rule creation at the local level without substantial 
interference by external authorities. Given the close relations between the local 
government authorities and leadership of the WUAs, this principle is met in many areas.  
Eight, institutional design principle eight – organization through nested 
enterprises – represents a primary long-term objective of irrigation management transfer 
in Kyrgyzstan. Given the ecological hierarchy that defines WUAs along a canal system, 
the creation of ―Federations‖ of WUAs is emphasized as an essential goal of irrigation 
management. Although several WUA Federations exist ―on paper‖ in Kyrgyzstan, their 
capacity to function independently and according to the reform guidelines is highly 
questionable.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented a brief historical overview of irrigation management in 
Central Asia and Southern Kyrgyzstan. It discussed Soviet policies, land reform and 
several institutions – ashar, mirabs and aksakals – that are important for understanding 
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contemporary water management in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Finally, the chapter provided 
important background information on Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs). 
Chapter 3 explores the international, national, regional and local factors that 
create significant obstacles to irrigation management reform in Kyrgyzstan. It also 
introduces the Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP) and describes its 
program theory and methods for improving the performance of WUAs.  
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Chapter 3 
Background on Water Users’ Associations and the Water Users’ 
Association Support Program (WUASP) 
 
 
This chapter describes the social, political and historical circumstances that 
undermine and constrain the Water User‘s Association Support Program‘s (WUASP) 
efforts to improve the performance of Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs). The first part 
of the chapter summarizes the main obstacles faced by WUAs and key explanations that 
have been put forward to explain their widespread failure to improve irrigation 
management outcomes. The second part of the chapter discusses the goals and methods 
of the Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP).  
Given the small body of rigorous research on WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan, for 
some parts of the discussion, I rely heavily on the work of a limited number of scholars 
and specialists who have significant expertise and experience in the region.  
 
Section 1: Levels of Analysis 
Overview 
To understand the primary constraints and failures of WUAs in Kyrgyzstan, it is 
necessary to examine the local, regional and national factors that influence WUA 
performance. To begin, Kyrgyzstan‘s national level policy regarding water management 
is heavily influenced by the economic and political relationship between the countries of 
Central Asia. Although this research project is focused on irrigation outcomes at the local 
level, Kyrgyzstan‘s position as the upstream country in relation to Uzbekistan establishes 
a power dynamic that has serious negative implications for efficient and equitable local 
water management. National and international politics generate perverse incentives for 
the efficient management of water, thereby creating significant challenges to the 
successful implementation of irrigation reform. 
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At the regional level, Southern Kyrgyzstan contains dozens of canal systems with 
an inherent upstream/downstream dynamic between the WUAs located on each system; a 
WUA‘s location at the beginning, middle, or end of a system explains a significant 
portion of the variation in its water availability. This ecological hierarchy creates 
positions of power and dependence throughout the irrigation system. Moreover, 
significant technical and infrastructure issues impact the distribution of water between 
WUAs.  
The local level is essentially defined by an upstream/downstream dynamic 
between water users within a WUA. Significantly, this ecological hierarchy within a 
WUA often reflects a social hierarchy which can raise an essential impediment to 
cooperation in cases where downstream farmers have no economic or social leverage to 
motivate the upstream farmers to distribute water fairly. Hence, several factors which 
influence this social or community dynamic and water management in general at the local 
level include: the residual effect of a Soviet mentality, the blue-print approach to 
implementing WUAs, and deep-rooted structural inequalities that were created, 
reinforced or exacerbated during land reform.   
 
Interviews 
Some of the information presented in this chapter comes from interviews 
completed during my field research. I conducted forty-three open and semi-structured 
interviews with individuals from a variety of organizations and geographic areas.  In 
order to attain a broad-based understanding of water management in Kyrgyzstan, these 
interviews took place in Bishkek, Osh, Jalalabad and Batken with local farmers, 
academics, community members, village leaders, WUA representatives, as well as the 
staff of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
The interviews were conducted in Russian, English, or with the help of an interpreter if 
my interlocutor spoke Kyrgyz, Uzbek or Tajik. Hence, whereas I was capable of 
independently conducting interviews with development staff and respondents in cities, 
translation assistance was essential in rural areas during my discussions with farmers and 
the WUA staff.  
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The expert interviews were intended to collect data concerning how Bishkek and 
the development community perceive irrigation challenges in Kyrgyzstan. These 
interviews provide information about how water policy problems are framed – an 
international or domestic issue – along with the recommended solutions.  My definition 
of ―expert‖ was fairly broad. It included individuals whose profession required 
considerable involvement with water management issues; this ranged from individuals 
who held more technical positions, such as agronomists and engineers, to individuals 
primarily focused on national and international policy issues. These interviews were 
conducted in English and Russian.
19
 
 
National/International-level factors 
The water-energy nexus 
Sehring (2009) argues that the Kyrgyz government is not committed to 
comprehensive irrigation reform and does not see irrigation service fees (ISF) as a 
legitimate mechanism for irrigation management. He maintains that Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) was not introduced in Kyrgyzstan because the government 
shifted its priorities in favor of efficient water distribution. Instead, a budget crisis 
motivated the adoption of IMT (Sehring 2007: 283). Since the Kyrgyz government did 
not have the resources to allocate to its water sector budget, it quickly became heavily 
reliant on donor funding from the World Bank and Asian Development. By the mid 
2000s, one government official estimated that donor funding accounted for 90% of the 
water sector budget. Furthermore, this funding is contingent on satisfying the basic 
guidelines of IMT, including the establishment of WUAs and introduction of irrigation 
service fees (ISF) (Sehring 2009: 138). 
While international donors exert significant leverage on Kyrgyzstan‘s water 
sector, the Kyrgyz government retains control of regulating the cost of water delivery 
through adjustments in the price of ISF. Currently, the government sets the ISF at an 
                                                 
19
 The expert interviews were designed to provide important context and background information. They did 
not represent the empirical material for hypotheses testing. Thus, there was no deliberate selection process 
for the interviewees; the goal was to conduct as many interviews as possible in the time available to gain a 
better understanding of the issues at hand. This clearly raises the potential for a biased representation of 
experts. However, since research on water management in Central Asia relies almost entirely on expert 
interviews and case studies, I am able to compare and supplement my findings with previous scholarship.  
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exceptionally low rate of 3 tyn per cubic measure. This rate is considered a ―symbolic‖ 
fee by international consultants since it only covers about 20% of the cost recovery needs 
for the system (Sehring 2009: 125). Moreover, the government does not actively enforce 
sanctions for delinquent ISF payments by WUAs.  
Sehring maintains that the low ISF rate is driven by the election considerations of 
officials in Parliament; water must remain cheap to keep farmers‘ votes (Sehring 2009: 
125-7). This lack of dedication to efficient water management manifests itself in the 
continued delivery of water to farmers at a very low cost which does not provide water-
users with an incentive to economize water use. ―Cheap water‖ (or water delivery) 
threatens the success of irrigation reform by removing a fundamental pillar of IMT. 
In addition to Sehring‘s claim, I put forth an argument that is encountered among 
the development community, regarding another national-level political consideration that 
has perverse implications for IMT. Drawing on interviews and informal conversations 
from my field research, I suggest that the economic and political process known as the 
―water-energy exchange nexus‖ between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan provides 
Kyrgyzstan with a strong incentive to keep water cheap for farmers, even though they 
will waste it.  
The ―water-energy exchange nexus‖ refers to the exchange of water by upstream 
countries in Central Asia for energy resources from their downstream neighbors. 
According to a 1984 Soviet protocol, which remains the regional water policy, the 
upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are entitled to 17% of the 
water resources from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, whereas Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan are slated to receive 52% and 31% respectively. This means that the 
downstream country of Uzbekistan has the right to most of the water originating from 
Kyrgyzstan before it flows into the Aral Sea Basin. This privileged allotment is based on 
Uzbekistan‘s role as a primary cotton producer in the Soviet economy, in conjunction 
with Uzbekistan‘s almost complete dependence on water sources that begin outside its 
border (Envsec 2005: 21; Sehring 2009: 78)  
 
 
 
39 
 
Figure 3.1. Water withdrawal in Central Asia (Envsec 2005) 
In accordance with the water-
energy nexus, from April through 
September, Kyrgyzstan is expected 
to release 75% of the water reserves 
collected from its Toktogul 
reservoir. This is designed to ensure 
adequate water supplies for the 
downstream countries during the 
irrigation season. From October 
through March, Kyrgyzstan‘s 
abundant water resources and mountainous topography enable the generation of hydro-
electricity through water releases. However, these winter releases are not to exceed 25% 
in order to prevent flooding in portions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and to ensure 
adequate water supplies for these downstream countries in the following summer. In 
exchange for water during the summer, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are expected to 
supply Kyrgyzstan with much needed fuels during the winter months (Envsec 2005: 21-
2). 
Several factors have complicated this arrangement. Namely, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union led to the emergence of a small, poor and militarily weak Kyrgyz state in 
contrast to a large, regionally powerful and militarily strong Uzbek state. Kyrgyzstan has 
a population of approximately five million and the smallest economy in Central Asia; the 
country‘s 2009 gross domestic product (GDP) was 11.5 billion dollars. In comparison, 
Uzbekistan is characterized as a ‗regional hegemon‘ with a population of 27 million, the 
largest armed forces in the region, and a official 2009 GDP of 71.5 billion dollars (Bond 
and Koch 2010: 543-4). Additionally, independent Kyrgyzstan is now solely responsible 
for the repair and upkeep of the reservoirs on its territory and must pay world prices for 
fossil fuels. Given Kyrgyzstan‘s dismal economic situation, it remains in a perpetual state 
of debt to Uzbekistan for natural gas supplies (Bond and Koch 2010: 545). Thus, 
Kyrgyzstan argues that the Soviet arrangement is no longer fair or financially viable; the 
cost of water versus the cost of gas and fossil fuels is not equal given the costs of 
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operating and maintaining the irrigation infrastructure. In one of my interviews, a Kyrgyz 
representative for the World Bank in Bishkek expressed the frustration felt on the Kyrgyz 
side.  
There is a problem with this idea of water as a commodity versus free 
resource in the political dimension with Uzbekistan… Why should the 
upstream pay for all of the problems when the main benefits accrue 
downstream? The situation is getting even worse because of the energy crisis 
that Kyrgyzstan faces in the winter….It is a simple model (equal payment of 
water for fuels) but they don‘t want to buy water and this is not because of 
economic reasons; they justify it because of past Soviet policies and religious
20
 
issues (WB 2008).  
 
Water has become an increasingly central component in the political dynamic 
between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In order to generate electricity for the winter, which 
reduces the need to purchase fuels from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan has an incentive to save 
water during the summer and release more during the winter. Indeed, since 1993, 
Kyrgyzstan has frequently been accused of releasing too much water during the winter, 
which results in floods for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Envsec 2005: 21-23). This 
flooding, as well as Kyrgyzstan‘s growing debt to these countries, provides Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan with two justifiable reasons for halting gas and coal deliveries to 
Kyrgyzstan in the winter (Bond and Koch 2010: 546).  
The tension has continued to escalate in recent years with Uzbekistan‘s alleged 
construction of massive storage facilities for water and Kyrgyzstan‘s threats to build two 
more hydro-electric stations that would enable the country to generate additional 
electricity that could be sold or used for the country‘s needs (Kupatadze 2009). 
Regardless of its status as a weak country, Kyrgyzstan‘s position as the upstream 
country provides it with control of critical water resources, as well as the capacity to use 
water as a strategic lever against Uzbekistan. Water is Kyrgyzstan‘s primary bargaining 
tool with Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan‘s power is greatest when Uzbekistan is threatened 
by water scarcity. As a Kyrgyz representative infamously said during a session of 
Parliament: ―We must stop fully the delivery of water to Uzbekistan during the 
vegetation period‖ (Kupatadze 1999). However, instead of engaging in a blatant and 
threatening act against a militarily strong country, Kyrgyzstan can simply increase Uzbek 
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 My informants often expressed the view that Islamic holds that water is a ―Gift from God‖ and should be 
free.  
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water scarcity by inefficiently managing/wasting irrigation water. For example, this can 
be done by allowing its WUAs to use excess water resources without imposing additional 
costs or sanctions. During wet years with high flows, Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) 
are charged the same amount as during the dry years. Thus, there is no incentive for 
farmers in Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) to economize their water use. Since the 
Kyrgyz government does not charge WUAs for the actual water that they receive, water 
is cheap, thus encouraging WUAs to inefficiently manage irrigation water. According to 
one of my sources who will remain anonymous: 
The government does not charge the WUAs for the excess water delivered 
and thus encourages the WUAs to be inefficient and wasteful of water. 
The only reason for doing this is to deliberately harm the downstream 
countries. 
 
Inexpensive water for the Kyrgyz farmers is detrimental to the domestic water 
situation for three reasons. First, Kyrgyzstan is impeding its own cost-recovery (Sehring, 
2009). According to the same source above: 
In its efforts to harm Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan also forgoes income by not 
charging for water actually delivered to the WUAs; income that is 
desperately needed to operate and maintain the main delivery system. 
 
Second, too much water is just as detrimental for crops as a shortage of water. Given the 
condition of drainage canals in Kyrgyzstan, excess water causes water logging and 
salinization, which subsequently inhibits plant growth and reduce overall crop yields 
(ICA, 2002, pp.8-10). Third, cheap water means that many WUAs get water on-demand, 
and this removes the incentive for the WUA to become a well managed organization 
(Baxter 2009: 18).   
Regardless of the reasons for ―cheap water,‖ national level political changes are 
required to raise the ISF rate for WUAs. Thus, in examining variation in WUA 
performance, it is important to remain cognizant of the factors potentially hindering 
WUA success that are well beyond the capacity of a WUA or small-scale development 
project to change. As political scientist Elinor Ostrom (1990) emphasizes: 
Differences between those who have and those who have not extricated 
themselves from (collective action) problems may also have to do with 
factors outside the domain of those affected…some groups suffer from 
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perverse incentives systems that are themselves the results of politics 
pursued by central authorities (21).  
 
Regional Issues 
Water measurement 
Effective and equitable water management requires the measurement of water 
flows and withdrawals in order to distribute and allocate water according to certain 
irrigation norms. However, Kyrgyzstan lacks the resources to overcome the significant 
technical and infrastructure challenges facing its irrigation infrastructure. Specifically, 
similar to canals, the gauging stations designed to measure water flows and withdrawals 
are in very poor condition. In 2004, one researcher in Kyrgyzstan estimated that only 139 
of the 545 water measuring stations in the entire Syr Darya basin were in working order 
(Sehring 2005: 80). Given the condition of the gauging stations, the ability of the regional 
water departments (RayVodKhoz) to measure water flows is highly questionable. The 
following field notes taken during a site visit by an American agronomist illustrate this 
problem with water measurement:  
It was obvious from my site visits that no one actually knows how much 
water is flowing down the Kojo-Kayir Canal. While there are 12 gauging 
stations, most of the stations are not functioning... The RayVodKhoz 
office has gauge charts for 8 of the 12 (stations)…the mirab for the 
RayVodKhoz has his own chart (different from the Rayvodkhoz charts) 
for a couple of the gauging stations that are sill operable. His charts show 
significantly less flow than the original gauging curves. The accuracy of 
(the mirab‘s) charts or the RayVodKhoz‘s charts is highly questionable. 
When asked how they come to a conclusion as to the actual flow, this was 
said to be ‗based on experience and mutual consent regarding flows with 
the RayVodKhoz observers‘ (Baxter 2009). 
 
In-kind payment of irrigation service fees 
Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) can pay their ISF for water delivery to the 
local water department (RayVodKhoz) using a combination of cash, labor and ―in-kind‖ 
payments of crops. The discrepancy between the percentage of ISF that a WUA is legally 
allowed to pay through an ―in-kind‖ payment and the actual percentage of ISF that most 
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WUAs pay in-kind is another factor argued to hinder the development of WUAs.
21
 
According to Kyrgyzstan‘s WUA law (2000), WUAs are allowed to pay 25% of their ISF 
to the RayVodKhoz in-kind; however, most WUAs in Kyrgyzstan pay 50-75% of their 
ISF through an in-kind payment (Baxter 2009: 5). Western analysis emphasizes the 
possibility of rent-seeking through high in-kind payments because the Director of the 
RayVodKhoz can potentially hold the crops until the market prices rise and/or sell these 
to the larger agricultural enterprises in Kyrgystan. However, many WUAs seem satisfied 
with the arrangement. From their perspective, this agreement eliminates the problems 
associated with storing, transporting and selling crops at local markets. Thus, it is 
perceived to be beneficial because many families in rural Kyrgyzstan do not have the 
resources to transport their crops, or they may find it risky to rely on selling the crops at 
the markets in order to receive cash (Abdulhamidovna 2009).  
 
Local Level 
Soviet mentality 
When irrigation reform began in Kyrgyzstan, the population‘s perception of water 
as a free and unlimited resource represented a large obstacle to Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT). The consensus among both academics and international policy 
specialists was that this ―Soviet mentality‖ had to be changed in order to promote water 
conservation and improve payment rates for irrigation service fees (ISF) (Temirkulov 
2009; UNDP 2009; USAID 2009).  
The following account illustrates how the behavioral implications attributed to 
this mentality introduced major challenges to the reform process and development work. 
The story was relayed to me by a Winrock staff member and is based on this individual‘s 
experience with Mercy Corps (an American NGO) during the early 2000s in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan.  
There was an isolated community of about 20 households in the middle of 
nowhere with no water. The cattle were so skinny because they had to 
walk such a long way to graze. So, we installed a pumping station for 
them, and one day someone called the NGO and said that there was a 
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 A portion of the ISF can be also be paid through a labor contribution. Labor has not yet been a problem 
because it comprises a small amount of the ISF contribution and the labor seems more efficient than the in-
kind payments since it provides a direct improvement to the irrigation infrastructure.  
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problem with the work that we had done and that they weren‘t getting any 
water. So the engineer went out there and called me and he said ‗Do you 
know what they have done?‘ They have created a lake!‘ They had pumped 
out all of the water! They just kept the pump running day and night, and 
they proceeded to blame us. When he asked why they did not take care of 
the (rehabilitation) site and why they just let all the water out- they replied 
that they didn‘t think the water would ever run out. He explained that they 
needed to wait until the water filled up again underground before they 
would receive water (A 2008).  
 
In an effort to change this mentality, public relations events and media campaigns 
have been introduced across the country and remain an important component of irrigation 
management reform (USAID 2009; World Bank 2009).  The public relations campaign 
seeks to inform people that water is a scarce resource, and the ISF is a payment for the 
delivery of water, not water. Nonetheless, academics and representatives of the Bishkek 
policy circles maintain that this Soviet mentality persists and represents a major reason 
why rural populations do not conserve water and pay the ISF (Aimbaeva 2004; Sehring 
2007; Temirkulov 2009; UNDP 2009; USAID 2009). 
Despite these claims, my exploratory survey project and focus groups point to an 
important shift in the population‘s mentality regarding water conservation and ISF, 
although these results are not based on probability methods. The exploratory research 
was conducted in the winter of 2008/9 and included over one thousand respondents from 
over twenty-six different WUA communities across Jalalabad, Osh and Batken oblasts. 
Whereas many individuals still believe that water should be free, they believe that the 
service of water delivery requires a payment. 
More specifically, a majority of respondents justified ISF on the basis of two 
factors. The first was that the staff of WUAs should receive compensation for their labor. 
The second reason was that improvements in the infrastructure required an ISF payment. 
Additionally, some respondents said water was government property that must be 
purchased, whereas a small number claimed that ISF payments will motivate people to 
value water more and use it in a more rational manner.  
Thus, these findings do not support the claim that delinquent ISF payment is due 
to an entrenched Soviet mentality or belief that water is a ―gift from God.‖  People are 
willing to pay ISF for the labor and infrastructure required for water delivery. Moreover, 
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there is a similar response pattern among focus group and survey participants in the 
Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP) and non-program respondents, as 
well as among individuals in Jalalabad, Osh and Batken provinces.  
Two main implications emerge from these results. First, it appears that the public 
relations campaign has produced the desired results. Second, the continued use of the 
―Soviet mentality‖ argument may be diverting attention from more valid explanations for 
the lack of ISF payment.  
 
Land Reform 
In conjunction with its move to a free market system, Kyrgyzstan initiated land 
reform in 1991 under the guidance of international donors. In many communities, land 
reform may have had significant negative implications for contemporary natural resource 
governance by creating, reinforcing or exacerbating economic and social inequality.  
Land reform involved the privatization of agricultural land through the 
dismantling of 422 collective and state farms. Initially, the first farms slated for re-
organization were those deemed ―unsuccessful‖ (Church and Roth 1996: 1-10). Land was 
assigned to individuals (private farmers) and families (peasant farming enterprises) on a 
competitive basis by local councils. These councils were generally comprised of the 
leadership of collective and state farms, and were endowed with tremendous power and 
responsibility during the process of land privatization through their control of the division 
and distribution of land and property shares (Church and Roth 1996: 16-22).   
In particular, the councils distributed land on the basis of several factors including 
soil fertility, land size, number of state or collective farm members, and the professional 
training and capacity of the applicants (Church and Roth 1996: 12). Significantly, 
individuals with the ‗professional training and capacity‘ to farm large tracts of land were 
also those individuals with the expertise and financial capability to separate from the state 
and collective farms (Church and Roth 1996: 93).  Thus, the managers, specialists and 
administrators from the state and collective farms represented the group with clear 
advantages – financially and legally – for receiving the best and largest tracts of land.    
Moreover, creating an independent farm during the initial stages of privatization 
entitled one to significant benefits. First, a presidential decree in 1992 stated that there 
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was to be no limit on land size requests for individuals leaving a state farm to establish 
their own farms. This gave independent farms the opportunity to apply for very large 
tracts of optimal land. Second, those willing to establish a farm received guaranteed 
market and state supports (Church and Roth 1996: 13). They were eligible for all 
necessary agricultural inputs – machinery, gas, seed, chemicals, etc. – at the wholesale 
prices available to state and collective farms (Church and Roth 1996: 95).  
In 1994, due to significant budget pressures and a continued decline in 
agricultural productivity, there was a renewed reform effort to dismantle and restructure 
the state and collective farms. The directives that emerged during the second reform wave 
emphasized the right of all citizens to arable land and imposed a twenty hectare 
maximum farm size in intensive agricultural zones. Twenty-five percent of the land 
remained state property while seventy-five percent of the agricultural land of the former 
collective and state farms was divided among the members of these farms based on the 
numbers of the population and total land available (Church and Roth 1996: 11-15).
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While all Kyrgyz citizens were guaranteed a plot of land and households received full 
private ownership for their home gardens, residents who had lived, but not worked, on 
the collective farm were legally slated to receive a significantly smaller tract of land. 
Farmers who received land in excess of these figures during the first wave of reforms 
were instructed to return it to the state, although it is doubtful this took place (Church and 
Roth 1996: 97). 
In summary, during land reform, the leadership and management of the state and 
collective farms were responsible for allocating potentially large tracts of the best land to 
individuals within their farms. Accordingly, in the first years of reform, those capable of 
farming independently of the collective and state farms received significant advantages to 
ensure the success of their endeavor. These circumstances created the potential for highly 
uneven and unfair land distribution, along with increased economic inequality in many 
communities (Sehring 2005; Wegerich 1996).   
 
Blue-print approach to implementing Water Users‘ Associations 
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 This means that areas with high population densities received much smaller land shares than low density 
areas. 
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I provide a brief overview of the general problems associated with a top-down 
approach to community-driven development in this section. In the context of WUAs, a 
blue-print approach implies their quick set-up, as well as a lack of time and resources 
devoted to institutional development and community-wide mobilization. For example, 
education and training efforts are focused on local political leaders and the residual 
leadership/management from Soviet era collective and state farms.  
Top-down approaches for establishing WUAs are justified on the basis of 
efficiency and affordability; individuals who either have some irrigation and agricultural 
experience are further trained with the expectation that knowledge will ―trickle down‖ to 
water users in a service area. Since most water users in Kyrgyzstan do not have much 
experience with irrigation or agriculture, the top-down method makes it feasible to 
establish hundreds of WUAs in a limited amount of time without substantial costs. 
However, scholars question whether robust institutions for common property 
resource governance will emerge from development methods that rely on the trickle-
down effect and ―one-size fits-all‖ institutions. They argue that the blue-print approach is 
an inferior method for achieving a critical mass of cooperators and ensuring that the 
benefits of cooperation and participation are well understood by a community. Instead, 
the claim is that the approach increases the potential for elite capture and produces weak 
institutions that fail to incentivize cooperation (Baland and Platteau 1994; Seabright, 
1994).  
Indeed, most WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan remain very weak institutions that 
have failed to produce the projected improvements in irrigation management (Aimbaeva 
2004; Sehring 2006).
23
 The development program of interest for this research study – the 
Water Users‘ Association Program (WUASP) – represents a correction strategy for the 
blue-print approach.  The program is designed to improve WUAs through institutional 
development, community-wide mobilization, and participatory rehabilitation.  
Section 1 Summary 
Section 1 provides information about the main factors hindering the performance 
of WUAs at the local, regional and national level. This information is important for 
understanding the obstacles facing the Water Users‘ Association Support Program 
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 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion.  
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(WUASP) in its attempt to improve the performance of WUAs. While WUASP is 
focused on improving WUA capacity at the local level, it is important to remain 
cognizant of the macro-level factors that complicate and hinder the program‘s work. In 
the following section, I describe the goals and methods of WUASP.   
 
Section 2: Methods and Goals of the Water Users’ Association Support Program 
(WUASP) 
According to the program objectives, the Water Users‘ Association Support 
Program (WUASP) seeks to strengthen Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) so that 
farmers can operate, manage and make the necessary investment decisions for 
maintaining and improving their irrigation systems. The primary proximate goal of 
WUASP is to motivate behavioral change in priority target groups (water users and 
irrigation management staff) that will result in greater irrigation management 
cooperation.
24
 The program‘s distal objective is to advance the economic condition of 
rural populations by improving a WUA‘s capacity to manage water. To achieve these 
aims, WUASP uses methods that emphasize social mobilization, institutional 
development and community-wide involvement in rehabilitation.  
In Southern Kyrgyzstan, WUASP worked with twenty-eight of the region‘s 188 
WUAs from 2004 – 2009.25 The program was funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and implemented by Winrock International, an 
American NGO with significant experience in international development work related to 
agriculture and irrigation. 
In Kyrgyzstan, WUASP was based in the city of Osh. It consisted of a country 
director, administrative assistant for the country director, three local engineers, three 
community mobilizers, one accountant, one finance specialist, one "public relations" 
specialist and five drivers. Also, American volunteers provided technical support at 
various stages of the program. Over the course of the program, the position of country 
director was held by three different people: a local Kyrgyz information technology 
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 WUASP also has a program component which is dedicated to informing policy makers at the national 
level regarding ways to improve irrigation management outcomes.  
25
 In 2004, there were approximately 150 WUAs. From 2004-2009, the World Bank created several dozen 
WUAs, bringing the 2009 total to 188.   
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specialist, an American agronomist and a female Uzbek national who had worked with 
WUASP since its launch in the late 1990s in Uzbekistan. The engineers were all from 
Southern Kyrgyzstan. They included ethnic Kyrgyz men (and one woman), as well as one 
ethnic Russian. The engineers were educated in technical fields during the Soviet era and 
did not necessarily have a specialization in irrigation.  The public relations specialist, 
grant manager, and accountant were ethnic Kyrgyz from Southern Kyrgyzstan; they were 
selected for their positions due to their proficiency in English and experience working 
with Western agencies. The two mobilizers and ―development specialist‖ were Kyrgyz 
men who were chosen for the project based on their experience in irrigation or agriculture 
during the Soviet period and/or language skills. The mobilizers speak Kyrgyz, Uzbek and 
Russian, and one mobilizer is also fluent in Tajik. All of the drivers were Uzbek.  
Several factors were explicit criteria in the selection of WUAs for the program.
26
 
First, although the treatment WUAs were not chosen on the basis of extremity, there had 
to be a problem with the WUA that could be solved through the introduction of 
management principles. For example, these problems might include disorganization or 
inactiveness among water users, as well as a general lack of understanding regarding the 
WUA and irrigation management. Also, there needed to be relatively significant 
infrastructure issues that could be addressed through emergency rehabilitation. Given the 
poor performance and substantial infrastructure issues that characterize most WUAs in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan, these were not difficult criteria. Ultimately, this meant WUASP 
tried to avoid selecting WUAs where other development programs were involved in 
heavy infrastructure projects, as well as successful WUAs or those on the verge of 
collapse.    
Second, after WUASP initiated several WUA projects, subsequent WUASP 
selections took into account whether a WUA was located along the same canal as other 
WUAs in the program. This translates into a situation where treatment WUAs are 
clustered together, though not necessarily located next to one another. Third, WUASP did 
not select WUA with excessively high debt levels because this was viewed as an 
indicator of an unfavorable community dynamic. Fourth, there are cases where the 
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 The methodological implications for the selection criteria are explicitly addressed in empirical Chapters 5 
and 6.  
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leadership of a WUA presented a petition to WUASP.  Although this did not guarantee 
acceptance into the program, it increased a WUA‘s chance of being considered for the 
program.  Finally, the WUA selections made by WUASP in 2008 were based largely on 
one requirement: the presence of large areas of unproductive land that could be brought 
back into production through infrastructure rehabilitation.  
The three standard components of WUASP include emergency technical 
rehabilitation, institutional development of WUAs and social mobilization. According to 
the theory underlying WUASP, all WUA members and direct beneficiaries should have 
basic information and skills to solve the irrigation problems facing their community.  
Thus, social (or community) mobilization is the essential foundation for the project, and, 
in Kyrgyzstan, it ranged from three months to six months for WUAs selected for the 
program before 2008.
27
 During this process, ―mobilizers‖ are tasked with building good 
relationships and trust with the local community. This requires mobilizers to spend 
extended periods of time in villages and to interact with a sizeable portion of the 
population through discussions and trainings on (1) the substance and goals of WUAs (2) 
the Kyrgyz Law on WUAs (3) specific water problems faced by the community and (4) 
ways to improve local irrigation management. The pictures below show WUASP training 
sessions in three WUAs (WUASP, 2010).  
Figure 3.2. WUASP training A              Figure 3.3. WUASP training B         Figure 3.4. WUASP training C 
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 For WUAs selected after 2008, the community mobilization process was drastically shorter – ranging 
from two weeks to one month. This difference for the 2008 selections can be attributed to a change in the 
donor (USAID) requirements. The WUASP program was scheduled to end in 2008; however, USAID 
provided a one year project extension with the stipulation that WUASP must bring several thousand 
hectares of land back into production. Therefore, WUASP changed its WUA selection criteria to include 
WUAs with large tracts of land that were no longer cultivated due to a lack of irrigation water. Given the 
one year time limit and extension requirement, WUASP focused almost entirely on rehabilitation work in 
the 2008 WUAs.  Accordingly, I explore the implications and significance of this qualitatively different 
treatment for the WUAs selected in 2008 in Empirical Chapter 6 and Analysis Chapter 7. 
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In comparison to months of development support received by the treatment 
WUAs
28
, the standard development help received by most WUAs in Kyrgyzstan includes 
a basic set of World Bank trainings and seminars that vary from one day to two weeks 
and are concentrated on the leadership of the Water Users‘ Association (i.e. the Director 
and Council members).  According to the program guidelines, WUASP mobilizers 
initially focus their efforts on individual water users. Next, they organize groups of the 
most ―active‖ water users for further education with the expectation that these active 
community members will continue the educational program throughout the community.  
The institutional development phase of WUASP is simply a version of the social 
mobilization that is focused on the WUA staff. The WUASP mobilizers, community 
development specialist, engineers and grants manager help to ensure that elections are 
held and positions filled for the WUA‘s governance and management posts. WUASP 
conducts trainings with the WUA staff on topics ranging from national WUA laws to 
WUA governance procedures; it informs the staff of their responsibilities and teaches the 
leadership how to conduct the mandatory election/assembly procedures.  
Once sufficient progress has been made with social mobilization and institutional 
development, WUASP initiates ―cement and stone‖ emergency infrastructure projects. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the program allocated approximately 3 million som (86,000 USD) for the 
infrastructure work in each WUA. The emergency rehabilitation generally involves the 
reinforcement of old canals to improve the efficiency of water flow and the installation of 
new water-gates to promote greater control of water distribution and reduce unsanctioned 
water withdrawals. Given sufficient time and resources, these infrastructure projects can 
also include the construction of new canals or an office for the WUA.   
WUASP‘s rehabilitation requires community participation and can be 
conceptualized as a more advanced phase of social mobilization and institutional 
development. First, a quorum of WUA members must select and vote on the irrigation 
repairs. Ideally, rehabilitation sites should be areas where there is the most extreme need, 
and they should also be dispersed across the beginning, middle and end of the canal. 
After the WUA members select the sites, WUASP engineers and the grant manager 
create a rehabilitation plan and budget. Several sites are usually eliminated due to budget 
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 This is not including the 2008 selections.  
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concerns; this requires another round of voting by WUA members. This process is 
designed to increase community participation in WUA decision-making and promote a 
sense of ownership for the WUA.  
Once the sites are selected, WUASP guides the staff of the WUA through the 
procurement process for the rehabilitation grants. For each step of the actual 
rehabilitation process, the WUA is required to develop a budget and list of necessary 
supplies for each rehabilitation site before WUASP disperses the grant money.  WUASP 
helps the WUA find product suppliers and demonstrates several methods for checking 
product quality. After each purchase, the grant manager reviews the receipts for the 
purchases and the actual supplies purchased. Besides ensuring accountability, this 
process is designed to help the WUA develop better accounting practices and business 
skills. Also, this conditional transfer of funds at each stage of the project has been 
suggested as a way to stop elite capture.  
Finally, since WUASP grants are relatively small, contractors cannot be hired to 
complete the rehabilitation. Therefore, community members must implement most of the 
rehabilitation projects through voluntary community labor known as ―ashar,‖ which has a 
long history in Central Asia (see Chapter 2). WUASP engineers oversee the work and 
teach the WUA staff and water users how to complete fundamental tasks such as cement 
mixing/preparation, canal lining and water gate installation. In theory, the rehabilitation 
process is designed to impart fundamental knowledge and skills to local water users 
while creating a sense of ownership for the canal infrastructure. 
Figure 3.5. Ashar (WUASP, 2010)                                             Figure 3.6. New water-gate (WUASP, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we see the use of ashar for canal 
rehabilitation, as well as the poor 
condition of the canal.  
This is a ribbon-cutting ceremony for 
the celebration of a community’s 
recently completed water-gate. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the primary problems hindering the success of Water 
Users‘ Associations (WUAs) at the national, regional and local level. I also provided 
relevant background information on the Water Users‘ Association Support Program 
(WUASP).  The following chapter presents hypotheses regarding WUASP‘s effect on 
WUA performance.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 
Background 
This dissertation is an applied study that investigates the impact of an 
international development program on irrigation management outcomes in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan. The Water Users‘ Association Program (WUASP) seeks to improve 
irrigation management outcomes by (1) building the institutional capacity of Water 
Users‘ Associations (WUAs) (2) and fostering cooperation among water users. These 
goals are not mutually exclusive; a stronger WUA is expected to motivate greater 
cooperation in irrigation management, and improved collective action should enhance a 
WUA‘s capacity.  
Collective action is defined as the pursuit of a goal, or set of goals, by more than 
one individual. A collective action dilemma arises when individuals in a group have a 
choice between participating in the provision of a resource or not participating (―free-
riding‖) and thereby receiving benefits while other members of the group pay the costs 
(Olson 1965).  The emergence of a collective action problem along an irrigation system is 
fostered by both the rivalry in water consumption between farmers and inability to 
prevent upstream farmers from taking unfair amounts of water. In particular, irrigation 
infrastructure and water are characterized as ―common property resources‖ because they 
are public goods that are ―non-excludable‖ and ―rival.‖ First, the incredibly high cost of 
regulating access to water means that it is often very difficult or impossible to exclude 
individuals within a group from using the resource.
29
  Second, there is competition 
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 For example, this is not true in cases where the irrigation water is supplied through a pumping system to 
individual farmers. In that case, it is possible to exclude individual farmers from irrigation water by simply 
not pumping water onto their fields. If water-gates are in good condition, the flow of water along the main 
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among users because the use of one unit of the resource by one member of society 
reduces its availability for another (Hardin 1968).  
The fundamental collective action problem that arises in an irrigation system is 
often initially centered on free-riding by farmers at the beginning of a canal system when 
there is an absence of incentives to cooperate and supply water to downstream farmers. 
Subsequently, users at the end of a system who do not receive an adequate water supply 
will also pursue non-cooperative strategies to secure their access to water. Thus, non-
cooperative behavior by farmers located at the beginning of an irrigation system 
generates a cascade effect of free-riding. This dynamic leads to social costs, a decreased 
water supply, and reduced incentives to contribute to the upkeep and maintenance of the 
irrigation system. Eventually, the infrastructure deteriorates and water supply decreases 
to the detriment of all water users (DiGregorio and McCarthy 2004).   
In order to understand how WUASP enhances the capacity of WUAs, it is 
necessary to achieve a better understanding of the program‘s influence on variables that 
have an effect on collective action in natural resource governance. In this chapter, I use 
theoretical arguments from the program theory guiding WUASP together with common 
property resource literature to develop hypotheses concerning the influence of the 
program affects the variables argued to promote collective action. In particular, I develop 
hypotheses about the program effect on four individual behavioral mechanisms, which 
function as precursors to improved collective action.  Behavioral mechanisms represent 
micro or individual level processes linking the program to the performance outcomes of 
interest; these help to explain the presence or absence of variation in cooperative capacity 
and the performance of WUAs. The following mechanisms are explored in this study: (1) 
knowledge regarding the WUA and irrigation management, (2) participation in the 
WUA, (3) attitudes concerning WUA capacity and ownership roles, and (4) social 
capital. These hypotheses serve as the basis of my empirical analysis for Chapters 5 and 
6.  
Water Users’ Associations and Collective Action Outcomes 
                                                                                                                                                 
and secondary canals can be regulated at specific nodes along the system, though not between individual 
fields.  
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The mechanisms driving the collective action problems inherent in common 
property resource management are often framed in economic terms such as benefits, 
costs, risks and incentives. It is assumed that individuals will cooperate and coordinate in 
natural resource governance if the benefits outweigh the costs. These cost and benefit 
calculations are affected by a plethora of factors including: social norms, socio-economic 
features, user group and resource characteristics, the history of resource management and 
cooperation, informal rules and traditions, and the capacity of formal institutions 
(Ostrom, Garner and Walker 1994).  
Common property resource scholarship‘s emphasis on the potential for 
institutional arrangements to alter individual‘s cost-benefit analysis in favor of 
cooperation is of particular significance for my project. Institutions are a coordination 
mechanism or ―structured bargaining forum‖ that enables individuals to more efficiently 
organize their actions for the successful governance of natural resources. Effective 
institutions promote consistency of behavior and reduce the large transaction costs arising 
from the decentralized coordination of an activity within a group (Ostrom 1990; White 
and Runge 1994). Although common property resource scholars assert that there is no 
single best strategy to promote cooperation, research has shown that local institutions are 
often a significant advancement over other methods of resource governance (Ostrom 
2009). 
Accordingly, Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) are formal institutions 
structured and implemented to constrain and shape interactions among water users (see 
Chapter 3). They are defined by a set of rules, specific organizational structure, and 
governance procedures. WUAs are supported, in theory, by a country‘s legal system. The 
assumption guiding existing policy discourses on irrigation reform is that the 
establishment of WUAs, in combination with the introduction of irrigation service fees 
(ISF), will motivate efficient and equitable irrigation management (Degnbol et. al, 2006). 
Theoretically, while WUAs represent the necessary institutional structure and democratic 
foundation for water governance, the ISF incentivizes efficient water distribution and 
ensures cost-recovery for the operation and maintenance of the system (Sehring 2008).  
Since farmers must pay a non negligible fee for water delivery, the assumption is that 
they will economize water use. Moreover, to avoid losing ISF contributions for water 
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delivery from downstream farmers, upstream users are expected to refrain from violating 
water-schedules, thereby proving an adequate supply of water for end-users (see Chapter 
3). In addition, the democratic and transparent decision-making in the WUAs, in 
conjunction with the ISF, is anticipated to generate a sense of ownership for the system, 
as well as increase participation in natural resource governance. Since farmers must pay 
for their supply of water and cover the cost of system repairs and equipment, the 
assumption is that they will play a more active role in irrigation management and be more 
vigilant about monitoring the condition of irrigation infrastructure (see Chapter 3).  
In Kyrgyzstan, the transfer of responsibility for irrigation management from the 
state to local WUAs exemplifies a community-driven development (CDD) approach. 
Important challenges have been raised about this approach to natural resource 
governance. In particular, the blue-print (or top-down) method used to implement many 
CDD projects is often a primary source of concern and criticism. The blue-print approach 
is characterized by rapid institutional set-up that is focused on a pre-existing set of 
community leaders. The claim is that this method generates weak institutions, opens the 
door for elite capture, and encourages a tradeoff between equity and efficiency. 
Indeed, there is tremendous variation in the performance of WUAs; numerous 
WUAs are failing to achieve their mandates of equitable and efficient water distribution 
across a command area. Despite the predictions of better irrigation outcomes from IMT, 
the deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure has accelerated in the post-Soviet period 
(Bichsel 2006; Envsec 2005; ICA 2003). Correspondingly, empirical studies have 
identified considerable variation in the effectiveness of WUAs, revealing the failure of 
most to collect irrigation service fees (ISF) and achieve their mandate to provide 
adequate, timely, and equitable water supplies to all water users within a command area 
(Abdullaev et. al, 2008; Mott MacDonald 2005; Sehring 2008). 
Despite these concerns, dominant policy and development discourses from the 
implementing agencies and donors continue to promote community-driven development 
as the necessary solution for improving development outcomes. Furthermore, the absence 
of rigorous independent impact assessments of most community-driven development 
projects contributes to the ambiguity regarding its effect (Platteau and Gasparat 2003).  
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Consequently, my program evaluation of WUASP allows us to gain useful 
insights into community-driven development through an investigation of the conditions 
under which CDD may promote more desirable development outcomes. Namely, 
WUASP represent a correction for the blue-print approach to establishing WUAs. The 
program is designed to foster the capacity of WUAs through international development, 
social mobilization and participatory rehabilitation efforts that are directed at all 
categories of water users (see Chapter 3).  
In particular, according to the theory underlying WUASP, all WUA members and 
direct beneficiaries should have basic information and skills to solve the irrigation 
problems facing their community. Thus, social (or community) mobilization is the 
essential foundation for the project, and, in Kyrgyzstan, it ranged from three months to 
six months for WUAs selected for the program before 2008. Moreover, the institutional 
development phase of WUASP is simply a version of the social mobilization that is 
focused on the WUA staff. The WUASP mobilizers, community development specialist, 
engineers and grants manager help to ensure that elections are held and positions filled 
for the WUA‘s governance and management posts. WUASP conducts trainings with the 
WUA staff on topics ranging from national WUA laws to WUA governance procedures; 
it informs the staff of their responsibilities and teaches the leadership how to conduct the 
mandatory election/assembly procedures.  
Furthermore, WUASP‘s rehabilitation requires community participation and can 
be conceptualized as a more advanced phase of international development and social 
mobilization. Specifically, the rehabilitation motivates irrigators to work collectively on 
physical capital investments in order to strengthen social cohesion, as well as a sense of 
self-governance. Also, WUASP implements a sequential and conditional release of funds 
for infrastructure repair. Thus, the program‘s methods have been cited as important ways 
to avoid elite capture and address many concerns associated with community-driven 
development (Baland and Platteau 1996; Sarker and Ioh 2001).  
Given the community mobilization, institutional development and rehabilitation 
procedures undertaken in WUASP sites and their absence in control sites, I expect better 
collective action outcomes in WUASP-supported WUAs. Hence, the fundamental 
hypothesis tested in this dissertation is as follows: 
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H Collective Action Outcomes: WUASP-supported WUAs exhibit better collective action 
outcomes than control WUAs that only received top-down development support.  
 
Section 1: Identifying and Testing the Mechanisms 
In order to understand how the Water Users‘ Association Support Program 
(WUASP) can influence the performance of Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs), it is 
necessary to test several variables linking WUASP to cooperation in natural resource 
governance. Common property scholars have identified a multitude of factors that alter 
individual‘s costs and benefits for cooperation. These variables have both a direct and 
indirect effect
30
 on collective action (Agrawal 2002). The expectation is that WUASP 
affects development outcomes through its direct or mediated effect on a subset of these 
variables. 
This section describes how four individual behavioral mechanisms – knowledge, 
participation, attitudes, and social capital – can effect cooperation and how WUASP‘s 
methods are designed to influence each of these mechanisms. These four mechanisms are 
derived primarily from WUASP‘s program theory, which corresponds to the general 
theoretical framework guiding community development approaches. They also represent 
fundamental collective action variables of interest for common property resource 
scholars.  
In general, WUASP‘s methods are anticipated to have a positive effect on each of 
these four mechanisms, thereby modifying individual‘s cost/benefit analysis in favor of 
cooperation. Enhanced cooperation is subsequently expected to promote distal 
development goals such as improved crop production and economic benefits for rural 
communities. In particular, WUASP can directly affect the mechanisms through 
community mobilization and rehabilitation work, or indirectly through institutional 
development. Although this study can test whether there is evidence of a particular 
behavioral change in program sites, it is beyond the scope of this project to specify and 
test a causal pathway that links WUASP to these four individual behavioral mechanisms 
                                                 
30
 In the empirical analysis, this indirect effect is also referred to as an interaction, mediated or 
heterogeneous treatment effect.  
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and collective action outcomes.
31
 Indeed, collective action outcomes are influenced by 
complex interactions between these behavioral mechanisms. 
In the second main section of this chapter, I move from a description of 
WUASP‘s effect on individual level behaviors to a discussion of important contextual 
variables that may mediate WUASP‘s effect on collective action outcomes. These 
potential mediating factors include a WUA‘s population and land size, economic 
inequality, social heterogeneity, and ecological scarcity.  
A reminder about terminology: WUASP represents the ―treatment,‖ and the 
WUAs where WUASP was implemented represent the treatment groups or sites. 
Correspondingly, WUAs where WUASP was not implemented serve as ―control‖ sites or 
groups.
32
 For my discussion of the mechanisms, the control sites represent WUAs that 
only received basic World Bank institutional support. The treatment WUAs received both 
basic World Bank support and the WUASP treatment.  
 
Knowledge 
Scholars assert that knowledge is a critical pre-requisite for successful collective 
action because it ensures a more accurate understanding of the costs and benefits of 
cooperation (Hardin 1995). Moreover, better cooperation is expected in situations where 
resource users share a common understanding of how the resource system operates and 
how individual actions affect each other and the system (Ostrom 2009). Thus, water users 
should be cognizant of basic information regarding the important structural and 
individual-level factors that influence the governance of their community‘s irrigation 
water. Knowledge of a WUAs rules and decision-making procedures is predicted to 
encourage participation in meetings and increase understanding of the advantages 
associated with active involvement in an effective WUA.  
Accordingly, WUASP seeks to improve water-users‘ knowledge of the WUA and 
irrigation management directly through social mobilization and the participatory 
rehabilitation process. The program can also indirectly improve knowledge through 
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 Therefore, in empirical Chapter 6, I attribute statistically significant discrepancies in the mechanism 
estimates for treatment versus control groups to a positive program association.  
32
 Chapters 5 and 6 include more detailed discussions of how control WUAs were determined for the two 
research designs used in the dissertation.  
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institutional development that leads to a more informed management staff, zonal 
representatives and Council members. Given the community mobilization, institutional 
development and rehabilitation procedures undertaken in WUASP sites and their absence 
in control sites, I hypothesize that respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP will be more 
knowledgeable about the WUA and basic irrigation management in comparison to 
control respondents. 
H Knowledge: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP are more knowledgeable 
about the WUA and irrigation management than respondents in control WUAs 
that only received the top-down development support. 
 
Participation 
Greater participation in a WUA is expected to increase knowledge and awareness 
of a resource system and the community dynamics influencing its management. Also, the 
participation of water users in decision-making regarding irrigation governance is 
predicted to increase their likelihood of following the rules and monitoring others 
(Ostrom and Nagendra 2007). Scholars claim that the dedication of time and energy in 
the WUA, in conjunction with participatory and transparent decision-making will create a 
sense of ownership for the WUA and irrigation infrastructure, thereby increasing 
investment in the organization and reducing the probability that individuals damage the 
irrigation structures (Sehring 2008). 
Furthermore, active participation in natural resource governance encourages 
dialogue and face-to-face communication. Multiple common property resource studies 
have shown that communication alone can have a significant positive effect on collective 
action outcomes; the effect is particularly salient in repeated settings (Basurto and 
Ostrom 2009; Ostrom and Walker 1991; Ostrom et.al, 1994). In particular, there are 
multiple mechanisms linking communication to cooperation; communication can be used 
for moral suasion, and it helps build a sense of collective/group solidarity. Moreover, 
individuals can make conditional promises during face-to-face communication that 
provides an opportunity to build trust over time (Ostrom 1998).  
Correspondingly, a primary WUASP objective is to increase community 
involvement in the WUA. During social mobilization, the program should inform water-
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users of ways to become involved in the WUA, along with the benefits from active 
participation. Also, WUASP emergency rehabilitation procedures require community 
involvement for the selection of rehabilitation sites. Given the required vote from a 
quorum of WUA members for the selection of rehabilitation sites, we expect individuals 
to participate in WUA meetings and to vote for rehabilitation sites that have the most 
direct impact on their fields. Moreover, the community must also contribute labor for the 
sites because WUASP only provides small grants that cover the costs of materials. In 
theory, this process is structured to impart fundamental knowledge and skills to local 
water users while creating a sense of ownership for the canal infrastructure. This 
voluntary labor contribution is known as ―ashar.‖ As discussed in Chapter 2, ashar 
represents an important traditional institute for irrigation management in collective 
action. Thus, WUASP methods are drawing on and encouraging local and historical 
institutions.  
By improving the institutional capacity of the WUA, the program can also have 
an important indirect effect on participation levels. Knowledge of election procedures and 
voting rights is of little use in cases where the WUA is too underdeveloped to allow 
members the opportunity to participate. Alternatively, an effective WUA should conduct 
the required election and assembly procedures to enable members to voice their 
preferences.  
Finally, by increasing involvement in the WUA, we expect WUASP to motivate 
greater dialogue among water users. Communication is costly; however, WUASP absorbs 
this cost by investing the time and effort to create and maintain opportunities for face-to-
face communication through educational trainings, elections, and meetings for the 
approval and planning of rehabilitation sites.  
Given the community mobilization, institutional development and rehabilitation 
procedures undertaken in WUASP sites and their absence in control sites, I hypothesize 
that respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP will exhibit higher participation levels in 
comparison to the control groups. 
H Participation: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP are more active 
participants in the WUA than respondents in control WUAs that only received the 
top-down development support.  
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Attitudes 
The third mechanism I analyze is attitudes concerning two issues that influence 
cost/benefit calculations for cooperation. First, there is an assessment of community 
responsibility for the success of a local WUA. Second, there is an individual‘s perception 
of the benefits provided by their local WUAs.
33
  
WUA ownership 
To begin, there is an expectation that democratic and transparent decision-making 
in the WUA, along with the mandatory irrigation service fee (ISF) requirement, will 
create a sense of ownership for the WUA and infrastructure among water users. 
Accordingly, natural resource scholars maintain that the sustainability of common 
property regimes can be supported by this sense of ownership and responsibility. These 
sentiments are claimed to encourage participation in the organization, monitoring of the 
infrastructure, reductions in damage to the system and more consistent application of 
effective sanctions (Meinzen-Dick et. al, 2000; Ul Hassan et. al, 2004).  
Accordingly, WUASP‘s social mobilization and participatory rehabilitation are 
anticipated to increase water users‘ awareness of their responsibility for the long-term 
success of the WUA. A more knowledgeable and informed population should display a 
greater sense of ownership and understanding of the community‘s responsibility for the 
WUA. 
Advantages from an effective WUA 
The second factor is water users‘ perceptions of the benefits associated with 
cooperation in natural resource governance, as well as involvement with the WUA. 
Individual rationality dictates that a water-user will only participate in a voluntary 
cooperative arrangement, such as a WUA, if it is perceived to be profitable or beneficial 
over time.  Individuals must believe that the benefits of behaving cooperatively (i.e. 
participating in and adhering to the rules of WUAs) outweigh the costs of noncompliance 
and continuing a decentralized decision-making process. Consequently, effective 
institutions can motivate collective action by changing incentives for cooperation; they 
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 This is not an attempt to test the program effect on the institutional capacity of a WUA by aggregating up 
from the individual responses. Here I am simply focusing on individuals‘ perceptions of irrigation 
management.  
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can increase the perceived benefits of cooperation, while simultaneously raising the costs 
of noncompliance.  
Thus, attitudes about the institutional capacity of a WUA can affect cost/benefit 
calculations for cooperation. If water users believe that the WUA is an effective 
institution with the capacity to ensure the fair and efficient distribution of irrigation 
water, they may refrain from non-cooperative behaviors such as bribery, water theft, or 
the destruction of irrigation infrastructure. Indeed, the vast body of empirical and 
theoretical common property resources scholarship highlights the importance of 
institutional effectiveness for collective action outcomes (see Chapter 3).  
WUASP‘s methods of institutional development are designed to improve the 
capacity of WUAs to perform basic tasks. Moreover, by improving knowledge and 
participation, resource users are expected to understand more clearly the benefits 
associated with an effective WUA, including the provision of an adequate water supply, 
monitoring, sanctioning for rule violations, and conflict mediation.  
Given the community mobilization, institutional development and rehabilitation 
procedures undertaken in WUASP sites, I hypothesize that respondents in treatment sites 
will exhibit greater confidence that their WUA provides benefits for their community as 
well as exhibit more responsibility for their local WUA.  
H Attitudes: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP express more positive 
attitudes about the WUA and irrigation management in comparison to those in 
control sites.  
 
Social Capital 
Community dynamics have a fundamental impact on the ability of user groups to 
solve collective action problems and develop institutional arrangements for natural 
resource governance. The study of ―social capital‖ represents the attempt of applied 
researchers to systematize the effects of social and communal relations on cooperation. 
Social capital is the fourth and final mechanism under investigation in my dissertation. 
There are multiple definitions of social capital. Putnam (1995) defines social 
capital as ―features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that 
facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit‖ (p.67). Krishna (2004) defines 
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social capital as the ―quality of human relations within some well-defined social group 
that enables members of this group to act in cooperation with one another for achieving 
mutual benefits‖ (p.2). Broadly speaking, social capital represents relationships between 
people that are characterized by trust, norms of reciprocity and social networks that can 
be mobilized for achieving individual or collective benefits (Krishna 2004; Coleman 
1990) It is an intangible asset or value that arises from networks of social relationships; 
groups with a high degree of social capital can use it to acquire financial and human 
capital resources that subsequently promote cooperation and economic development 
(Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993).  
Two of the key drivers of social capital are communication and repeated 
interactions in the context of a collaborative process (Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 
2008). Communication helps promote understanding, which is a necessary condition for 
building respect. Repeated interactions can promote trust and reciprocity through 
reputational effects.  Overall, relations of trust, reciprocity, understanding, respect, 
transparency, and predictability are all factors that generate social capital (Meizen-Dick, 
DiGregorio and McCarthy 2004: 204-206).  
Common property resource scholars point to a strong association between social 
capital and successful collective action. In particular, empirical studies find that positive 
community dynamics explain a substantial amount of the variation in natural resource 
and development outcomes (Agrawal 1994; Krishna 2004). The claim is that social 
capital facilitates collective action by decreasing the costs of cooperation. It reduces the 
moral hazard and opportunism that characterize inter-personal dynamics (Quibria 2003) 
and minimizes transaction costs through the mechanisms of reciprocity, individual 
reputations and trust (Ostrom 2009). Hence, social capital is a subject of primary interest 
in collective action research because it is perceived to be a method for overcoming social 
dilemmas inherent in natural resource governance (Ostrom 2008). 
Social norms, which represent one form of social capital, impact individual 
preferences and limit the range of accepted behaviors for self-interested individuals 
(Baland and Platteau 1996). More specifically, norms, such as fairness and reciprocity, 
are internal values or expectations about whether certain actions are right or wrong 
(Coleman 1987: 135). They imply certain behaviors or conduct that should be followed if 
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an individual seeks to avoid sanctioning or punishment by a community (Coleman 1988). 
Norms can reduce non-cooperative behavior if the penalties associated with their 
violation are costly and punishment is relatively certain. Effective punishments include 
social estrangement or exclusion that results in public humiliation, shame, as well as loss 
of prestige, status or respect (Krishna 2004; Ostrom 1998; Platteau 2008; Quibria 2003; 
Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 2008).  
Ultimately, social capital enables actors to forego short run benefits for longer-
term interests and mitigates many of the factors that contribute to the emergence of the 
free-rider dilemma (Ostrom et.al, 1994; Quibria 2003; Wagner, Fernandez-Gimenez 
2008). Scholars argue that social capital is especially important for motivating successful 
collective action in cases where there is an absence of formal legal systems and/or well-
defined legal property rights (Katz 2000). Specifically, historically based social capital 
can substitute for legal property rights; ―it fosters a sense of ownership and respect for 
boundaries and provides the foundation for use rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms‖ (Katz 2000: 114).   
Nevertheless, much debate surrounds the concept of social capital and its usage in 
collective action research. There are three primary problems. First, there is no single 
agreed upon definition of social capital; it remains a conceptually ambiguous term. This 
problem can be attributed to the abstract nature of social capital, which is used to refer to 
everything related to social embeddedness and/or social interactions (Ostrom 2007). 
Accordingly, the second issue is how to quantify or ―operationalize‖ such an abstract 
concept. Developing a valid and reliable measure of social capital presents serious 
methodological challenges.  
Third, there is a fundamental endogeneity problem related to social capital. Social 
capital manifests itself in many of the same behaviors attributed to successful collective 
action, but scholars often fail to make a clear distinction between social capital and 
collective action. In particular, social capital is often conceptualized as trust, norms of 
reciprocity and individual networks that provide individual and collective benefits. 
Hence, higher levels of social capital are argued to promote greater collective action. 
However, collective action can also generate trust, norms of reciprocity, etc; this means 
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that social capital is a potential outcome of collective action (Wagner and Ferdandez-
Gimez 2008: 2).  
Therefore, the problem is that the causes and effects of social capital feedback on 
each other so that the argument becomes circular; social capital is sometimes treated as 
the cause or independent variable when it is actually the dependent variable of interest. 
For example, Ostrom (2008) states that social capital is a way to understand how 
―cultural, structural and institutional aspects of small to large groups in a society interact 
and affect individual incentives and behavior.‖ Thus, greater associational or institutional 
ties are purported to signal greater social capital. Yet, associational ties are also 
understood as a reflection of social capital that helps solve social dilemmas and reduce 
conflict. Thus, the question becomes: did the institution create the social capital or did the 
social capital create the institution? The most likely explanation is that there is a feedback 
effect between social capital and effective institutions, which means that it is extremely 
difficult (or impossible in some circumstances) to isolate the effect of social capital on 
economic and political change. 
Without discounting the conceptual and methodological problems that 
characterize the analysis of social capital, empirical work by common property resource 
scholars, as well as my own research, highlights the crucial role that community 
dynamics play in explaining variation in collective action outcomes. While there remains 
tremendous room for improvement in the study of social capital, this dynamic must be 
addressed in common property resource scholarship. Furthermore, although my project is 
subject to the first two criticisms discussed above, I avoid much of the third major 
criticism by exploring the treatment effect on social capital with a completely different 
data source than the data-set used to investigate collective action outcomes.  
Indeed, international development represents one area where scholars see an 
especially crucial need to develop a solid theory to explain how social capital affects 
individual behavior. In resource-poor Kyrgyzstan, most WUAs do not have the technical 
and financial capacity to adequately monitor water-theft and enforce sanctions for rule 
violations. In such areas, dialogue, social sanctioning and everyday social interactions are 
claimed to form an especially critical base for collective action. Given weaknesses in 
formal institutions, social norms and a community‘s sanctioning system can operate as 
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the informal institutions that maintain and support cooperation (Sehring 2003; Ul Hassan 
et.al, 2004). While aid agencies have spent billions of dollars on physical capital 
investments, there has been a gradual realization that an appropriate community dynamic 
is essential for reaching broader economic development goals. Thus, donors and 
implementing agencies have begun to emphasize the importance of building social 
infrastructure and trust prior to physical capital investments (Gibson, Williams, and 
Ostrom 2005; Woolcock 1998). 
According to WUASP‘s program theory, the program‘s methods are designed to 
build or strengthen community relations. In particular, the program aims to promote 
greater participation in WUA governance, in conjunction with increasing community 
knowledge and awareness by information exchange. Moreover, social mobilization 
includes face-to-face communication through educational seminars, meetings and 
discussions. Consequently, repeated interactions and communication are important 
mechanisms for building trust and establishing community generated rules and norms for 
water management. In addition, the community involvement in the planning and 
implementation stages of emergency rehabilitation is designed to encourage repeated 
interactions that build ―connectedness‖ within a collective framework. Overall, 
communication and repeated interactions through community mobilization and 
collaborative processes are argued to promote understanding, respect and, in the long run, 
trust and reciprocity (Baland and Platteau 1994). Finally, by developing institutional 
capacity, WUASP can help a WUA appeal to the social norms in its community. For 
example, WUASP has introduced ―community shaming‖ boards that note cases of non-
payment for irrigation service fees. Cooperation can be encouraged if defectors are made 
public in a system where social ostracism is costly.   
Given the congruence between WUASP program methods and theoretical 
arguments about the factors that promote social capital, I hypothesize that the program 
will have a positive effect on social capital.   
H Social Capital: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP exhibit more 
cooperative communal behaviors regarding irrigation water in comparison to 
those in control sites.  
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Section 2: Mediating Variables (size, heterogeneity, ecological scarcity) 
In addition to investigating direct or average program effects, my project explores 
whether WUASP‘s effect on collective active outcomes was dependent on a WUA‘s size, 
economic and social heterogeneity, as well as ecological scarcity. Although the influence 
of resource scarcity is a less contentious issue, there remains a great deal of empirical and 
theoretical debate regarding these other three factors on cooperation in the common 
property resource literature (Ostrom 2009). My project provides an opportunity to test 
whether the program‘s effect depends on its interaction with these variables, thereby 
contributing to our understanding of how these factors mediate the influence of external 
actors in a field setting.  
Size 
Scholars continue to debate whether a small or large population size promotes 
successful collective action. Most studies suggest that a small group size encourages 
successful collective action because monitoring and sanctioning are less costly. 
Accordingly, monitoring and sanctioning can improve reputations and help to build or 
reinforce norms of reciprocity (Bardhan 2000; Dolsak and Ostrom 2003; Gebremedhin, 
Pender and Tesfay 2004; Olson 1965). Alternatively, Sethi and Somanathan (2008) argue 
that larger groups are linked to more successful collective action outcomes because there 
are more economic, material and human resources at the group‘s disposal; a greater 
resource base diminishes the possibility that fixed costs present an obstacle to organizing 
collective action. Also, a larger community, if sufficiently organized, could generate 
more political power for achieving their objectives (Bardhan 2000: 852).
34
 
Combining the logic behind small and large populations, Agrawal and Goyal 
(2001) argue that there is a quadratic (or U-shaped) relationship between group size and 
cooperation; medium-sized groups are more likely to be successful than small or large 
groups. In particular, while a very small group size is hypothesized to make cooperation 
more difficult because of larger fixed costs, a large population size translates into 
increased communication, monitoring and sanctioning costs.  
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 The proportion of resource quantity to population of users is also an important factor to consider. A large 
population utilizing a smaller resource pool could generate a situation of scarcity that prompts higher levels 
of cooperation in comparison to situations with small populations and a more abundant resource. 
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Since WUASP works with WUAs that vary in population size, I am interested in 
exploring how population size mediates the program effect. Although the program may 
have a positive effect on a range of population sizes, I expect better outcomes in 
treatment WUAs with smaller populations for two main reasons. First, the program 
covers many of the fixed costs for organizing and motivating initial collective action; 
thus it addresses the primary challenge to coordination that is associated with small 
groups. Second, the program‘s methods and small staff size are best suited to produce a 
more immediate and pronounced impact in smaller communities. This is especially the 
case given the limited project time frame that makes it more difficult to organize and 
conduct trainings with larger communities.  
H WUA population size: Treatment WUAs with smaller populations exhibit better 
collective action outcomes in comparison to treatment groups with larger 
populations.  
I also test whether WUA land size plays a mediating role on the treatment effect. I 
expect greater program benefits in WUAs with a smaller land area because it will 
significantly reduce monitoring and communication costs.  
H WUA land size: Treatment WUAs with a smaller land size exhibit better collective 
action outcomes in comparison to larger treatment sites.  
 
Heterogeneity 
Natural resources are managed by user groups characterized by variation along 
multiple dimensions, including ethnicity, wealth, gender, and caste (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999). These group heterogeneities do not have a single or consistent effect on collective 
action (Agrawal 2002) and many questions remain concerning the role of economic and 
socio-cultural heterogeneity, especially in cases where economic and socio-cultural 
heterogeneity overlap (Agrawal 2008).  
The theoretical argument for why heterogeneity has a negative impact on 
collective action outcomes is based on the assumption that it leads to variance in the 
distribution of costs and benefits for cooperation. In particular, variations in the value 
assigned to a resource can lead to disagreement over common goals concerning its 
management and use. Thus, heterogeneity can promote competition instead of 
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collaboration, as well as stifle the development of trust relationships (McCarthy, Dutilly-
Diane and Drabo 2004). On the other hand, some scholars claim that heterogeneity may 
increase network capacity by diversifying both the contributions made to certain public 
goods and skill-sets used in natural resource management (Ostrom and Poteete 2004; 
Ruttan 2008). Generally, the key question is whether the heterogeneity in question 
coincides with a heterogeneity of goals regarding the resource (Ostrom 2009). 
Economic heterogeneity 
The common property resource literature is filled with case studies that highlight 
the perverse effects of economic inequality. Scholars argue that economic inequality 
leads to higher transaction costs and significant variation in individual‘s costs and 
benefits for cooperation because different economic or social strata may not derive 
similar values from access or the use of a good (Baland 1999; Ostrom 2007; Ruttan 
2006). Indeed, empirical evidence supports the claim that large differences in economic 
assets can reduce cooperation (Bardhan 2000; Cardenas 2007; Dayton-Johnson 2000; 
Tang 1991).  
However, groups or individuals with significant political or economic assets may 
help overcome the initial collective action dilemma by bearing the initial cost of 
organizing.  If a few wealthy individuals can capture enough benefits, they may take on 
the large fixed costs of providing a public good, regardless of the actions of others. Thus, 
a privileged group with a large incentive to protect and maintain the commons can 
become the ―critical‖ mass of participants needed to establish a regime for natural 
resource governance (McKean 1992).  
To address this debate, my study investigates whether WUASP‘s effect on 
collective action outcomes was mediated by variation in economic heterogeneity. Due to 
the potential for highly unequal land distribution during land reform, I investigate the 
program‘s effect in WUAs that are characterized by varying levels of land inequality 
among farmers. More specifically, greater inequality is associated with the presence of 
relatively few large landholders relative to the majority population of water users.  
An analysis of the interaction between the program and economic inequality is 
important for exploring the criticisms leveled against international development projects. 
In particular, common property resource scholars and anthropologists frequently raise 
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concerns about whether international development work has the intended impact on 
socially marginalized groups or if it sacrifices equity for efficiency gains. They stress the 
potential for certain groups to gain the most from development projects and for unequal 
benefits and advantages to worsen collective capacity by disrupting mutual relationships 
among resource users; inequality can be exacerbated if certain groups or individuals are 
able to capitalize on or monopolize the work/benefits of the external actors.  
Moreover, collective action can be diminished if the development project is not a 
result of a community initiative and/or a program‘s implementation scheme clashes with 
the cultural context. Also, there is the threat that informal management techniques and 
networks, which are potentially more efficient at resource management, could be 
―crowded-out‖ by the external organizations (Gebremedhin et. al, 2004: 5). Finally, in the 
post-Soviet Central Asian context, there is a genuine threat that external involvement will 
perpetuate a culture of dependency (McGinnins 2000).  
Indeed, some research on the impact of development projects offers evidence that 
privileged individuals or groups are able to gain more advantages. In many settings, the 
local elite is able to capitalize or monopolize common property institutions and make the 
most of the collective choice decisions (see Agrawal 2001; Ensminger 1990; Platteau, 
2004). Thus, there is a potential for external actors to increase the asymmetry of interests 
and endowments among community members, crowd out informal networks, and replace 
local efforts at collective action (Gebremedhin et. al, 2004).  
Furthermore, in the context of Kyrgyzstan, effective WUAs can reinforce 
domination by replicating power hierarchies and further disadvantaging vulnerable 
groups. Stronger institutions do not necessarily lead to more equitable outcomes. 
Therefore, the WUA can simply reflect the power dynamics in a community, and 
asymmetries of power can increase in cases where powerful social groups or political 
actors are able to capitalize on (or monopolize) the work of the WUA (Agrawal 2008; 
Gebremedhin et. al, 2004; Mosse 2008; Steins and Edwards 1999).  
Nonetheless, according to WUASP‘s program theory, the project is designed to 
empower all water-users and militate against the threat of elite capture. Community-wide 
mobilization and institutional development are expected to raise the population‘s 
knowledge base and help create a strong WUA where individual interests are advanced 
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and protected. Participatory rehabilitation with required community involvement and 
voting should ensure that the benefits of the rehabilitation work are spread across the 
system. In addition, the conditional transfer of aid funds should diminish the threat of 
elite capture. Therefore, given the program methods and objective, I hypothesize that the 
program will not provide additional benefits to wealthy farmers or powerful groups.   
H Economic heterogeneity: There will be no difference in collective action outcomes 
among treatment WUAs with varying levels of economic heterogeneity.    
 
Furthermore, to help explain the program effect for economic heterogeneity, my 
investigation of the four individual behavioral mechanisms from Section 1 also includes 
an analysis of the WUASP effect on potentially ―disadvantaged‖ social groups including 
women and water users at the end of the canal.   
Given the program objectives and methods, I expect disadvantaged social groups 
in treatment WUAs will exhibit better outcomes on the four individual behavioral 
mechanisms (knowledge; participation, attitudes, and social capital) in comparison to 
their counterparts in control WUAs. Despite the potentially low baseline for these groups, 
I predict their change to be greater than control respondents but perhaps their overall 
level on each outcome to be lower than more advantaged groups.  
 H FEMALE (knowledge, participation, attitudes, social capital) Female WUASP respondents 
perform better on the individual behavioral mechanisms in comparison to those in 
control sites. 
 HEND-USERS (knowledge, participation, attitudes, social capital) WUASP respondents at the tail-
end perform better on the individual behavioral mechanisms in comparison to 
those in control sites. 
Social heterogeneity 
Socio-cultural heterogeneity is often posited to reduce cooperative capacity and 
have a more clearly negative effect than economic heterogeneity; differences in social 
norms may produce substantial variation in the incentives for cooperation among diverse 
groups (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002; McCarthy and Drabo 2004; Ruttan 2006). 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence regarding the effects of social or ethnic 
heterogeneity does not reveal a consistent effect. While some studies find evidence of a 
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negative effect (Baland 2000, 2006; Dayton Johnson 2000), others have found ambiguous 
or insignificant results (Fujita et. al., 2000; Tang 1991). 
My project investigates whether WUASP‘s impact on collective action varied in 
ethnically heterogeneous areas. In the context of Southern Kyrgyzstan, this means I 
compare the treatment effect in WUAs with a mix of ethnic Uzbek and ethnic Kyrgyz to 
WUAs with a more homogeneous Kyrgyz composition. I predict better collective action 
outcomes in ethnically heterogeneous communities in comparison to homogenous 
Kyrgyz communities. My claim is that it is not the heterogeneity per se that motivates 
better outcomes in communities with sizeable Uzbek populations. Instead, it is the 
Uzbeks‘ more extensive historical experience with agriculture and irrigation that explains 
why communities with an Uzbek population have an advantage in comparison to 
homogenous Kyrgyz communities. Thus, I suggest that, on average, Uzbeks organize, 
mobilize and cooperate more efficiently and effectively for irrigation management than 
ethnic Kyrgyz. This logic implies a linear relationship between ethnicity and irrigation 
management outcomes. As we move from homogeneous Kyrgyz communities to 
homogenous Uzbek communities, there should be a gradual improvement in collective 
action outcomes.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, ethnic Uzbeks are associated with a much longer 
history of sedentary agriculture, whereas ethnic Kyrgyz are historically linked to a 
nomadic lifeway. Accordingly, natural resource scholars emphasize the importance of 
history for collective action outcomes (Ostrom 1992; Platteau 2008) because of the 
historical evolution of social capital, which is essential for cooperation. Social cohesion 
and social capital have evolved historically (Katz 2000). Thus, a group‘s culture and rules 
of behavior are intimately tied to their particular history (Baland and Platteau 1996), and 
behavioral conventions, such as norms of reciprocity and fairness, arise in an 
evolutionary way through common experience. Tradition and historical precedents shape 
expectations and beliefs about social interactions for the management of the commons 
(Ostrom 2007a: 198).  
In the context of contemporary irrigation management in Southern Kyrgyzstan, 
ethnic Uzbeks‘ longer history with sedentary agriculture provides them with several 
advantages over Kyrgyz. Generally speaking, ethnic Uzbeks are more familiar with 
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irrigation and agriculture. In particular, Uzbek communities have greater experience with 
previous forms of the institutions that define contemporary agriculture in Kyrgyzstan. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, there is a certain degree of historical continuity between: (1) 
WUAs and pre-colonial local associations of water users in sedentary community known 
as ketmen (2) voluntary community labor (ashar) and (3) the position of mirabs (water 
masters) who control water distribution at the local level. Thus, I maintain that 
communities with a sizeable Uzbek population have been able to more easily adapt to 
post-Soviet irrigation management. I hypothesize that such areas will be able to learn 
quickly from WUASP and maximize their benefits from program involvement. However, 
since the positive benefits are attributable to the Uzbeks‘ ‗skills‘ or advantages, this 
implies that ethnically homogenous Uzbek communities should exhibit the best collective 
action outcomes.  
H Social Heterogeneity: Treatment WUAs with ethnically heterogeneous communities 
will exhibit better collective action outcomes than treatment WUAs with a 
homogenous Kyrgyz population.  
Furthermore, to better explain why we see certain collective action outcomes for 
ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks, I examine outcome for the four individual behavioral 
mechanisms from Section 1 among Kyrgyz and Uzbek respondents. Two hypotheses 
emerge from my argument discussed above. First, I hypothesize that Uzbek respondents 
in the program will exhibit better outcomes than Kyrgyz respondents in the program for 
the four mechanisms. Second, I predict that Kyrgyz respondents in ethnically 
heterogeneous program areas with outperform Kyrgyz respondents in ethnically 
homogeneous program areas.  
H UZBEKS (knowledge, participation, attitudes, social capital): Ethnic Uzbek respondents in 
treatment sites will perform better than their Kyrgyz counterparts.  
HSOCIAL HETEROGENEITY (knowledge, participation, attitudes, social capital): Kyrgyz respondents in 
ethnically heterogeneous treatment sites will perform better than Kyrgyz in 
ethnically homogeneous communities.  
Ecological scarcity 
Ecological scarcity is the final mediating variable that will be explored in my 
empirical analysis of the WUASP effect on collective action outcomes. Unlike size and 
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heterogeneity, the influence of ecological scarcity has not generated a large amount of 
debate in the common property resource literature. In contrast to cases of water 
abundance, greater cooperation is expected in cases where the scarcity of a resource 
generates substantial ecological and economic risks, in conjunction with relatively large 
benefits for group cooperation (Lansing 2006; Wade 1988). Water scarcity and a 
dependence on irrigation for a significant portion of one‘s livelihood are expected to 
promote better organization and cooperation. However, in cases of extreme water 
scarcity, cooperation may fail. Thus, the relationship between scarcity and cooperation 
may be quadratic. 
Given the generally accepted claims of a U shaped relationship, I hypothesize that 
WUASP-supported WUAs with greater levels of ecological scarcity should motivate 
cooperation, except in cases of extreme water abundance or scarcity.  
H Ecological Scarcity: The relationship between scarcity and collective action 
outcomes in WUASP-supported WUAs is U shaped.  
Conclusion 
This chapter situates my project within the large body of scholarship on collective 
action concerning natural resource governance. In this chapter, I develop hypotheses 
about the program effect on four individual behavioral mechanisms that link WUASP to 
collective action outcomes; knowledge, participation, attitudes and social capital are the 
mechanisms of interest in this study. In addition, I present several hypotheses regarding 
the mediating role of population size, land size, economic and social heterogeneity, as 
well as ecological scarcity on the treatment effect. In the following chapter, I present the 
results of the empirical analysis for WUASP‘s effect on collective action outcomes.  
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 Chapter 5 
 
Outcomes 
 
 
Overview of the Results 
The research question guiding this study is whether the bottom-up program 
methods of the Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP) motivated better 
collective action outcomes in Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs). Common property 
resource scholarship corroborates the program theory guiding WUASP regarding the 
factors that enhance cooperation over natural resource governance. Thus, I hypothesize 
that the program‘s methods of social mobilization, institutional development and 
participatory rehabilitation positively affect proximate individual behavioral mechanisms 
such as knowledge, participation, attitudes and social capital. Given a positive program 
effect on these mechanisms, the expectation is better collective action outcomes for 
WUAs involved in WUASP.  
To answer the research question, I conduct a rigorous impact evaluation of the 
Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP) in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Survey 
data is used to examine the association between the program and the four mechanisms of 
interest, and panel data is used to test the program‘s impact on WUA performance 
indicators, which proxy for collective action outcomes. I use interviews, case studies and 
focus-group conversations collected during my field research to illustrate and corroborate 
the empirical results.  
Overall, the results indicate that, on average, WUASP did have a statistically 
significant and positive effect on several WUA performance outcomes. There is evidence 
that WUASP‘s involvement in a WUA increased community participation and irrigation 
service fee contributions, as well as improved a WUA‘s institutional capacity and 
irrigation infrastructure. Moreover, there is some evidence that the program improved 
78 
 
these outcomes through the expected process. In particular, there is strong evidence of a 
positive association between the program and results for knowledge, participation, and 
attitudes. This includes a significant positive program association with all four behavioral 
mechanisms among ethnic Uzbek program respondents. 
Nevertheless, there are important empirical results that do not support my 
predictions for the treatment effect on the mechanisms of interest. With the exception of 
survey respondents in the ethnically heterogeneous WUASP-supported WUA, the 
program either had no effect on social capital or it actually worsened communal 
relations. Accordingly, there is no evidence of a difference in the outcomes for these 
mechanisms among women and water users at the end of the canals in treatment versus 
control sites.  
Furthermore, I investigated whether ecological risk, population size, land size, as 
well as economic and social heterogeneity mediated the treatment effect on collective 
action outcomes. The results provide some support for my hypotheses concerning the 
interaction effects of these variables with WUASP. First, there is evidence that treatment 
WUAs with larger Uzbek populations have higher irrigation service fee payments. While 
this result indicates that the program achieved a better result on this outcome in social 
heterogeneous WUAs versus ethnically homogenous Kyrgyz communities, it also implies 
that the greatest program benefits were achieved in homogeneous Uzbek communities.  
Next, while there is evidence of an additional program benefit for water-delivery 
payments in WUAs with a smaller land size, my analysis of the interaction between 
WUASP and WUA land size does not offer consistent support for my hypothesis of 
additional program benefits in smaller WUAs. Specifically, larger treatment sites exhibit 
better results for infrastructure and development indicators than smaller sites. Also, the 
program achieves better outcomes for on-time water delivery payments in more populous 
WUAs. Furthermore, among WUASP-supported WUAs, there is a quadratic (U shaped) 
relationship between population size and institutional development, as well as the 
proportion of the WUA budget dedicated to rehabilitation and WUA staff salaries. Put 
differently, those WUAs with middle range populations exhibit additional program 
benefits for these two outcomes in comparison to WUAs with small or very large 
populations.  
79 
 
Moreover, my analysis of the interaction between water scarcity and WUASP 
provides an important empirical confirmation for natural resource scholarship concerning 
a quadratic relationship between collective action outcomes and scarcity. Specifically, 
additional program benefits are found in treatment WUAs facing a ―middling level‖ of 
ecological scarcity – not WUAs with extreme water abundance or scarcity – for tariff, 
water delivery payments, as well as operation, maintenance and rehabilitation payments.  
Finally, my investigation of economic heterogeneity does not provide support for 
my hypothesis that there will be no difference in collective action outcomes among 
treated WUAs with varying levels of economic heterogeneity. Instead, there is evidence 
of additional program benefits in WUAs with more equal land holdings among water 
users for tariff levels and institutional development. On the other hand, there are 
additional WUASP benefits for canal infrastructure improvements in areas with a greater 
discrepancy between the land holdings.  
Table 5.1 summarizes the average WUASP results for both mechanisms and outcomes. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the mediated program results for the mechanisms, and Table 5.3 
summarizes the mediated WUASP results for collective action outcomes.  
 
Table 5.1 Average WUASP effects  
 
Evidence of a 
positive average 
WUASP effect?  
MECHANISMS 
Knowledge Participation 
 
YES 
 
Attitudes Social Capital 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
NO 
WUA PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 
Institutional 
Development 
 
WUA development 
problems/member 
activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
improvements 
Financial Indicators 
 
YES YES YES 
 
YES 
Table 5.2. Mediated WUASP effect on mechanisms 
 
 
Evidence of a 
positive, 
mediated 
WUASP 
effect? 
 MECHANISMS 
Knowledge Participation Attitudes Social 
Capital 
Kyrgyz in the 
ethnically 
heterogeneous WUA 
NO NO YES YES 
Groups with greater 
historical experience 
with agriculture and 
irrigation management? 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
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Table 5.3 Mediated WUASP effect on outcomes  
Evidence of a 
positive 
mediated 
WUASP effect 
on outcomes? 
 
 OUTCOMES 
 
Institutional 
Development 
 
WUA 
development 
problems/member 
activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
improvements 
Financial 
Indicators 
 
Size YES YES YES YES 
Scarcity NO NO NO YES 
Economic 
heterogeneity 
YES NO YES YES 
Social 
heterogeneity 
NO NO NO YES 
 
Roadmap 
In this chapter, I use panel data to examine the Water Users‘ Association Support 
Program‘s (WUASP) impact on common property resource outcomes.  The analysis 
investigates the average WUASP effect on Water Users‘ Associations‘ (WUA) 
performance indicators that proxy for collective action outcomes. It also seeks to 
determine if the program effect is mediated by a WUA‘s population and land size, 
ecological scarcity, as well as economic heterogeneity and social heterogeneity.  
The subsequent chapter will explore the mechanisms linking WUASP to 
collective action outcomes in order to explain why we see certain outcomes. In particular, 
Chapter 6 uses case studies, focus groups and the results from an exploratory survey 
research project to provide context and help illustrate my claims concerning the empirical 
results. 
 
Research Methods and Data 
 
Panel data analysis 
In the context of this study, internal validity refers to confidence in one‘s 
assessment of the actual program impact on the variables of interest. Due to the non-
random assignment of WUAs to the program, there is a serious threat of ―selection bias‖ 
(i.e. Uzbek 
communities) 
Disadvantaged groups 
within a WUA?(end-
users and women) 
NO  NO NO NO  
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to the validity of the study results. Selection bias means that the program selected WUAs 
that were systematically different from WUAs that were not selected for the program. In 
particular, we are concerned that WUASP selected WUAs that were performing better on 
certain outcome variables of interest to the program evaluation. Indeed, empirical 
analysis indicates that, on average, the twenty-eight WUASP-supported WUAs had 
smaller populations, lower debt levels, and development levels in the range of three to 
five.
35
 Therefore, we cannot simply compare the performance of WUASP-supported 
WUAs after the introduction of the program to the performance of non-WUASP-
supported WUAs.  
In order to isolate the true program effect given selection bias, an interrupted 
panel design and fixed effects regression methods are employed for the empirical analysis 
of WUA performance outcomes. The use of an interrupted panel design and fixed effects 
methods allows me to partially compensate for selection bias by observing how outcomes 
in individual WUAs changed before and after the introduction of WUASP. Since the 
WUA is compared to itself, consistent differences between WUASP-supported WUAs and 
non-WUASP-supported WUAs do not affect the outcome.  This means that we are focused 
on analyzing changes that occur within the time trends of WUASP-supported WUAs for 
indicators of interest after the program began working in the WUA (Stock and Watson 
2007: 349-372).  
Thus, in analyzing the program effect on debt, we are looking at pre and post 
treatment debt levels in WUASP-supported WUAs in order to determine whether the 
program influenced these levels. In addition, we are comparing pre and post trends across 
the treatment and control groups to verify that any change in treatment WUAs is not the 
result of aggregate overall time trends (i.e. WUASP happens to implement the year 
before an amazingly good year for rainfall). Thus, we are left with the possibility that 
WUASP-supported WUAs are different from control WUAs in a way that changes over 
time. For example, having more social capital initially might cause a WUA not only to 
                                                 
35
This is supported by anecdotal evidence regarding World Bank On-Farm Irrigation Program (OIP) 
incentives, which may have motivated WUAs to reduce debt levels in order to improve their chances for 
selection into WUASP. Furthermore, the World Bank On-Farm Irrigation Program (OIP) and WUASP 
interface about which Water Users‘ Associations would be more appropriate for WUASP resulted in the 
selection of WUAs that met the qualifications for the World Bank but were perhaps deemed too small by 
the World Bank program to justify the large scale infrastructure projects.   
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have lower debt to begin with, but also to lower its debt more rapidly than it would 
otherwise.  This threat is addressed by comparing trends in WUASP-supported WUAs 
before they are treated to WUAs that are never treated to ensure such an effect is not 
present.  Taken together, these methods help counter the selection bias present in this 
"natural experiment." 
Hence, by using fixed effects methods, it is possible to control for all possible 
characteristics of the WUAs in the study that do not vary over time. Thus, fixed effects 
help to overcome an omitted variables problem in panel data. Put differently, a fixed 
effect regression enables one to control for unobserved heterogeneity between WUAs as 
long as the effects of that heterogeneity are time-invariant. Consequently, fixed effect 
methods are the best option for the analysis of the program effect because between WUA 
variation is most likely explained by unmeasured individual WUA-specific traits that 
correlate with our outcomes of interest (Allison 2009).
36
 Although fixed effects do not 
allow me to estimate the effects of time invariant covariates, I include interactions 
between the program and stable variables – such as ethnicity, population size, land size, 
economic inequality,  and water scarcity – to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. 
An interrupted panel design is feasible for this project due to the availability of 
economic and budget data for all WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan from 2004 through 
2009, together with the implementation of WUASP among 28 of these WUAs at various 
intervals within this time period. I acquired the data from the World Bank On-Farm 
Irrigation Project (OIP), which has been collecting a mixture of yearly, quarterly and 
monthly data for all WUAs in Kyrgyzstan since 2000.
37
 In Kyrgyzstan, primary data 
collection and outcomes measurement by the World Bank reduces concerns about the 
                                                 
36
 However, it is difficult to calculate longer term pre-treatment trends with fixed effects. In addition to 
fixed effects regression, I also analyzed the panel data using an event studies approach. The event studies 
allowed me to look at the regression coefficients on the outcomes of interest at time points before and after 
the treatment to determine if there were positive trends before the treatment. A main problem with the 
event studies approach is that if a positive trend begins upon entry into the program, the analysis might 
attenuate the program effect; this means a positive but small program effect could be masked. Indeed, for 
the event studies approach, there is no evidence of a statistically significant average program effect for any 
of the ten outcomes.  On the other hand, the use of a fixed effects regression approach yields some evidence 
of a statistically significant positive program effect for four of the ten outcomes. Since I found no evidence 
of pre-treatment trends in the event studies (except in the case of Tariff), I believe that the event studies 
may be masking the small but positive program effect that we see for the four outcomes that yielded a 
statistically significant outcome in the fixed effect approach.   
37
 For most WUAs and variables of interest, the data ranges from 2004-2009; however, some variables have 
been measured since 2000. 
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accuracy of the data for two reasons. First, it decreases the likelihood that the WUA 
altered the data. Second, it ensures more accurate statistics because most WUAs do not 
have the capacity for data collection and recording. The World Bank staff determined or 
collected all variables directly from the WUAs except the irrigation service fee (ISF) 
payment information for water delivery, which is initially gathered by the local water 
department (Rayvodkhoz).
38
 
Although fixed effects can be used to isolate the program effect, an important 
concern for my project is the small number of WUAs involved in WUASP. In particular, 
the program worked with twenty-eight WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan.  However, two of 
these WUAs must be excluded from the analysis. In one case, there is no pre-treatment 
data on the WUA since it was created by WUASP, and the other WUA was involved in 
the World Bank heavy infrastructure project several years prior to its selection into 
WUASP. The small treatment N requires greater attention to the standard errors for my 
coefficient estimates. This is especially the case with my analysis of heterogeneous 
treatment effects. In some cases, large standard errors for coefficients relatively far from 
zero may indicate that there is not enough power in my models to make compelling 
arguments concerning the program impact. 
Furthermore, out of the twenty-six WUAs that can be included in the statistical 
analysis, eight WUAs were selected for the program in 2008 which means that there is 
only one year of post-treatment data. Moreover, for WUAs selected in 2008, the 
community mobilization process was drastically shorter – ranging from two weeks to one 
month. The empirical work for the project outcomes takes these differences into account 
by running statistical models with the inclusion and exclusion of these 2008 selections, 
which I refer to as the ―2008 cohort‖.39 Accordingly, I explore the implications and 
                                                 
38
 The budget data that is collected from the WUAs is the most likely to be compromised or inaccurate 
since a WUA might have incentives to report higher payment levels in order to gain access to rehabilitation 
programs like the World Bank or WUASP. Although there is always the possibility that information from 
the local water departments regarding payment for water delivery may also have been tampered with 
because of corruption, I argue that there is less of an opportunity and incentive to alter the water-delivery 
data. First, it would be more difficult to tamper with the data due to the multiple parties involved in the 
water delivery process. Second, I maintain that the Rayvodkhoz‘s main mechanism for rent-seeking is the 
in-kind payment of ISF, which does not require any data manipulation for them to reap additional benefits.  
39
 By removing a significant portion of the treatment group, the inferences from my results no longer 
represent an assessment of the average effect of the treatment on the treated.  Therefore, when discussing 
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significance of this qualitatively different treatment for the 2008 cohort in Chapters 6 and 
7.  
 
Dependent Variables 
I created nine performance indicators for Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs). These 
can be divided into four categories: institutional capacity, development problems, 
financial indicators and infrastructure improvements.  The indicators are as follows. 
Institutional Capacity 
Institutional development (2004-2009): A measure of the number of World Bank 
development milestones completed by a WUA (discrete ordinal variable). There are 
seven World Bank milestones or levels that a WUA must complete to become eligible for 
large-scale rehabilitation credits from the World Bank. The completion of each milestone 
requires documentation from the WUA leadership and membership, and the milestones 
are intended to represent increasingly difficult tasks for the WUA to complete.  They 
range from the official formation and legal registration of the WUA (Milestone 1) to 
documentation that the General Assembly or assembly of representatives of the WUA 
have agreed to contribute 25% of the costs for World Bank rehabilitation (Milestone 7). 
More developed WUAs are expected to have completed a greater number of milestones 
because the milestones require an organized leadership that is capable of holding the 
necessary election/meeting procedures and collecting sufficient funds from its members.  
Development Problems 
Development problems: The World Bank‘s assessment of resource, technical and 
human capital problems in a WUA (count variable). I use this variable as a proxy for the 
development problems faced by a Water Users‘ Association (WUA). I expect WUASP 
involvement in a WUA to help reduce these development problems.  
Member activeness: The World Bank‘s assessment of the activeness of a WUA‘s 
Council and zonal representatives, as well as the ease of securing irrigation service fee 
(ISF) payments from members (count variable). I use this variable as a proxy for the 
activeness of a WUA‘s leadership and membership. The expectation is that more 
                                                                                                                                                 
outcomes for only those WUAs that receive water from the local water department, it is important to 
remain aware that this only applies to a subset of the treatment group.  
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successful WUAs are characterized by both an active leadership and members that pay 
their fees in a timely manner.  
Financial indicators 
Tariff: The inflation adjusted charge for water delivery, operation and 
maintenance, rehabilitation and staff salary (continuous variable). This rate is set at a 
WUA‘s annual meeting. Given the nascent state of WUA development and significant 
rehabilitation required in most WUAs, tariff rates should be increasing in more successful 
WUAs for the period under study.
40
 
Operation and maintenance (O & M) and rehabilitation budget: The proportion of 
a WUA‘s budget allocated for O & M and rehabilitation (continuous variable). For 
successful WUAs within the study period, we expect this to increase over the years 
because the current funds for staff salaries and rehabilitation are too low to support many 
WUAs. WUAs that perform well and provide good water management services to their 
water users should find it easier to increase budget allocations for staff salaries and/or 
rehabilitation.   
Operation and maintenance (O & M) and rehabilitation payment: The proportion 
of O & M and rehabilitation expenses paid by a WUA (continuous variable). For 
successful WUAs, I expect the proportion of the planned expenses for O & M and 
rehabilitation to be paid at a higher rate. For example, the leadership of an effective 
WUA should be able to collect close to 100% of the expenses necessary to cover the 
planned O & M and rehabilitation in a given year. Alternatively, ―good‖ leaders could 
motivate or coerce water users to pay.    
Water delivery payment: The proportion of water delivery fees paid by a WUA to 
the local water department (continuous variable). We expect a higher collection rate in 
successful WUAs because water users will most likely refuse to pay for water that they 
do not receive. This means that the WUA needs to efficiently distribute water across its 
service area. It is important to emphasize that this measure, along with the following 
measure, only applies to WUAs that have a portion of their water delivered. Thus, it 
excludes 20% of my WUA sample that relies completely on a natural water source. Since 
                                                 
40
 We would expect this to level off at some point in the future.  
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it excludes several of the treatment WUAs, inference about the treatment effect for this 
indicator is restricted to those WUAs that have water delivered.
41
 
On-time water delivery payment: A measure of on-time water delivery payment 
(continuous). It is an average of the quarterly proportion of debt paid to the government 
for a WUA‘s water delivery from the local water ministry. I expect more successful 
WUAs to pay all or a larger proportion of their debt each quarter. Whereas the ―water 
delivery‖ payment outcome tells us if the WUA ultimately paid off their debt, this 
measure provides information about whether the WUA was able to collect funds 
consistently throughout the year to pay off the quarterly debt. Once again, the inference 
about a program effect is restricted to a subset of WUAs because this indicator only 
applies to WUAs that have water delivered. 
Infrastructure condition 
Canal Infrastructure: The World Bank‘s measure of the condition of a WUA‘s 
canal system (continuous). It approximates the proportion of a WUA‘s canal 
infrastructure that is in satisfactory condition. I expect WUASP‘s rehabilitation to 
improve the condition of canal infrastructure in treatment WUAs. Furthermore, since the 
program‘s methods teach WUAs how repair and maintain the infrastructure independent 
of WUASP, treatment sites should exhibit even greater improvements in their 
infrastructure over time.
42
  
 
Independent Variables 
Besides a program indicator, three time-variant controls are included in several of 
the model specifications for the analysis of average program effects. I control for WUA 
involvement in the World Bank large rehabilitation program
43
 and a WUA Director‘s 
                                                 
41
 Due to the lack of measurement capabilities on many of the main canals, the ability to accurately 
measure (or to measure at all) is highly questionable. Also, this measure should be interpreted as an 
approximation even though the World Bank provides detailed measurements of the water requested and 
received.  
42
 The first year that canal condition was measured and/or reported is 2006; this means that pre-treatment 
data is missing for 2004 and 2005. Given a conservative assumption that the program did not worsen the 
infrastructure, the outcomes for this variable may attenuate the program effect. Specifically, if a WUA‘s 
canal condition was .6 in 2004/2005, but was given a 2006 measure of .7 due to WUASP‘s rehabilitation 
efforts in 2005, the outcome would be biased against this positive program effect.  
43
 In one specification for each model, I remove the WUAs that received the large-scale World Bank 
projects to check for any major differences in the results. 
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educational background.
44
 Also, there is one model specification for each outcome with a 
proxy for water scarcity; it is a measure of the actual water received as a proportion of the 
water originally requested by the WUA from the local water department.
45
 Assuming no 
strategic behavior in requests, the expectation is that a ―water-rich‖ WUA will receive all 
or more of the water requested and vice versa.
46
 Since this measure involves the use of 
water delivery data from the water departments, it faces the same restriction discussed 
above for the two ―water delivery‖ outcomes; it only applies to WUAs that have a portion 
of their water delivered and excludes about 20% of the WUAs that rely completely on a 
natural water source. It is important to focus on this subset in one model specification 
because WUAs that are completely dependent on a natural source have a very different 
relationship with the local water department and are not subject to the ―ecological 
hierarchy‖ that defines most WUAs along a canal system. In addition, they are often 
located in more remote or peripheral geographic areas.  
In order to explore whether ecological risk, WUA size, economic heterogeneity 
and social heterogeneity mediate the WUASP effect, I interact measures of these 
variables with the program indicator. For population size, I use a measure of the number 
of beneficiaries in a WUA; this is an estimate of the population within a WUA‘s service 
area. I also explore whether the treatment effect was mediated by variation in the number 
of hectares within a WUA. For social heterogeneity, I use demographic data from a 1999 
Census conducted by the United Nations to construct a measure of the ethnic composition 
of each WUA.
47
 Next, I develop a proxy for economic inequality by creating a measure 
of inequality in land holdings among water users in a community. The measure represents 
                                                 
44
 This is a dummy variable to indicate whether the director has an educational background in agriculture. 
This could proxy for continuity from the Soviet era collective and state farm leadership. 
45
 The mirabs in a WUA are responsible for determining how much water the WUA needs for a given 
irrigation season. They aggregate the water requests for water users and submit the total to the water 
department.  
46
 This will often correspond to a WUA‘s location along a canal system. WUAs at the beginning of a canal 
will generally receive all (or more) of the water requested, whereas a WUA at the end of the canal will 
often not receive its requested share of water because of the inefficient use from WUAs at the beginning of 
the canal and less than ideal condition of the canals.  
47
 I have concerns about the accuracy of the Census data for two reasons.  First, Southern Kyrgyzstan has 
experienced large-scale migration since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We cannot exclude the possibility 
that there have been significant changes in the ethnic make-up of communities. Second, during my field 
research, I discovered several gross discrepancies between the census data and actual ethnic compositions 
of several communities. For treatment WUAs, I was able to cross-reference and/or correct the UN data with 
the estimates from Winrock leaders and information collected from the WUA director‘s that I interviewed.  
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the proportion of ‗individual farmers‘ in a WUA relative to the proportion of land owned 
by individual farmers.
48
 Finally, to examine whether ecological risk mediated the 
WUASP effect, I use the proxy measure discussed above for water scarcity. Since model 
specifications that include this last interaction restrict the analysis to WUAs that receive 
water from the local water department, inferences from these results can only be applied 
to a subset of treatment WUAs. 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Average program effects 
During the first three months of my field research, I shadowed the Water Users‘ 
Association Support Program‘s (WUASP) field team and conducted a series of 
interviews with the leadership of the Water Users‘ Associations (WUA) involved in the 
program. Following this phase of the research, I was relatively confident that WUAs 
involved in WUASP were more successful than WUAs receiving basic development 
support from the World Bank‘s On-Farm Irrigation Project (OIP). WUASP‘s program 
theory and methods involve substantial community mobilization and participation in 
comparison to the blue-print approach used to establish and support most WUAs.  In 
theory, the project seems to represent an appropriate solution for many of the problems 
facing WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan. 
My interviews with WUA leaders and several focus group transcripts from 
WUASP communities provided evidence of positive program results.  There was a 
general consensus among the Winrock staff and WUA Directors that WUASP 
communities were more active, knowledgeable, better organized and felt more ownership 
and responsibility regarding water and irrigation infrastructure.  Moreover, my field 
observations provided evidence that important outcomes had been achieved including 
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 Similar to the ethnicity measure, this measure is also problematic for several reasons. First, aside from 
‗individual farmers‘, a WUA can also contain cooperative farms that can be another significant source of 
inequality. Although I have data on the number of cooperative farms and the amount of land that they 
occupy in a WUA, I do not know the exact number of families that comprise each cooperative farm. Thus, I 
cannot construct a better inequality measure that takes account of unequal land holdings in a WUA that 
result from both individual farmers and cooperative farms. Second, WUAs do not define their membership 
in a consistent manner. For example, some WUAs include individuals who own garden plots as members 
while others do not. This means that my measure for the proportion of individual farmers in a WUA may 
not be an accurate construct. 
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increased irrigation service fee (ISF) collection rates, improvements in canal 
infrastructure, greater efficiency in water regulation, and more cooperative behaviors.  
Indeed, the results of the panel data analysis indicate a positive overall program 
effect for four of the nine outcomes: institutional development, ISF payments, canal 
infrastructure, and WUA member participation. However, there is an absence of a 
treatment impact on the overall resource, technical and human capital problems faced by 
WUAs.  Furthermore, while there is evidence of increased payment for O & M and 
rehabilitation fees, there is not strong and consistent evidence of a WUASP effect for the 
other four financial indicators.   
More specifically, we find a 4.77% increase in the payment of irrigation service 
fees for O & M and rehabilitation. Although this is a small substantive effect, WUASP‘s 
capacity to motivate some benefits for this indicator is important. While payment for 
water may be easier to collect and justify, payment of these ―additional‖ costs for staff 
salaries and rehabilitation may indicate greater support and trust of the WUA‘s work. On 
the other hand, this is an ―average‖ performance measure; therefore, we cannot determine 
whether this increase was broadly distributed across community members of if may have 
been driven by larger contributions from a subset of water users who disproportionately 
benefit from the treatment.  
For institutional development, we see that the treatment motivated approximately 
a half step increase in a WUA‘s achievement of the World Bank‘s development 
milestones. While I expected a slightly larger policy effect, this result points to a more 
organized WUA staff and may also reflect greater participation by WUA members and 
zonal representatives. Since ―member activeness‖ was estimated with a fixed-effects 
Poisson model, the interpretation of the coefficient is not very straightforward. Here we 
see a .191 decrease in the log odds ratio of a one unit increase in member passivity with 
WUASP-supported WUAs. This represents a nontrivial positive practical policy effect.  
Finally, we see a 1.51% improvement in the irrigation infrastructure for treatment WUAs. 
As previously discussed, given the absence of 2004/2005 data for this indicator, analysis 
of this outcome only assesses the change in a WUA‘s infrastructure from 2006-2009. 
Thus, it does not measure program benefits for WUAs that experienced improvements 
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from rehabilitation in 2005 and 2006. Consequently, these results may attenuate the 
program effect for this indicator.
49
  
Table 5.4 below provides the regression results and appendix 1.A. contains the 
regression results for all model specifications. For continuous outcomes, I use a fixed 
effects linear model, whereas a fixed effects Poisson model is used for the two count 
outcomes.  
Table 5.4 Regression results for average WUASP effects 
  Financial Indicators 
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water delivery 
payment50 On-time payment 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
            
2001.year -0.234* 
    
 
(0.135) 
    2002.year 0.0491 
    
 
(0.135) 
    2003.year 0.315** 
    
 
(0.131) 
    2004.year 0.339* 
    
 
(0.188) 
    2005.year 0.665*** 
 
-0.0679** -0.0212 -0.197*** 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.0272) (0.0207) (0.0322) 
2006.year 1.402*** 
 
-0.0656*** 0.0206 -0.154*** 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.0239) (0.0217) (0.0348) 
2007.year 2.097*** 
 
0.0645** 0.0542** -0.135*** 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.0271) (0.0216) (0.0360) 
2008.year 2.522*** 
 
0.0601* 0.116*** -0.194*** 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.0309) (0.0220) (0.0372) 
2009.year 2.639*** 
 
0.0985*** 0.129*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.232) 
 
(0.0293) (0.0211) (0.0367) 
Post WUASP 0.192 -0.0953 -0.0478 0.0117 0.0477* 
 
(0.448) (0.0612) (0.0681) (0.0218) (0.0250) 
World Bank 0.976** 0.0684 -0.0907* 0.0148 -0.000574 
 
(0.403) (0.104) (0.0523) (0.0263) (0.0704) 
Constant 3.346*** 0.858*** 0.471*** 0.509*** 0.852*** 
 
(0.138) (0.0220) (0.0195) (0.0237) (0.0260) 
      Observations 1,444 826 832 828 955 
R-squared 0.349 0.001 0.090 0.239 0.095 
WUAs 180 147 145 145 179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
     
          
                                                 
49
 Moreover, for an interesting comparison, we see that the coefficient on the World Bank WUAs that 
received the large rehabilitation support only indicates a 3.18% improvement for irrigation infrastructure. 
The same logic applies in this case; improvements made before 2006 are not captured in this analysis.  
50
 In contrast to the other eight outcomes, the autocorrelation test for ―water delivery payment‖ was 
negative. Hence, for this outcome, I do not include a control for year.  
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
Member 
activeness 
Canal 
Infrastructure 
          
     2005.year 0.384*** 0.00231 0.0128 -0.00226*** 
 
(0.0735) (0.0458) (0.0636) (0.000852) 
2006.year 1.014*** -0.0356 0.0679 -0.00364*** 
 
(0.107) (0.0470) (0.0638) (0.00130) 
2007.year 1.052*** -0.0883* 0.0284 -0.0293*** 
 
(0.109) (0.0480) (0.0650) (0.00507) 
2008.year 1.196*** -0.0837* -0.0121 -0.00890* 
 
(0.113) (0.0491) (0.0674) (0.00525) 
2009.year 1.260*** -0.0757 -0.00218 -0.00404 
 
(0.115) (0.0491) (0.0673) (0.00519) 
Post WUASP 0.434* -0.0526 -0.191* 0.0151* 
 
(0.225) (0.0770) (0.106) (0.00901) 
World Bank -0.517*** -0.0161 -0.194 0.0318*** 
 
(0.188) (0.124) (0.188) (0.0120) 
Constant 3.306*** 
  
0.660*** 
 
(0.0756) 
  
(0.00274) 
     Observations 1,085 1,061 1,061 1,086 
R-squared 0.354 
  
0.073 
 
181 177 177 181 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Heterogeneous program effects 
While the statistical analysis of average WUASP effects corroborates several 
theoretical expectations and field observations regarding the program effect on a WUA‘s 
performance, my field research, along with findings from common property research 
point to a strong possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects. Put differently, given 
important contextual factors that vary across WUAs – size, water scarcity, social and 
economic heterogeneity – the treatment effect is not expected to be consistent across 
WUAs.  
 
Land and population size 
In Chapter 4, I hypothesized that WUAs with small populations and land sizes 
would exhibit additional treatment benefits. However, with the exception of water 
delivery payments, WUAs with a smaller population or land size did not exhibit 
additional program benefits. Contrary to my hypothesis, we see an additional treatment 
benefit for ―middle‖ and large WUAs. In particular, WUASP-supported WUAs with a 
―middle-range‖ population size exhibit better institutional development outcomes and 
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allocate a greater proportion of their budget to rehabilitation and staff salaries. These 
empirical results support Agrawal and Goyal‘s (2001) argument that there is a quadratic 
relationship between population size and collective action outcomes. In particular, when 
the population is small, the fixed costs to successful cooperation are too large; however, 
when the population is small, transaction costs become too large in a heavily populated 
area. Furthermore, there is evidence of additional program benefits for institutional 
development and canal infrastructure in treatment sites with a larger land size.  
 
Ecological scarcity 
Theoretical and empirical work on collective action in natural resource 
management claims that ecological risk translates into economic risks that can provide a 
greater impetus for cooperation. Hence, areas experiencing a relatively significant degree 
of ecological risk will be more likely to develop cooperative arrangements in order to 
mitigate these risks. On the other hand, in cases of extreme scarcity, cooperation may 
completely breakdown. Thus, I predicted a quadratic relationship between scarcity and 
collective action in treatment sites.  
Indeed, the panel data analysis indicates that WUASP‘s effect on collective action 
outcomes is dependent on ecological constraints and that there is a quadratic relationship 
between water scarcity and collective action outcomes. In particular, the program‘s 
methods were able to motivate greater financial contributions for tariff, water delivery 
payment, as well as O & M and rehabilitation payments in areas facing ―middling‖ levels 
of water scarcity.  
 
Social heterogeneity 
In Chapter 4, I hypothesized that communities with a sizeable Uzbek population 
have been able to more easily adapt to post-Soviet irrigation management. Given the 
potential for Uzbek communities to have greater experience with previous forms of the 
institutions that characterize contemporary agriculture in Kyrgyzstan, I expect such areas 
will be able to learn quickly from WUASP and maximize their benefits from program 
involvement. The empirical results provide some evidence to support the claim that 
WUASP achieved superior results in WUAs with sizeable Uzbek populations.  The panel 
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data analysis indicates that WUASP sites with more Uzbeks have higher O & M and 
rehabilitation payments. This impact on a key financial indicator is important because the 
long-term viability of the WUA depends on increasing water-users contributions for 
irrigation service fees to cover staff and rehabilitation expenses.  
 
Economic heterogeneity 
Finally, I predicted the absence of variation in collective action outcomes in 
treatment sites with varying levels of economic heterogeneity. Since WUASP methods 
are designed to empower all water users and avoid elite capture of a WUA, I expect 
WUASP to level the playing field. However, contrary to my expectation, the results 
indicate that treatment sites with a more equal distribution of land among water users 
acquired additional program benefits for institutional development and tariff level. 
Alternatively, there is evidence that WUASP sites with less equal land distribution have a 
better outcome for improvements in canal infrastructure.  
Table 5.5 below provides the regression results for the tests of heterogeneous 
treatment effects. For size and ecological scarcity, I include additional interaction terms 
in order to test the hypotheses of a quadratic relationship among WUASP-supported 
WUAs. Since I test the interaction of the program with five dependent variables for nine 
different outcomes, I only provide the outcomes where the coefficient on the interaction 
term was significant. The regression results for all outcomes and model specifications can 
be found in appendix 1.B.  
Table 5.5. Heterogeneous WUASP effects 
 
Social hetero. Economic hetero. Ecological scarcity 
VARIABLES O & M/rehab payment Tariff Inst. Dev Canal Infr. Tariff 
Water 
delivery 
payment 
O & M 
rehab 
payment 
Post WUASP 0.0281 -1.417 -0.336 0.0486*** -5.401*** -0.313 -0.225*** 
 
(-0.0293) (-1.146) (-0.3) (-0.0151) (-1.846) (-0.41) (-0.0693) 
Post WUASP # 
main effect+ 0.133** 2.636* 1.462** -0.0509*** 9.216** 0.938 0.493*** 
 
(-0.0654) (-1.354) (-0.576) (-0.0186) (-3.846) (-0.68) (-0.12) 
Post WUASP 
#scarcity^2     
-2.925** -0.684** -0.230*** 
     
(-1.367) (-0.322) (-0.0413) 
World Bank 0.00478 0.605* -0.464** 0.0365*** 0.955 0.0761 0.0149 
 
(-0.0765) (-0.31) (-0.208) (-0.0132) (-0.621) (-0.0989) (-0.0265) 
Scarcity 0.0137 
  
0.00119 -0.548 -0.212 0.0382 
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(-0.0371) 
  
(-0.00574) (-0.893) (-0.515) (-0.0574) 
scarcity squared 
    
0.213 0.401 -0.0125 
     
(-0.302) (-0.28) (-0.0201) 
Year 
Reported in appendix I.B. 
 Year # main 
effect+ 
 
Constant 0.842*** 3.408*** 3.378*** 0.664*** 4.385*** 0.721*** 0.496*** 
 
(-0.0367) (-0.127) (-0.08) (-0.00656) (-0.522) (-0.231) (-0.0381) 
        
Observations 824 1,338 990 827 862 822 828 
R-squared 0.119 0.391 0.388 0.124 0.289 0.076 0.248 
WUAs 144 165 165 138 144 145 145 
  Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 +ethnicity, land inequality, scarcity, land size and population size 
 
  Landsize Population size 
VARIABLES Water delivery payment Dev. problems Canal Infra. 
On-time 
payment Inst. Dev 
O & M 
rehab 
budget 
              
Post  WUASP 0.0719 0.168 0.00152 -0.156* -0.251 -0.0682 
  (-0.105) (-0.124) (-0.0116) (-0.0806) (0.380) (0.0425) 
WUASP#main 
effect -0.000135** -0.000192** 1.23e-05* 1.58e-05*** 0.000169* 1.59e-05* 
 
(-6.18E-05) (-8.73E-05) (-6.32E-06) (-5.55E-06) (9.51e-05) (8.48e-06) 
WUASP# 
pop size^2 
    
-5.19e-09* -4.79e-10* 
  
    
(3.11e-09) (2.68e-10) 
World Bank  0.094 -0.0727 0.0306** -0.0943* -0.482** 0.0442 
  
(-0.114) (-0.121) (-0.0127) -0.0528 (0.191) (0.0307) 
Scarcity 0.723*** 0.0312 -0.00124 -0.00902 -0.130 0.00735 
  (-0.261) (-0.059) (-0.00554) (-0.0334) (0.0938) (0.0214) 
  
Reported in appendix I.B. 
Year 
year#main 
effect+ 
year# 
population 
size^2 
Constant 0.291   0.663*** 0.478*** 3.828*** 0.506*** 
  -0.216   -0.00643 -0.0344 (0.109) (0.0239) 
              
Observations 822 867 867 831 867 828 
R-squared 0.086   0.088 0.102 0.346 0.267 
WUAs 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ethnicity, land inequality, scarcity, land size and population size 
 
Conclusion 
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To summarize, WUASP did have a positive effect on the performance of WUAs. 
Moreover, for many outcomes, the program‘s success was mediated or determined by 
several contextual variables. The following chapter explores several mechanisms that 
may link WUASP to these positive outcomes. I also explore the circumstances under 
which the program may have effectively promoted broader cooperation objectives in 
contrast to enhancing the capacity and benefits for elites and privileged groups.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Mechanisms 
 
 
This chapter fulfills the dissertation‘s second major research objective by 
examining the processes linking WUASP to common property resource outcomes.  This 
chapter seeks to explain how the program positively affected certain performance 
indicators and why the program may have successfully motivated broader collective 
action objectives under certain circumstances, but failed under others. 
 
Overview 
My program evaluation provides strong evidence that WUASP was a clear 
improvement upon the blue-print approach for supporting and establishing WUAs. The 
panel data analysis indicates that WUASP improved the average performance outcomes 
for financial, institutional, infrastructure and development indicators. Additionally, the 
treatment effect was mediated by a WUA‘s population and land size, ecological scarcity, 
as well as economic and social heterogeneity. Hence, the results offer some evidence that 
community-driven development (CDD) will yield much more desirable results if it is 
supported through bottom-up methods. Nevertheless, this claim is not without important 
qualifications.  
In particular, I conclude based on my research that the program‘s ability to 
encourage broader cooperation, such as equitable water distribution and participation in 
the rehabilitation projects, was mediated by a community dynamic that allowed the 
program benefits to be shared by a larger segment of the population. In my study, I 
located a pattern of this positive community dynamic in WUAs with sizeable ethnic 
Uzbek populations and relative economic equality between water users. Moreover, in 
areas where the community dynamic was highly unfavorable for large scale cooperation 
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due to extreme social inequality, the program may have represented a catalyst for 
coordination among a subset of the more powerful community members to the detriment 
of average water users.  
I argue that WUASP was not able to build the social infrastructure necessary for 
enhancing community-wide cooperation for two reasons. First, there are entrenched 
structural problems with inequality in some communities. Second and related to the first, 
WUASP‘s version of ―social mobilization‖ was not capable of fundamentally altering the 
social relations in such communities. Thus, the program was only able to generate 
community-wide collective action outcomes in WUAs with an established history of 
irrigation management or in communities that lacked an imbalance of wealthy farmers 
and so already enjoyed some degree of social cohesion. Due to implementation 
limitations and failures, the program may have exacerbated inequality in communities 
characterized by severe equity problems. 
Therefore, while the treatment motivated improvements in the performance of 
WUAs, some of these benefits might have come at the price of a tradeoff between 
efficiency and equity in irrigation management. Thus, despite WUASP‘s advantages and 
success, some of the same limitations and criticisms of the blue-print approach remain, 
and researchers must exhibit caution when equating improved WUA performance with 
the fulfillment of broader collective action objectives.   
 
Roadmap 
In this chapter, I use survey data to test for an association between WUASP and 
outcomes on four individual behavioral mechanisms: knowledge, participation, attitudes 
and social capital. Beyond an investigation of overall WUASP effects, I explore the 
treatment effects for socially or economically disadvantaged groups by comparing 
outcomes for the mechanisms in program versus control respondents for women and 
water users located at the end of the canal system (tail-enders or end-users). In addition, I 
seek to examine the program‘s influence on these four mechanisms among ethnic Uzbek 
versus ethnic Kyrgyz respondents. My hypothesis is that the program has a more 
pronounced effect among Uzbeks in comparison to Kyrgyz, because of Uzbek‘s more 
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extensive history with irrigation and agriculture, in comparison to ethnic Kyrgyz.
51
 
Finally, I compare the results for ethnic Kyrgyz in an ethnically heterogeneous program 
site to the results for ethnic Kyrgyz in homogeneous program WUAs. This provides a 
means to investigate the influence of social heterogeneity.  
After presenting the empirical results for the mechanisms, I discuss several of the 
main implementation problems and inequality issues that hinder WUASP‘s ability to 
achieve its objectives among a broader treatment population.   
 
Data and Methodology 
Focus groups and preliminary survey research project 
Before discussing the quantitative methods, I describe the qualitative methods 
used to inform the statistical analysis in this chapter. First, I conducted forty-three open 
and semi-structured interviews in Bishkek, as well as Osh, Jalalabad and Batken oblasts. 
These interviews were with government officials, non-governmental organizations, 
international organizations, local farmers, academics, community members, village 
leaders, and the leadership and staff of WUAs.
52
  
Also, I implemented a focus group project and exploratory survey research project 
from December 2008 – January 2009. Data from my interviews and initial fieldwork 
were used to create three survey instruments to collect information on ethnic relations, 
trust, conflict levels, assessments of WUA effectiveness, and overall community 
relations. During the focus groups, participants discussed the functioning of WUAs, 
various water management issues, and equality of water distribution in their 
communities. 
In particular, I contracted the Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI), a 
local Kyrgyz NGO, to conduct the focus groups and implement the exploratory survey 
project in Osh, Jalalabad and Batken oblasts among (1) local government leaders (2) 
village elders (aksakals) and (3) villagers. I roughly matched twenty-eight treatment and 
control villages throughout these oblasts on the basis of geographic and demographic 
                                                 
51
 As I discuss in this chapter‘s methods section, my research design does not allow me to separate the 
program effect from the ―Uzbek‖ effect. However, the empirical analysis taken as a whole provides some 
evidence to address this research question.  
52
 I conducted interviews either in Russian or English, or with the help of an interpreter if my interlocutor 
spoke Kyrgyz, Uzbek or Tajik. 
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indicators. Within these communities, surveys were distributed to several aksakals, 
community leaders, and 25 to 50 individuals. Judgment and convenience sampling 
methods were used to select focus group participants and survey respondents; these non-
probability sampling methods were necessary due to financial considerations. This pilot 
survey provided the basis for the large N probability survey completed in December 
2009-January 2010.  
I did not attend the focus group discussions or participate in the exploratory 
survey research to avoid introducing bias. The focus groups were digitally recorded to 
minimize the risk of data falsification. In contrast, there were few ways to ensure the 
quality of the exploratory survey research. Therefore, I rely more heavily on the focus 
group results in my analysis.  
Large N Survey Project 
In this chapter, a survey post-test with non-equivalent comparison group is the 
primary research design used to test the mechanisms linking the Water Users‘ 
Association Support Program (WUASP) to collective action outcomes. The survey 
project represents an individual level survey that utilized a multi-stage sampling design. 
A random sample of 1160 land parcels was surveyed from six Water Users‘ Associations 
(WUAs) in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The project was implemented by a team of 18 local 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek survey researchers and completed during an eight week period from 
December 2009-January 2010.  
Phase 1: Matching 
In the first stage of the survey research, longitudinal data on budget, institutional 
capacity and contextual factors was used to match three treatment WUAs to three control 
WUAs. The inclusion of a control group by matching techniques represents a correction 
strategy for selection bias. Specifically, matching is an attempt to compensate for the 
non-experimental implementation of the program. The use of control WUAs that are 
matched to treatment WUAs using ―pre-treatment‖ data helps to improve estimates of the 
program effect by controlling for variables that may have affected the outcomes of 
interest (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002: 179; Posavac and Carey 2001: 193-201).  
The accuracy of matching is increased by good measurements of variables that 
potentially predicted the selection of WUAs into WUASP. Thus, the goal of the matching 
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procedure is to include all variables that played a role in the WUASP selection process 
and that are related to the dependent variables. It is also important to note that although 
matching may help to alleviate or eliminate some bias, considerable bias can still remain 
because matching is based on observables. This leaves the threat of unobserved 
correlation in the errors between the control and treatment groups unaddressed (Shadish, 
Cook and Campbell 2002: 161-170, 503). 
The overall matching objective was to select the three best matched pairs while 
also achieving some variation in the size, location and ethnic composition of the 
WUAs.
53
 Unfortunately, only six WUA were selected for the study due to time and 
budget constraints.  Three WUASP-supported WUAs that had also received basic World 
Bank institutional development assistance were matched with three control WUAs that 
only received basic World Bank institutional development support. Kyzyl Koshchy, 
Ykbol and Tal Bulak represent the treatment WUAs, whereas Jar Ooz, Nur Bulak Bashat, 
and Vorukh Ali represent the corresponding control WUAs.  
The matching database included pre-treatment measures from World Bank OIP 
data on economic indicators, institutional development indicators, land and member 
sizes, beneficiaries, crop composition, demographic data, canal location, water 
availability, and the condition of the canal system. However, there was an absence of 
good quality pre-treatment measures on the specific individual behavioral mechanisms 
that the survey was designed to measure, including knowledge, participation, attitudes 
and social capital (i.e. trust levels and conflict levels over water resources, etc.).
54
  
Finally, United Nation‘s census data from 1999 was used to determine the ethnic 
composition of the administrative districts for the WUAs because it represented the most 
                                                 
53
 GENMATCH was used only to narrow the field of controls that might match to an individual treatment.  
Since WUASP selected WUAs at different times, this study matched using a one-by-one procedure with 
the set of pre-treatment variables from that year or the previous year (if the WUA was chosen at the 
beginning of some year) to calculate the propensity score and to include in the balancing criteria for 
GENMATCH.  This produced a group of four or five matches for each potential control. Subsequently, the 
best matches from this reduced set were selected based on budget/location concerns. For example, control 
WUAs bordering treatment WUAs were eliminated as potential matches because of the threat of 
information spillover between leaders and/or residual benefits from better irrigation management.   
54
 Additionally, there was a lack of accurate figures for WUA members. WUA members pay dues and have 
a vote in the WUA; they represent the legal owners of land tracts.  WUA ―beneficiaries‖ include anyone 
who benefits from or is serviced by the WUA in addition to members. Thus, the decision was made to 
match on land size although this means that for two WUA pairs, we have a discrepancy between the sizes 
of WUA membership.  
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recent demographic data from a relatively reliable source. These ethnicity measures were 
then used for the matching process, and the primary objective was the selection of an 
ethnically heterogeneous WUA pair. However, despite the census data report of a large 
percentage of ethnic Uzbeks in the district where WUA Nur Bulak Bashat is located, this 
area is characterized by a homogenous Kyrgyz community.
55
 Thus, a mixed 
Uzbek/Kyrgyz WUA was matched to a Kyrgyz WUA. This significantly complicates my 
analysis of the role of ethnicity because all of the ethnic Uzbeks are located in a treatment 
sites, thereby making it impossible to isolate program versus ―ethnicity‖ effects among 
the Uzbeks in Ykbol.  
Phase 2: Sampling 
For the second phase of the survey project, a random sample of 1160 land plots 
(or tracts) in six WUAs was selected to survey. In particular, after the six WUAs were 
selected, WUASP community mobilizers collected a list of the land tracts that had been 
divided up within a WUA following the land reform in Kyrgyzstan. These lists of land 
tracts contain the heads of households and/or original legal owners of the land, and they 
comprise the sample frames from which random samples were drawn.
56
 
Moreover, there was a 100% response rate because the parameters for respondent 
selection were relaxed to include ―heads of households‖ or those individuals who took 
primary care of the land in cases where the original owner was no longer available due to 
death or migration.
57
 Given the lack of updated records and high migration rates in 
Kyrgyzstan, it would not have been feasible to attain adequate response rates in cases 
where the respondent was required to be the owner noted on the official member list. In 
cases where the original head of household was not available, the survey team was 
                                                 
55
 This could be due to a mass migration of Uzbeks from the area since the WUA is located near the Uzbek 
border or problems with the 1999 census project.  
56
 In particular, numbers from 1 to N were assigned to each tract (N is the number of land parcels).  R's 
"sample" command was used to select a sample of size n+x (where n was the optimal size based on the 
power calculations and budget, and x was a set of spares that were never actually used).  The numbers 
produced corresponded to land tracts on the list to be surveyed. The power calculations themselves were 
driven primarily by budget and time concerns due to the limited money and time to complete interviews. 
Originally the number of interviews for each WUA was divided evenly between the six. However, since 
some matched WUAs had less land tracts, we did censuses.  
57
This means that the sampling was not complicated because there was no need to resample non-
respondents.  
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instructed to locate and interview the individual who was currently in charge of the land 
or who shared responsibilities for managing the land.
58
 
Phase 3: Implementation 
The survey instrument was designed to collect data on relevant predictors and the 
individual behavioral mechanisms of interest – knowledge, participation, attitudes and 
social capital. (A more detailed discussion of the independent and dependent variables is 
provided below.) Thus, it included questions related to household awareness of WUA 
governance procedures, basic knowledge of WUAs, involvement in WUAs, behavioral 
changes of interest, assessments of WUA effectiveness, general community relations 
regarding irrigation management, and payment of irrigation service fees. The survey 
consisted of 39 questions and required approximately 45 minutes to complete; it was 
derived from the surveys used during my 2008/2009 pilot study. The survey instrument is 
located in appendix 2.A.   
The survey project was implemented by a team of 18 local Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
survey researchers during an eight week period from December 2009-January 2010.
59
  
 
Dependent Variables 
The survey data is used to test for an association between WUASP and the four 
individual behavioral mechanisms that were developed and discussed in Chapter 4. The 
individual behavioral mechanisms represent abstract concepts that were operationalized 
for testing purposes through the use of survey questions and/or indexes comprised of 
multiple survey questions. Specifically, the survey questions were grouped into four 
                                                 
58 
In cases where the original member on the list was located and interviewed, we can be relatively 
confident that the individual was legally the WUA member.  In cases where there was a new caretaker for 
the land, we assume that they have taken on the roles and responsibilities of the previous/original owner. 
However, they may not be considered a legal member of the WUA since they do not own the land. In 
situations where the legal member has migrated or passed away, there does not seem to be any practical 
difference in the roles or expectations of the family members that have taken over the land. However, in 
cases where families rent their entire plot of land to an outside actor, the practical implications may be 
specific to the WUA. While Sehring (2008) pointed to the disenfranchisement of renters in Northern 
Kyrgyzstan, I did not find this in my field research.   
59 
The project was managed by a local Uzbek woman who had a great deal of experience with short-term 
contract work for international organizations and researchers.  In order to minimize any potential bias from 
a lack of understanding, the survey was translated into Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek for respondents and 
interviewer. A Linguistics PhD Candidate at Indiana University completed the English to Kyrgyz survey 
translation, and the Kyrgyz staff of WUASP in Osh city helped refine the survey.  Professional Uzbek and 
Russian translators converted the document from English to Russian and from Russian to Uzbek.  
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categories – measures of knowledge/awareness, participation/activeness, attitudes about 
and irrigation management outcomes, and social capital/community relations over 
irrigation resources.
60
 
Independent Variables 
The predictors used in my models include: program, sex, ethnicity, size of 
irrigated land, WUA membership status, ecological zone, age of respondent, canal 
location, and whether respondents rent, instead of own, the land. Also, the model 
specifications included interactions between program and key predictor variables, such as 
location, sex, membership and ecological zone, to investigate whether the program effect 
was mediated by these variables.   
The ecological zone variable is an attempt to control for water availability 
between farms, as well as differences in soil conditions. Respondents were coded into 
three zones, depending on their primary crops. Zone 1 indicates that respondents cultivate 
crops such as corn, wheat and food for livestock. These crops require the least amount of 
water, and in some circumstances, can grow and survive as purely rain-fed crops. Zone 2 
designates land where soil/water conditions support vegetables and fruit. Zone 3 includes 
areas where soil/water conditions enable rice cultivation. In Kyrgyzstan, the three zones 
also correspond to the ―profit potential‖ of these crop categories with rice representing 
the most profitable crop and Zone 1 the least.  
For canal location, respondents were asked to provide the approximate location – 
beginning, middle, or end – of their irrigated land within a WUA‘s service area. This 
variable controls for variations in water availability within a WUA. Furthermore, since 
the ecological hierarchy along an irrigation canal generally mirrors a social hierarchy, 
this variable is also an attempt to determine the treatment effect on the disadvantaged 
group of end-users.  
The question used to determine membership status asked respondents if they were 
a member of the WUA, and it included three response categories (yes, no, do not know).  
It is important to emphasize that this is a measure of respondents‘ personal assessment of 
                                                 
60 
Several proxy measures were created for each individual behavioral mechanism and the aggregate results 
of all of the proxy measures represent our ―final measurement‖ for that mechanism. For example, nine 
survey questions that measured respondents‘ knowledge and awareness of basic WUA information 
represent the nine proxy measures for knowledge. The hypothesis test for ‗knowledge‘ is determined by 
examining the aggregate results for all nine proxy measures. 
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their membership status and not their actual legal membership status. Therefore, it is 
highly possible that we have cases where individuals have a legal right to WUA 
membership but are not aware that they qualify for membership.   
Modeling technique 
Regression analysis was used to analyze the survey data. For categorical 
outcomes, logistic or multinomial logistic regression was used to investigate the 
predictors of interest. For continuous index measures, ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS) was selected as the appropriate modeling technique.
61
 The use of a clustered 
standard errors option in the model specification adjusts the variance estimate for 
correlation between respondents within the WUAs. This option assumes that observations 
were independent across the six WUAs (six clusters) but not necessarily within the 
cluster, thereby allowing for unobserved characteristics to be correlated across 
individuals. Put differently, this enables me to model the potential for individuals within 
each WUA to be similar in ways not measured in the study.
62
 
Discussion 
The survey data analysis suggests a positive association between the Water Users‘ 
Association Support Program (WUASP) and three of the mechanisms linking the 
program to better collective action outcomes – knowledge, participation and attitudes. 
Specifically, there is greater community awareness and member participation in treatment 
sites – critical project goals. Moreover, certain categories of program respondents express 
more positive (or desired) attitudes regarding: their right to water given the payment of 
                                                 
61
Two different modeling techniques were considered for analysis—hierarchical linear modeling (linear 
mixed models (LMM)) and ordinary least squares (OLS). First, OLS with clustered standard errors is more 
appropriate for my project since I simply want to control for the clusters and not assess the clustered effect.  
Furthermore, given the assumptions inherent in the two techniques, OLS was determined to be the correct 
strategy. In particular, the hierarchical modeling strategy requires a stronger assumption about the form of 
the correlation between respondents in the same WUA and is founded on the assumption of a normally 
distributed random effect. Given the small number of WUAs, assumptions were likely violated in my study 
because I have little reason to assume that these six WUAs represent a normally distributed random effect; 
an  N approaching or greater than 30 would have made this a more tenable assumption. Therefore, OLS 
was chosen as the modeling technique because it represents a more conservative approach that does not 
require an assumption about the underlying form of the correlation.  
62
 Since we have only six clusters, the bias in standard error might not necessarily be upwards. However, in 
theory, when the numbers of the clusters increases to a sufficient number, the clustered standard errors are 
necessarily more conservative. Since it is more conservative, it will tend to over-correct for correlation. 
Therefore, we are more confident that the results of our statistical models are significant.   
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irrigation service fees, community responsibility for the WUA, and perception of the 
WUA‘s institutional capacity.  However, despite these positive results for three 
mechanisms, the results for social capital suggest that WUASP methods either had no 
effect on community relations surrounding irrigation water management or actually 
worsened them. In program sites, there is more evidence of tension over irrigation water 
and uncooperative behaviors, including ―water-stealing‖ and canal vandalism. 
Regarding the outcomes for specific sub-groups, the statistical results for 
knowledge, participation, and attitudes show very little evidence of a positive program 
effect for women and end-users. For social capital, there is not just an absence of a 
statistically significant difference between program and control respondents in these two 
groups; the results actually show relatively large effects for various categories of control 
respondents. For example, females and end-users in control sites are 13% more likely 
than their program counterparts to state that water is distributed fairly.  
In contrast to the results for disadvantaged groups, the statistical analysis points to 
evidence of better outcomes for each of the four mechanisms among respondents in 
Ykbol WUA – the ethnically heterogeneous WUA. However, it is important to note that 
the absence of Uzbek respondents in control sites eliminates my ability to isolate the 
Uzbek versus program effect.  
In the following sections, I link these empirical results to relevant field 
observations and discuss the program methods that generate positive outcomes for 
knowledge, participation and attitudes. I then put forward an argument to explain why we 
do not see similar results for social capital and disadvantaged groups. Regression output 
is only provided for the interactions of interest; a discussion of the index measures and 
complete regression output for each of the models can be found in appendix 2.B – 2.C.   
 
Mechanism I: Knowledge/Awareness 
During each of my interviews in WUASP-supported sites, WUA Directors 
emphasized the program‘s impact on community awareness. They also drew a connection 
between greater awareness and the achievement of WUA objectives. Directors explicitly 
linked awareness to a greater sense of ownership and responsibility for the irrigation 
infrastructure, which subsequently helped to increase the collection of irrigation service 
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fees (ISF) and decrease uncooperative behavior. For example, the Director of Boz Aryk 
WUA spoke directly to the importance of mobilization and its impact on ownership: 
―Fifty percent of success is awareness; you should mobilize people. They have to 
understand the ownership; they should feel the ownership of the canal.‖ The Director of 
Ak Bulak WUA noted the improvement in irrigation service fee (ISF) collection rates: 
―Earlier, the mirabs had to visit the households but now they (water users) bring the 
money to us and it is the middle of the season and we have already collected about 50%. 
Responsibility has increased.‖  
The leadership turnovers that followed WUASP trainings on the rights and 
responsibilities of water users were another important theme to emerge during the 
interviews. In particular, education and social mobilization sought to inform the 
population about the rights of WUA members to elect the WUA‘s Council members and 
to teach people that the Council members have the authority to hire and manage the 
WUA director and other paid staff, such as mirabs and accountants.  As a WUASP 
coordinator said, ―Most people think that the WUA is part of the government. Once they 
find out more about the WUAs, the first thing that they do is usually replace the 
management‖ (JB 2008). This assertion was affirmed during my interviews. For example, 
according to the Directors in two WUAs: 
Our WUA was set up in 2004 and no one knew what was going on and 
who had rights to the water. They (WUA members) thought that the 
director of the WUA held total control. After Winrock, the situation 
became clearer and they (WUA members) changed managers through 
elections (Director, Ak Bulak WUA). 
 
People started having meetings and realized that the Council was the 
supreme power. At the beginning, they only respected the director and the 
mirabs, but after the trainings, they realized that the council was superior 
(Director, Isa Mariyam WUA). 
The regression results corroborate my qualitative findings concerning a positive 
program association with knowledge and awareness outcomes. As expected, communities 
exposed to WUASP‘s educational trainings and formal/informal meetings about the 
WUA are more informed than communities that did not receive the additional education. 
For six of the nine survey questions used to assess knowledge, program respondents are 
clearly more knowledgeable and informed than their control counterparts. For the 
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remaining three questions, we find a mix of positive control and treatment results. More 
specifically, individuals in treatment sites are more likely to know the name of their 
WUA Director and zonal representative, as well as their WUA‘s election and meeting 
procedures. Also, individuals in WUASP-supported sites feel more informed about the: 
timing of WUA meetings, WUA budget, responsibilities associated with WUA 
membership, water-delivery schedules, and benefits of WUA membership.  
This program effect for knowledge is not just positive and statistically significant; 
it also represents a practical or policy relevant effect. Depending on the question and 
respondent category, the likelihood of WUASP respondents answering a knowledge 
question correctly or feeling completely informed about an issue in comparison to control 
respondents ranges from 10% to 57%, with an average in the upper twenties.  
Table 6.1. Regression results for knowledge measures  
  Logit Multinomial 
 
Q7 Q10 Q12 Q15 Q17a Q17d Q17b ( 2) Q17c ( 1) 
    
    
    
WUASP 1.466* 1.237 0.838 1.588** 1.858** 4.447***     1.368** 2.274*** 
 
(0.890) (0.946) (1.052) (0.680) (0.843) (0.922) (0.594) (0.802) 
WUASP#mem. -1.291 -2.486*** -0.731 -0.975 -1.864** -1.435* -2.425*** -1.538** 
 
(1.407) (0.883) (0.877) (0.932) (0.850) (0.750) (0.683) (0.780) 
WUASP#uncer. 0.260 -0.524 0.787 3.150*** 0.0265 -1.334*** -1.552*** -15.08*** 
 
(0.808) (1.040) (0.575) (0.978) (0.303) (0.359) (0.310) (1.598) 
WUASP#middle 0.569** 0.947*** 0.0848 -0.711 0.293 -0.499* 0.995*** 1.026** 
 
(0.232) (0.301) (0.178) (0.483) (0.213) (0.256) (0.215) (0.411) 
WUASP#end -0.0719 0.363 -0.821** -1.751*** 0.695 -0.633 0.367 -0.218 
 
(0.298) (0.577) (0.387) (0.414) (0.772) (0.638) (0.584) (0.564) 
WUASP#1.sex 0.494 0.839* -1.199*** -0.426 -0.905** -2.057* -1.288*** -0.717 
 
(0.583) (0.481) (0.368) (0.451) (0.410) (1.152) (0.189) (0.455) 
WUASP#Zone1 1.028*** 0.852 0.989 -0.0869 0.497*** -0.601*** 0.370 -0.326 
 
(0.360) (0.612) (0.808) (0.308) (0.169) (0.171) (0.343) (0.423) 
WUASP#Zone2 0.0955 0.871** 1.598** 0.947*** -1.374*** -3.284*** -2.989*** -3.012*** 
 
(0.266) (0.433) (0.690) (0.301) (0.494) (0.592) (0.395) (0.813) 
Constant 0.418 1.839*** 1.682** -0.374 -2.578*** -6.476*** -2.419*** -1.687 
 
(0.621) (0.572) (0.697) (0.577) (0.762) (0.757) (0.810) (1.153) 
       
  
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,123 1,131 1,127 1,114 1,129 1,128 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Mechanism II: Participation/Activeness 
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As expected, the quantitative analysis provides evidence of greater participation 
in WUASP-supported WUAs. There is strong statistical support for a positive treatment 
effect on participation in meetings, elections, as well as the overall time that individuals 
dedicate to the WUA. The outcomes for the participation index measure indicate a 
substantively large and positive difference for treatment respondents who are members, 
those uncertain about their membership status, as well as respondents located at the 
beginning and middle of the canal. More specifically, respondents in these four categories 
exhibit either an entire point increase, or close to an entire point increase, on the five 
point scale. Furthermore, WUASP respondents in ecological zone 3, together with 
respondents uncertain of their membership status, are approximately 15% more likely to 
have voted for a zonal representative.  
  Indeed, throughout my field research, the WUA staff and leaders maintained that 
WUASP‘s methods helped motivate greater community involvement through a variety of 
mechanisms. As the Director of Shaidan Kara Unger asserted, ―the biggest change was 
the attitude in each of the zones. People became more active in all of the zones.‖ The 
project was claimed to have improved the WUA staff‘s skills for organizing or 
mobilizing the population; WUASP had ―improved inter-personal skills‖ and ―helped us 
to work better with the people.‖ As the former director of Shaidan Kara Unger WUA 
said, ―we know our area well but we didn‘t know how to communicate with people about 
the WUA, motivate people and train and select leaders.‖ As discussed above, institutional 
development and social mobilization ensured that WUA members understood their rights 
and responsibilities and that the WUA held the required elections and meetings to enable 
water users to express their leadership preferences.  
Moreover, the program‘s participatory rehabilitation process requires an engaged 
and active WUA leadership and community in order to successfully complete the work. 
First, the process for approving irrigation sites for rehabilitation requires a meeting 
involving a quorum of members or zonal representatives. Next, the WUA leadership has 
to take responsibility for purchasing the materials necessary for rehabilitation and 
organizing the population for the required labor contribution. Since WUASP grants are 
relatively small, they help a WUA cover the costs of most of the materials required for a 
rehabilitation site, but labor must be provided by the community unless water users 
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contribute additional funds for hiring workers. Consequently, the leadership emphasized 
that the multiple meetings and discussions during the project helped to increase people‘s 
understanding of how the WUA functions; this subsequently motivated many people to 
become involved in the rehabilitation projects by contributing funds and providing labor. 
Table 6.2. Regression results for participation measures  
  Logit OLS 
 
Q13 PARTIC 
WUASP -0.0597 -1.323*** 
 
(0.634) (0.235) 
WUASP#mem. -1.702** 0.929** 
 
(0.711) (0.348) 
WUASP#uncer. 1.958*** -0.0148 
 
(0.459) (0.353) 
WUASP#middle 0.425 -0.0766 
 
(0.273) (0.122) 
WUASP#end 0.0176 0.586*** 
 
(0.397) (0.133) 
WUASP#1.sex -1.337*** 0.274 
 
(0.423) (0.395) 
WUASP#Zone1 0.109 0.215 
 
(0.600) (0.253) 
WUASP#Zone2 1.204** 0.113 
 
(0.536) (0.0726) 
Constant 1.745** -0.545 
  (0.786) (0.315) 
Observations 1,123 1,101 
R-squared   0.415 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
  Mechanism III: Attitudes 
As expected, WUASP respondents express attitudes about irrigation management 
and the WUA‘s institutional capacity that suggest a potential for better collective action 
outcomes. The statistical analysis suggests a positive association in WUASP-supported 
WUAs for the six attitudinal measures. WUASP respondents provide a more favorable 
evaluation of the WUA‘s staff and irrigation management. Also, individuals in treatment 
sites are more confident that non-cooperative behavior will be punished and that they will 
receive adequate water given their irrigation service fee (ISF) payment. Finally, program 
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respondents are more likely to state that their community is responsible for the success of 
the WUA.  
  Furthermore, these results are substantively large. The positive treatment effect 
for the four indexes used to measure attitudes ranges from .36 to 1.32 on the four and five 
point scales. Additionally, in program sites, respondents who are uncertain of their 
membership status, as well as respondents in ecological zone 3 are more than 30% likely 
to accept responsibility and ownership for the WUA, and members are 12% more likely 
to provide the highest performance evaluation of their WUA.  
Given the corresponding improvements in knowledge and participation in 
WUASP sites, the results for attitudes seem to support theoretical assertions that 
awareness and activeness can promote the desired changes. Once again, interviews with 
WUA directors revealed the important effect that the program had on responsibility and 
ownership, factors deemed crucial for attitudinal and behavioral change. According to the 
Director of Uch Korgon WUA, ―You have to understand that we were under the USSR 
for 70 years and there was no initiative. This is their association and they needed to 
understand that this was their responsibility.‖ 
Significantly, participatory rehabilitation is expected to motivate positive attitudes 
concerning institutional capacity and community responsibility for the WUA. The 
rehabilitation consists of WUASP grants that are usually combined with community labor 
and sometimes even supplemented by community finances. The primary, concrete benefit 
of emergency rehabilitation is to improve water distribution, especially in downstream 
areas. The assumption is that increased water flows for end-users will motivate greater 
irrigation service fee (ISF) payments and labor contributions. When discussing the 
benefits of the Winrock program, many Directors explicitly noted the link between grants 
and increased ISF collection. For example, as the Director of Kara Dobo WUA 
explained,  
The upper-users have always planted the same crops, but since the 
program, the downstream farmers have more water and more crops. 
Earlier, a lot of water was lost and the canals were not clean. So, we built 
water-gates to help direct the water better and reinforced some parts of the 
canals with concrete, and the time for water to reach the irrigation points 
changed from about one hour to thirty minutes. There was no change with 
the fee payment among upstream farmers but the downstream farmers 
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have increased their payment…We used to always owe money to the 
government before, but now, there is no debt. For example it is only July 
and approximately 70% of the ISF has been paid.  
 
Next, these rehabilitation projects grants are expected to have significant short or 
long term effects on the trust dynamic between the population and the WUA‘s 
management and leadership. Taking part in the labor or seeing tangible results of the 
rehabilitation work is predicted to increase the payment of ISF. Greater financial support 
from the community may be promoted in cases where the community has seen two or 
three cycles of the WUA cleaning and lining canals and installing water-gates. Third, 
involvement in the rehabilitation process is expected to enhance the community‘s sense 
of ownership for the infrastructure. According to a WUASP engineer, ―When they build 
it themselves, they start to have an understanding of this as their own. The behaviors 
change along with the idea that they must pay for water and the infrastructure.  
Correspondingly,  the Director of Kara Dobo WUA stated, ―Before, the water and 
infrastructure were owned by the Soviets, but now they (the community) have 
constructed water-gates and lined the canals on their own through ―ashar‖;63 now they 
own it‖ (Director Kara Dobo WUA).  
Nevertheless, for three of the six attitudinal indicators, these positive results in 
WUASP-supported sites are restricted to WUA members, as well as respondents in 
ecological zone 3, which corresponds to the treatment WUA with an ethnically 
heterogeneous population. The potential implications for this limited program effect are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Table 6.3. Regression results for attitude measures  
  OLS Logit Multinomial 
 
STAFF PUNISH IRMAN ISF Q16 Q22(1) 
            
WUASP 0.249 -0.411 0.492* 0.625 0.260 -0.439 
 
(0.403) (0.242) (0.238) (0.412) (0.368) (0.732) 
WUASP#mem. 0.740 -0.246 0.136 0.745* -0.373 -0.499 
 
(0.427) (0.488) (0.306) (0.308) (0.456) (0.808) 
WUASP#uncer. 0.0317 -0.533 -0.169 -0.00816 1.436*** 1.647** 
 
(0.248) (0.302) (0.312) (0.397) (0.503) (0.643) 
WUASP#middle -0.635 -0.0936 -0.613 -0.475 0.318 - 
                                                 
63
 Asharn refers to voluntary community labor. Please see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion   
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(0.407) (0.256) (0.343) (0.273) (0.329) - 
WUASP#end -0.308 -0.117 -0.779* -0.437 0.150 - 
 
(0.398) (0.231) (0.313) (0.350) (0.362) - 
WUASP#1.sex -0.0147 0.273 0.399 -0.307 -0.724 -0.293 
 
(0.304) (0.282) (0.411) (0.242) (0.491) (0.844) 
WUASP#Zone1 -0.204 0.464** 0.202 -0.340 -0.811** -0.195 
 
(0.391) (0.174) (0.344) (0.256) (0.344) (0.848) 
WUASP#Zone2 -2.163*** -1.428*** -1.580*** -1.297*** 1.290*** 18.71*** 
 
(0.335) (0.228) (0.300) (0.205) (0.309) (1.158) 
Constant -0.503** 0.466 -0.733** -0.948 0.623 0.0534 
 
(0.195) (0.373) (0.230) (0.493) (0.469) (1.069) 
      
 
Observations 1,106 1,107 1,104 1,105 1,130 1,101 
R-squared 0.437 0.487 0.436 0.205    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Mechanism IV: Social Capital 
In contrast to the positive program results seen for the other three mechanisms, 
there is a notable lack of a positive program association with the nine social capital 
outcomes tested.  Moreover, there is not just an absence of a statistically significant 
difference between program and control; the results actually show substantial effects for 
various categories of control respondents. Among program respondents, there were more 
reports of behaviors and community dynamics that are detrimental to the long term 
success and development of the WUA, including ―water-stealing,‖ vandalism of canals 
and tension over irrigation water. Control respondents also report higher levels of trust, as 
well as better community relations and more cooperative behaviors over irrigation water. 
Accordingly, multiple categories of control respondents are much less likely to report that 
divisions in economic/social status, religion or ethnicity are related to conflict over 
irrigation water. Finally, control respondents are more likely to report that water is 
distributed fairly and that irrigation management outcomes are equitable across the 
WUA. These results provide some evidence that WUASP programmatic methods either 
failed to motivate or worsened a community‘s communal relations regarding irrigation 
water. 
Furthermore, these are large substantive effects. For example, on a five point 
index scale, the smallest effect is .33, while the largest is a 1.57 point difference. The 
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exception to this is the results for ecological zone 3, which is located in the ethnically 
heterogeneous Ykbol WUA. In Ykbol, we find better assessments of trust and community 
relations over irrigation management, as well as more reports of cooperative behavior and 
stronger norms of community shaming, although we also find that ethnic and religious 
divisions are related to conflict over irrigation water.  
Consequently, these results highlight concerns raised by common property 
resource scholars and anthropologists regarding the potential negative effects of 
development projects. In particular, WUASP may be replicating and further enforcing the 
divide between disadvantaged and more socially powerful groups by disproportionately 
benefiting the latter. In order to describe why we fail to see a positive association between 
WUASP and the critical proximate objective of social capital, I put forth two key 
explanations later in this chapter that relate to the significant structural inequality in some 
communities and implementation problems with the program.  
Table 6.4. Regression results for social capital measures  
  OLS Logit 
 
COOP TRUST ECONSTAT RELETHN FAIR Q39a 
WUASP -1.981*** 0.948*** -1.208*** -1.224*** -1.825*** 0.889*** 
 
(0.286) (0.194) (0.263) (0.302) (0.320) (0.240) 
WUASP#mem. 1.244** -0.233 1.143** 0.525 0.875** 0.141 
 
(0.442) (0.396) (0.347) (0.338) (0.297) (0.487) 
WUASP#uncer. 1.885** -0.472 -0.321 -0.256 -0.0372 1.612*** 
 
(0.667) (0.331) (0.164) (0.131) (0.607) (0.462) 
WUASP#middle 0.443 -0.364 0.412 0.142 0.515 -0.633 
 
(0.263) (0.239) (0.332) (0.176) (0.380) (0.503) 
WUASP#end 0.388 -0.343 0.429 0.349* 0.255 -0.202 
 
(0.450) (0.296) (0.270) (0.156) (0.304) (0.436) 
WUASP#1.sex -0.632* 0.150 -0.502** 0.0379 0.143 -0.945*** 
 
(0.258) (0.296) (0.155) (0.163) (0.340) (0.344) 
WUASP#Zone1 0.434 0.191 -0.295* 0.339** 0.103 0.375 
 
(0.482) (0.204) (0.132) (0.0968) (0.192) (0.280) 
WUASP#Zone2 1.853** -1.851*** 0.212 0.620*** 0.572** 0.243 
 
(0.473) (0.316) (0.170) (0.0836) (0.186) (0.172) 
Constant 1.55*** -.697*** 1.16*** 1.20*** 1.10*** 1.841*** 
 
(.235) (.154) (.25) (.092) (.198) (0.415) 
Observations             1097 1130      1119                    1122 
 
1105 1,121 
R-squared                 .4176 .3689 
 
.3686                    .3435 
 
.3357 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Multinomial 
 
Q19e(2) Q33d(1) Q33d(2) Q34(2) Q34(3) 
WUASP -0.260 1.524 0.982* 0.644 1.740* 
 
(0.503) (1.098) (0.530) (0.527) (0.917) 
WUASP#mem. - 0.332 -1.481*** - - 
 
- (0.652) (0.484) - - 
WUASP#uncer. - -2.577*** -2.607** - - 
 
- (0.612) (1.162) - - 
WUASP#middle - - - -0.944** -1.624** 
 
- - - (0.374) (0.659) 
WUASP#end - - - -0.0487 -0.693 
 
- - - (0.570) (0.649) 
WUASP#1.sex - - - 0.720*** 0.845** 
 
- - - (0.255) (0.412) 
WUASP#Zone1 -0.133 -2.864** -1.998*** -0.221 -1.918 
 
(0.444) (1.170) (0.559) (0.519) (1.397) 
WUASP#Zone2 -2.308*** -1.046 -1.574*** -1.367*** -4.387*** 
 
(0.780) (0.901) (0.316) (0.486) (0.830) 
Constant 2.281*** -0.960 -0.456 -3.324*** -3.989*** 
 
(0.360) (1.132) (0.608) (0.586) (0.907) 
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,118 1,118 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results for Ykbol WUA, women and tail-enders 
For knowledge, participation and attitudes, I find consistently positive program 
effects for males, WUA members and respondents located at the beginning and middle of 
the canal. However, the statistical results show very little evidence of a positive program 
effect for disadvantaged groups in WUASP sites; there is not a statistically significant 
difference between program and control respondents in these groups for the majority of 
proxy measures. Similar to the results for social capital, the lack of positive outcomes for 
disadvantaged groups raise questions concerning whether the program‘s benefits 
extended beyond local elites or the most advantaged groups.   
In Kyrgyzstan, and across the developing world, women play a critical role in 
agriculture. In Southern Kyrgyzstan, women are actively involved in the planting, 
watering and harvesting of crops. Yet, in most WUAs, they comprise a trivial proportion 
of the leadership, staff and zonal representatives. Moreover, since land was distributed to 
115 
 
the male head of household during land reform, they are often legally excluded from 
WUA membership. 
According to WUASP program theory, the project is designed to empower 
women. In addition to the educational trainings, the project works to ensure that 
institutional barriers to female participation are removed. However, the program 
evaluation provides little evidence of a positive association between the treatment and 
outcomes for women.  For knowledge, female respondents in treatment WUAs are more 
than 50% likely to successfully identify the Director of their WUA than their control 
counterparts. Alternatively, females in control sites are 32% more likely to feel informed 
about water delivery schedules; 13% more likely to say that water is distributed fairly; 
and 4% less likely to say that people damage water-gates. Moreover, females in control 
sites are less likely to state that divisions in economic and social status are linked to 
tensions over irrigation water.  
For end-users, the results suggest an important, positive treatment association 
with participation; those in WUASP-supported WUAs score .23 higher on the four point 
participation measure. This outcome is significant at the 99% level, although it is not a 
large substantive effect. However, the only other evidence of a positive treatment effect is 
found for a knowledge question where program respondents are 10% more likely to feel 
informed about their WUA‘s governance procedures. In contrast, end-users in control 
sites are 13% more likely to say that water is distributed fairly and substantially less 
likely to claim that divisions in religion and ethnicity are linked to tension over irrigation 
water. Finally, the results of the other twenty measures tested for knowledge, 
participation, attitudes and social capital suggest no difference between treatment and 
control respondents at the end of the canals. 
The results for end-users provide the strongest evidence of a tradeoff between 
equity and efficiency in WUASP sites. In particular, the overwhelming majority of 
WUAs in Southern Kyrgyzstan experience the most significant infrastructure and water 
scarcity problems in their downstream canal locations. The ecological hierarchy that 
often motivates free-riding by upstream farmers and sub-par results for downstream 
farmers generally reflects a social hierarchy in WUAs; upstream farmers represent the 
wealthier or more socially powerful individuals, whereas downstream plots were 
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distributed to the poorest or least influential community members. Although the social 
dimension was never openly discussed, WUASP was well aware of the disproportionate 
infrastructure and water scarcity problems faced by downstream farmers. Thus, the lack 
of a program effect or positive control effect for end-users is highly problematic.  
  Hence, the improvements that we find for the first three mechanisms are 
restricted to certain population categories. The improvements for knowledge and 
participation are generally restricted to males, WUA members and water users at the 
beginning of the canal. Despite the positive program effects for knowledge, the restricted 
set of program beneficiaries may explain why a large percentage of respondents in 
program sites still lack basic knowledge. Among survey respondents, twenty percent of 
program respondents do not know the name of the WUA or their zonal representative, 
and approximately half do not know the selection procedure for the WUA director. 
Twenty-three percent  of program respondents feel ―completely uninformed‖ about water 
delivery schedules and the responsibilities of WUA membership; thirty-four percent feel 
―completely uninformed‖ about WUA meetings and the benefits of membership; and 
fifty-six percent of  program respondents feel ―completely uninformed‖ about the WUA 
budget.  
Furthermore, if we take a closer look at attitudes, we see that the positive program 
results are concentrated in ecological zone 3 which only includes respondents from 
Ykbol—the majority Uzbek WUA (The significance of Ykbol and WUAs with sizeable 
Uzbek categories is discussed below). In contrast, improvements are notably lacking in 
these categories for women and tail-enders. In WUASP sites, although women are more 
knowledgeable about some basic WUA info and tail-enders are slightly more likely to 
participate in the WUA, there is not consistent evidence to support the claim that 
WUASP methods have a significant positive impact on these groups.  
I also investigated the program effect on respondents in the ethnically 
heterogeneous WUA – Ykbol – versus the ethnically homogenous program sites. From 
the beginning of my field research, cultural differences between the ethnic Kyrgyz and 
ethnic Uzbek populations emerged as an important theme in irrigation management.  
Both Kyrgyz and Uzbek respondents contrasted the nomadic history of the Kyrgyz with 
the Uzbeks‘ longer history of settled agriculture and experience with formal and informal 
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institutions for the management of irrigation.  Moreover, Uzbeks are generally associated 
with greater success in agricultural endeavors. 
 Accordingly, in treatment sites with sizeable Uzbek populations, qualitative 
findings consistently indicate greater equity in water distribution. There was a general 
consensus among focus group and survey respondents that water was distributed fairly 
and that the population could depend on the WUA‘s commitment to water distribution 
through water-schedules. The WUASP staff maintained that it was generally easier to 
organize the Uzbeks, and relayed stories about the strength of community shaming in 
these communities,  although they also asserted that results attained in some 
homogeneous Kyrgyz communities could be just as good as those in majority Uzbek 
areas. 
Given the lack of Uzbek respondents in the control WUAs, there is no way to 
determine whether better outcomes for the four mechanisms in Ykbol are indicative of an 
Uzbek versus program effect. Thus, I grapple with this question in a less straight-forward 
manner. First, I restrict the observations to include only those individuals in program sites 
and examine outcomes for Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. If there is no difference between Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz in program sites, this provides some evidence for the argument that WUASP 
affects these groups differently or that there is an ―Uzbek‖ effect. Next, I further restrict 
the analysis to individuals within Ykbol and examine differences between the Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz in this WUA. If the Uzbeks in Ykbol perform better on the four individual 
behavioral mechanisms, this represents some evidence in favor of a purely ―Uzbek 
effect‖ or heterogeneous program effect for the Uzbeks. Finally, I investigate differences 
between Kyrgyz in Ykbol and Kyrgyz in homogeneous program sites to examine the 
effects of social heterogeneity. These empirical results are summarized in the four tables 
below, which provide the predicted probabilities from the regression analysis. The 
complete regression output is available in appendix 2.C. 
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 Among program respondents and within Ykbol, the results suggest that ethnic 
Uzbeks are much more knowledgeable and informed about the WUA and irrigation 
management than Kyrgyz. We see no evidence of a positive knowledge effect for Kyrgyz 
in Ykbol versus Kyrgyz in homogeneous program sites. For participation outcomes 
among WUASP respondents, the analysis indicates that Uzbeks at the beginning of the 
canal are more active participants than their Kyrgyz counterparts. However, while there is 
no difference between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Ykbol, Kyrgyz in Ykbol are less likely to 
participate than Kyrgyz in other treatment sites. Thus, for knowledge and participation, 
we see little evidence of a positive influence from social heterogeneity among Kyrgyz 
and Uzbeks. The positive results for Uzbeks may be attributable to a heterogeneous 
treatment effect on theUzbeks and/or a purely Uzbek effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
Results for all treatment respondents 
 
Results within Ykbol 
 
Results for Kyrgyz in 
homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous sites 
Meetings 
 
Positive Uzbek effect: males (.17)***, females (.4) 
***, beg (.26) ***, mid (.35) ***, end (.29) ***, Zone 
1 (.36) ***, Zone 2 (.23) ***, Zone 3 (.26) *** 
Positive Uzbek effect: Zone 
1 (.28) ***, Zone 3 (.24) 
*** 
No difference 
 Benefits Positive Uzbek effect: males (.22) ***, females (.27) 
***, beg (.23) ***, mid (.33) ***, end (.22) ***, Zone 
1 (.35) ***, Zone 2 (.18) ***, Zone 3 (.21) *** 
Positive Uzbek 
effect:2.13*** 
No difference 
 
Responsibiliti
es 
Positive Uzbek effect: males (.27) ***, females (.37) 
***, beg (.35) ***, mid (.32) ***, end (.3) ***, Zone 1 
(.39) ***, Zone 2 (.09)**, Zone 3 (.39) *** 
Positive Uzbek effect: 
2.31*** 
No difference 
 Budget Positive Uzbek effect: males (.13) ***, females (.26) 
***, beg (.19) ***, mid (.29) ***, end (.14) ***, Zone 
1 (.34) ***, Zone 2 (.10)*, Zone 3 (.15) *** 
Positive Uzbek effect: Zone 
1 (.27)**, Zone 3 (.09)** 
No difference 
 Schedules Positive Uzbek effects: males (.27)***, females 
(.40)***, beg (.38)***, mid (.37)***, end (.26)***, 
Zone 1 (.48)***, Zone 3 (.28)*** 
Positive Uzbek effect 
(1.48)*** 
Positive homog. 
effects: beg (.15)** 
Table 6.5. Knowledge results for the analysis of social heterogeneity and Uzbek outcomes 
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 In contrast, for attitudes and social capital, we find evidence of positive effects 
for social heterogeneity. In particular, in WUASP-supported sites, Uzbek respondents 
have much better outcomes for attitudes than Kyrgyz. However, for four of the six 
attitudinal measures, we find no difference (or even better Kyrgyz results) between 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Ykbol. Significantly, for all attitudinal questions, we find better 
outcomes for Kyrgyz in Ykbol in comparison to Kyrgyz in ethnically homogeneous sites.  
The results for social capital are similar to the findings for attitudes. Once again, 
in treatment sites, Uzbeks have much better outcomes for social capital than Kyrgyz 
respondents. Nevertheless, for six of the eight social capital measures, we find no 
difference (or even better Kyrgyz results) between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Ykbol or better 
results for Kyrgyz. Finally, for six of the eight social capital measures, I also find better 
outcomes for Kyrgyz in Ykbol in comparison to Kyrgyz in homogeneous treatment sites.  
 
 
Results for all treatment respondents 
 
Results within Ykbol 
 
Results for Kyrgyz in 
homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous sites 
Staff eval 
 
Positive Kyrgyz effects: Zone 3 (.14)*** Positive Kyrgyz effects: 
Zone 3 (.92) *** 
Positive hetero. effects: beg 
(.89)***, mid (.96)***, end 
(.95)*** 
Sanction? 
 
Positive Uzbek effects: males (.58) ***, females 
(.85) ***, beg (.68) ***, mid (.90) ***, end (.56) 
***, Zone 1 (1.22)*, Zone 2 (.51)*, Zone 3 (.40)** 
No difference Positive hetero. effects: mid 
(1.51)***, end (.67)*** 
WUA eval? 
 
Positive Uzbek effects (Outcome 1): .mem05*** 
Positive Kyrgyz effects (Outcome 1): non 
mem(.06)*** 
Positive Uzbek effects  Outcome 3: mem .14***, 
non-mem .20*** uncertain .20*** 
No difference NA 
 
Results for all treatment respondents 
 
Results within Ykbol 
 
Results for Kyrgyz in 
homogeneous versus  
heterogeneous sites 
 
Participation  
 
Positive Uzbek effects: beg (.11)** No difference 
Positive homog. effects: beg 
(.91)***, mid (.89)***, end 
(.58)*** 
Voting? 
 
Positive Kyrgyz effects: males (.30) ***, 
females (.11) ***, beg (.25) ***, end (.20) 
***, Zone 1 (.24) ***, Zone 2 (.24)**, 
Zone 3 (.13)*** 
Positive Kyrgyz effects: 
end (.25)** 
Positive homog. effects: beg 
(.30)***, mid (.29)***, end 
(.18)*** 
Table 6.6. Participation results for the analysis of social heterogeneity and Uzbek outcomes  
Table 6.7. Attitudes results for the analysis of social heterogeneity and Uzbek outcomes 
120 
 
Irrigation 
outcome? 
Positive Uzbek effects: males (.48)***, females 
(.99)*, beg (.71)**, mid (.86)**, Zone 1 (1.05)**, 
Zone 2 (.95)*, Zone 3 (.20)** 
Positive Kyrgyz effects: 
Zone 1 (.42)* 
Positive hetero. effects: beg 
(1.35)***, mid (1.42)***, end 
(1.44)*** 
 
 
ISF? 
Positive Uzbek effects: males (.25) ***, beg (.39) 
***, mid (.27) ***, Zone 2 (.50)**, Zone 3 (.36)* 
Positive Uzbek effects: 
Zone 3 (.34)* 
No difference 
 
 
Own/resp.?  
Positive Uzbek effects: males (.26) ***, females 
(.26) ***, beg (.37) ***, mid (.24) ***, end (.17)*, 
Zone 1 (.15) ***, Zone 2 (.40) ***, Zone 3 (.27) 
*** 
Positive Uzbek effects: 
Zone 3 (.18)* 
Positive hetero. effects: beg 
(.34)***, mid (.26)** 
 
 
 Results for all treatment respondents 
 
Results within 
Ykbol 
 
Results for Kyrgyz in 
homogeneous versus  
heterogeneous sites 
Trust 
 
Positive Uzbek effects: males (.90) ***, 
females (.50) ***, beg (1.05) ***, mid 
(1.03) ***, end (.85) ***, Zone 1 (1.25) 
***, Zone 2 (1.33) ***, Zone 3 (.41) *** 
Positive Uzbek main 
effect -.31* 
Positive hetero. effects: beg 
(1.96)***, mid (1.59)***, end 
(1.0)*** 
Econ/social 
divisions 
Positive Uzbek effects: females (.40)*, end 
(.53) ***, Zone 3 (.46) *** 
No difference 
 
Positive hetero. effects: mid (.11)*** 
 
Ethnic/religious 
divisions 
 
Positive Kyrgyz effects: males (.83) ***, 
females (.30)**, beg (.82) ***, mid (.63) 
***, end (.24)**, Zone 1 (.66) ***, Zone 2 
(.61) ***, Zone 3 (.41) *** 
Positive Kyrgyz main 
effect -.38** 
Positive homo.  effects: beg 
(.65)***, mid (.83)***, end (.66)*** 
 Solve conflicts 
 
Positive Uzbek effects: females (.16)**, 
mid (.18) ***, Zone 2 (.17) ***, Zone 3 
(.15)** 
No difference Positive hetero. effects: beg (.23)** 
Positive homo. effects: mid (.27)*** 
 Community 
shaming 
 
Positive Kyrgyz effects (Outcome 1): Zone 
1 (.16)***, Zone 3 (.11)* 
Positive Uzbek effects (Outcome 3): Zone 2 
(.14)**, Zone 3 (.13)**, males (.13) ***, 
mid (.13) ***, non-mem(.29)*** 
No difference Positive hetero  2.01*** 
Cooperation 
 
 
 
Positive Uzbek effects: males (1.43) ***, 
females (2.10) ***, beg (1.90) ***, mid 
(1.68) ***, end (1.69) ***, Zone 1 (2.27) 
***, Zone 2 (1.90) ***, Zone 3 (1.05) *** 
Positive Uzbek 
effects: females 
(1.19) *** 
Positive hetero effect: beg (1.79)***, 
mid (1.59)***, end (2.19)*** 
Infrastructure  
damage 
 
Positive Uzbek effects (Outcome 1): Zone 1 
(.32) ***,  Zone 3 (.06) ***, females (.15)*, 
beg (.09)*, end (.13)** 
 
No difference 
 
Positive hetero. effect for outcome 3: 
1.14*** 
Fair water dist. Positive Uzbek effects: males (.75) *** Positive Kyrgyz 
effects: females 
(1.56)*** 
Positive hetero. effects: mid 
(.66)***, end (.76)*** 
 
Table 6.8. Social Capital results for the analysis of social heterogeneity and Uzbek outcomes  
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Mediating Factors 
As the results of the collective action outcomes analysis in Chapter 5 indicate, 
WUASP did have a positive effect on WUA performance indicators. Moreover, the 
empirical results for this chapter suggest that WUASP motivated these positive outcomes 
through its positive effect on knowledge, participation, and attitudes, although this 
dissertation cannot directly test the link between the mechanisms and outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative analysis also implies that the program did not have 
consistent effects across population groups and it was not capable of building social 
capital assets in all circumstances. The improvements in knowledge, participation and 
attitudes are generally limited to the advantaged groups and Ykbol WUA, and the 
positive results for social capital are further limited to Ykbol.  
These findings suggest a distinction between WUASP‘s effect on WUA 
performance outcomes and WUASP‘s impact on community-wide cooperation for 
irrigation resource management; positive performance outcomes for WUAs may not 
necessarily reflect improved collective action among a broad population of water users in 
a service area. Although WUASP motivated significant improvements in the institutional 
capacity of WUAs, my research suggests WUASP helped promote broad-based 
cooperation and collective action objectives in WUAs that already had the necessary 
social foundation for cooperation.  
The social capital is generated by and reflected in a positive community dynamic 
is a prerequisite for cooperative behavior such as equitable water distribution and 
voluntary participation in rehabilitation efforts. Given the lack of resources and 
institutional weaknesses that plague irrigation management in Southern Kyrgyzstan, a 
certain level of social cohesion helps diminish the emergence of a free-rider dilemma 
between upstream and downstream water users by substantially raising the costs for 
destroying equitable water distribution schemes. However, despite WUASP‘s methods 
and goals, it was not capable of improving community dynamics for irrigation water 
management.   
Thus, community-wide cooperation was dependent on the program‘s involvement 
in WUAs where this foundation already existed. During my field research, I identified a 
pattern of this community dynamic in WUAs with a sizeable Uzbek population or 
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absence of significant economic inequality. Qualitative findings from field observations, 
interviews, the exploratory survey project, focus groups and WUASP‘s informal 
evaluations indicate that the program benefits were especially wide-spread in these 
WUAs.  
Thus, a certain degree of economic or social equality and/or an established history 
of cooperation in irrigation management may be key factors for determining this positive 
community dynamic. I suggest the program‘s achievement of broader objectives required 
a relative balance of power between water users in a community before the program 
began. This balance could be achieved in situations where there was not significant 
economic inequality; this may correspond to WUAs without a significant number of 
farmers with large land-holdings relative to the size of most water users‘ land plots. I also 
believe that this balance could be achieved in cases where the population could minimize 
the financial power of the wealthy through informal mechanisms of community control, 
such as ―community shaming.‖ For example, the general success of Uzbek communities 
may be due to their longer history of cooperation and governance over irrigation water 
resources; this may have generated stronger mechanisms of social control. 
In the following sections, I put forward two complementary explanations for why 
WUASP failed to generate social capital and how the program may have actually 
undermined social cohesion in some WUAs. First, significant entrenched structural 
inequalities, which were exacerbated during land reform, define many communities in 
Kyrgyzstan. Thus, limitations in WUASP‘s capacity, together with the relatively short-
term nature of the project, significantly reduced its odds of success in such areas. Second, 
there were fundamental implementation issues that prompt questions regarding the extent 
to which WUASP consistently followed its extensive social mobilization objectives. As is 
often the case in international development, this gap between planned and actual 
implementation was generally driven by the standard problems encountered in 
development work, including a perverse incentive structure from donor funding 
requirements.  
Factor 1: Inequality in land distribution—the “farmers” 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the land reform process in Kyrgyzstan had the 
potential to reproduce and increase social inequalities in rural communities. During the 
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early stages of land reform, the capacity to farm large tracts of land independent of the 
state or collective farms was limited to individuals with appropriate expertise and/or 
financial security. Moreover, individuals who petitioned for their land earlier usually 
received better land that was located at the beginning of the canal. Furthermore, the 
reforms required land to be distributed on a competitive basis by a committee of 
individuals with the greatest knowledge of agriculture and irrigation. Thus, those who 
distributed the land and those who received optimal land represented individuals in 
privileged positions in the collective/state farms, such as directors, engineers, and 
government employees (Wegerich 1996: 250; Sehring 2005: 18).  
Although the average individual and household in rural Southern Kyrgyzstan 
relies on agriculture for their livelihood, they generally do not refer to themselves as 
―farmers.‖ As I discovered during the course of my field research, the term 
―farmer‖(“fermer”)64 is generally applied to individuals with large tracts of land. Hence, 
communities where the term farmer was frequently encountered in my focus groups, 
interviews and surveys often coincided with WUAs experiencing extreme cooperation 
and irrigation management problems.  
Moreover, in cases where there was a large power imbalance between the farmers 
and other water users, WUASP was must less effective and/or blatantly contributed to the 
imbalance by giving the powerful even more control over water. To illustrate this point 
about equitable land distribution, I provide the reader with some context from the field 
concerning Kyzyl Koschy WUA, a WUASP-supported WUA. Kyzyl Koshchy 
represented a serious burden for the project staff and seemed to be a ‗failing‘ WUA. The 
general problems found in Kyzyl Koshchy emerge throughout my field research in cases 
of ―under-performing‖ treatment WUAs.  
Kyzyl Koshchy WUA is a small WUA with a population of 99% Kyrgyz and 
large degree of water scarcity among end-users. Kyzyl Koshchy is characterized by 
significant social/economic problems between farmers with large landholdings and water 
users with small land plots. In December 2006, WUASP began working in Kyzyl 
Koshchy. The program dedicated an entire year to ―social mobilization‖ in the WUA, and 
                                                 
64
  This is a relatively new word borrowed from English mostly in the post-Soviet period. The widespread 
use of this term is especially interesting, since it has replaced the Russian term for agricultural producers.  
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the rehabilitation work, which began in August 2007, was not finished until June 30, 
2009. According to WUASP evaluations of Kyzyl Koshchy, ―the WUA required constant 
monitoring from the WUASP side and the community would not make the necessary 
labor contribution to complete the rehabilitation work.‖ WUASP assessed this as a ―very 
weak‖ WUA, due to the lack of activity on the part of the population. As one  staff 
member succinctly stated, ―We just couldn‘t get them to mobilize‖ (A 2010).  
Indeed, despite the program‘s efforts, Kyzyl Koshchy seems to be failing as a 
WUA. According to my interview project in the winter of 2008, the local leadership and 
aksakals of Joosh Ayil Okmotu were clearly unsatisfied with the work of the WUA, 
describing it as ―highly ineffective.‖ An aksakal said, ―People ‗always‘ violate the water 
distribution rules and many people do not pay the (ISF) fees….The men fight it out while 
the women stand by the water.‖According to the head of the Ayil Okmotu: 
Water is often scarce here and the WUA doesn‘t serve any useful purpose 
for the population…The water is not delivered on-time and the WUA 
works badly. Those who do not pay the ISF or damage the canals and 
water-gates do not receive any form of punishment….The management of 
water should be transferred to the Ayil Okmotu. 
 
My preliminary survey research and focus group project points to a serious 
problem of inequitable water distribution. In my exploratory survey project, 75 residents 
of Kyzyl Koshchy were surveyed from February 11-13, 2009 using convenience 
sampling, and among these respondents, 50 individuals said that water was distributed 
unfairly because wealthy farmers bribe the mirabs and control the water supply. Several 
quotes from the survey responses illustrate this claim:  
(KYKO 18)The farmers have a lot of money and they have cars. They can 
shut off the water.  
(KYKO 19) The farmers get water first, and then us.  
(KYKO 32) The farmers bribe the mirabs and receive a lot of water and 
other people in the village only receive a little water.   
(KYKO 63) We even stand in line day and night for water, and the 
farmers get water without waiting in line. It is not fair.  
Similar to the case of Kyzyl Koshchy WUA, Toichubek Check WUA, another 
WUASP-supported WUA, presented a series of challenges for WUASP during the 
rehabilitation phase of the program. Specifically, the community was ―inactive‖ and 
plagued by an extreme power imbalance between wealthy farmers, including the WUA 
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Director, and the rest of the community. In fact, WUASP‘s rehabilitation work was used 
by the WUA‘s Director to further his own interests.  According to a WUASP staff 
member: 
The population is not active; the director has too much power. They 
installed an outlet to water 10 hectares of the Director‘s land. Winrock 
should have caught this mistake. They installed 2 outlets and these were 
only used to water 10 hectares of the director‘s land and 6 hectares for the 
neighbor of the Director who is a Director of another WUA.  The people 
told Winrock about this problem but nothing was done. They are 
frightened of the director. He has too much power and he has relatives 
who sit on the Council so even if some of the council representatives want 
to vote him out, it will be impossible (A, 2010).
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Therefore, in some cases, WUASP‘s achievement of efficiency gains among 
select population groups may have been at the expense of equitable outcomes for 
irrigation management. WUASP‘s involvement in areas with significant social or 
economic inequality may be to the detriment of average water users and serve to 
exacerbate a community-wide collective action dilemma. Specifically, the program may 
help solve a coordination problem among the wealthy and/or powerful individuals and 
families by motivating them to identify or cooperate more effectively with the subset of 
the community that shares their economic interest. In situations where WUASP acts as a 
coordinating mechanism for the farmers in ―unequal‖ communities, a strong WUA and 
organized group of farmers in control of that WUA may lead to the suppression of  the 
average water-users‘ interests. As has often been a concern of anthropologists and 
common property resource scholars, WUASP methods could be helping the powerful to 
better organize and extract resources from the population.  
Factor 2: Social mobilization versus rehabilitation 
Another important question is how effective a relatively short term project like 
WUASP can be at literally transforming the ―social structure‖ of a community. Although 
it is highly unlikely that WUASP could fundamentally alter the social inequalities in 
these communities, we expect the ―social mobilization‖ and bottom-up methods to result 
                                                 
65
 Toichubek Chek is bordered on either side by two other WUASP WUAs—Myrza Suu to the left and 
Kashka Suu to the right. I believe that the ―neighbor‖ in this situation is the director of one of these two 
WUASP WUAs. Not surprisingly, Myrza Suu and Kashka Suu are two other highly challenging WUAs for 
WUASP.  
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in positive changes for some groups. More to the point, we certainly would not expect to 
find examples of what happened in Toichubek Chek WUA, with the particularly 
disturbing fact that ―people told Winrock about this problem but nothing was done.‖ 
I believe that there are two related factors which explain the ―Toichubek Chek 
situation.‖ First, the ―social mobilization‖ described in the program theory and to me in 
the initial interviews with the WUASP staff is not actually what always occurs in the 
field. Second, the demands from the donor and Winrock headquarters place an extremely 
large amount of pressure on the Winrock staff in Osh to quickly spend money and show 
results. To fulfill these demands, the Osh staff naturally puts a premium on the 
rehabilitation work. Thus, the social mobilization becomes centered on mobilizing the 
population in order to complete the rehabilitation and not empowering average water 
users. 
The implementation problems seen in my field research are certainly not new. 
Anthropologists have done an especially thorough job of describing and analyzing the 
problems inherent in development work. In particular, David Mosse‘s ethnography of aid 
policy and practice explores many of the problems that I encountered in the field.  In 
describing the development model, Mosse says that ―a multitude of contradictory 
interests and cross-purposes get translated into a single technically-rational, politically 
and ambitious project model‖ (Mosse 2008: 45). However, given the drive for concrete 
results in a relatively short period of time, despite lofty goals and good intentions, when it 
comes to the actual implementation, the social and historic setting and larger 
political/economic/social analysis can be the first considerations to be dropped. For 
Mosse, ―the project became something quite different than what was intended‖ (Mosse 
2008:129). In some respects, this was the case with WUASP, given the overwhelming 
focus on rehabilitation during the time that I shadowed the staff, and almost complete 
dismissal of social mobilization during the final year. In this section, I will illustrate and 
elaborate on this issue with observations from the field.  
During my first months conducting interviews with the WUASP staff, the 
mobilizers and development expert frequently discussed the extensive time that they 
spent in each WUA during the social mobilization. Yet, as the staff grew comfortable 
with me and/or annoyed with my insistent questions, their responses changed. In the 
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second phase of my research, the extensive social mobilization that had originally been 
directed at a large percent of the ―water users‖ had changed to something more along the 
lines of ‗we talk to the most active farmers and leadership because it would clearly be too 
time consuming to go throughout the community.‘ Indeed, when Winrock holds 
―seminars‖ and trainings, the attendance seemed to range between twenty to thirty 
participants for WUAs, which technically have an average membership of 1000. If 
WUASP is focused on the ―most active farmers and leadership‖ it becomes more difficult 
to differentiate its mobilization from a top-down approach.  
Over the course of my field research, it was not abnormal for a meeting 
concerning the approval of rehabilitation sites to ―fail‖ in program sites. This meant that 
the meeting did not have a quorum of representatives for the population, and it had to be 
rescheduled because a quorum was necessary for approving rehabilitation sites. In cases 
where a quorum was not reached, the WUASP mobilizers would try and help the WUA 
leadership gather enough people for the next meeting so that the rehabilitation efforts 
could move forward. During one of my visits to Batken, I attended a failed meeting in 
Uch Korgon WUA.
66
  What follows represents an excerpt from my field notes
67
: 
We are in an auditorium in Uch Korgon. The director and council 
chairman are on the stage along with the Winrock staff. The community is 
sitting in the seats in front of the stage. I am in the very back of the room.  
There are five women sitting in the front. A Winrock representative tells 
me that the overwhelming majority of the population is Tajiks with a few 
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The meeting is being held in Uzbek, and some 
Winrock staff are speaking in Kyrgyz. Winrock announces that there is not 
a quorum and therefore they cannot confirm the irrigation sites for 
rehabilitation. At this point, a Winrock staff member on stage points to me 
and a Winrock staff member translates for me that he is telling the 
audience “this young woman came all the way here from the United States 
to watch how you work. This should be two-sided. We (Winrock) can’t do 
all the work.”  A woman stands up and begins speaking in (what seems to 
me) an agitated tone to everyone on stage. A Winrock staff member 
explains/translates for me that the woman is angry because she and eight 
other people from her zone have come to this meeting because they really 
                                                 
66
 Uch Korgon was selected for the Winrock program because the WUA Director was very active in 
gathering irrigation service fee (ISF) funds and paying off the WUA‘s debt to the government for water 
delivery. When Uch Korgon initially petitioned itself for program selection, it was rejected by Winrock due 
to the large debt. A high level of debt was a criterion that the program used to eliminate WUAs because it 
was believed to serve as a proxy for an ―inactive community.‖ However, after the initial rejection, the 
director spent a year collecting fees and the WUA was eventually accepted. 
67
 I have changed the names to ―Winrock staff member.‖  
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need help.  They are at the end of the canal and she says that it is not fair 
to her zone that all the other zones are not well represented. The Winrock 
staff member adds that “it is always those at the end of the canal that 
come to all the meetings and those without problems who do not.” 
Winrock staff then explains to me that this meeting has failed. Uch Korgon 
is the biggest WUA that Winrock is working with and the leadership could 
not get a quorum today so they need another week to get all the people 
organized. Winrock will come back next Tuesday. 
 
The WUASP coordinator expressed frustration about the effort that the staff 
exerted in such situations, ―We are supposed to be training these organizations to be self 
sufficient. We should not be going out there and organizing these WUAs for them‖ (JB 
2008). Nevertheless, once a WUA was selected by WUASP and time/effort was invested, 
it did not seem likely that the WUA would be dropped from the program. As one staff 
member said: 
Once we start off in a specific WUA, it is better to put the effort in and 
send the mobilizers in for a day or two to get the people to gather. They go 
to everyone and force them to come to the general meetings. They have to 
force them—otherwise they don‘t get a meeting (A 2010).  
 
Because of the donor and funding requirements, despite a program theory based 
on the fundamental importance of ―social mobilization,‖ I believe that this critical pillar 
of the program is frequently lost. In contrast to what  is regurgitated by the staff in 
interviews and the narrative found in WUASP policy documents, a WUA‘s progress and 
success is ultimately judged on how quickly and efficiently it completes the rehabilitation 
work; the overwhelming concern is how the rehabilitation is going. The majority of the 
staff meetings I attended were dedicated to questions regarding the number of sites under 
rehabilitation, how many were ready to start, and how many had finished. Successful 
WUAs were those that were getting their rehabilitation work completed without too many 
problems, whereas the ―black sheep‖ WUAs were those that were not completing their 
rehabilitation tasks. ―Social mobilization‖ is not a primary goal of the program in and of 
itself. Instead, it represents a tool to help ensure that the rehabilitation is actually 
completed. The drive to complete the rehabilitation means that social mobilization gets 
lost in the project implementation and the ―activeness‖ of the community during 
rehabilitation becomes conflated with ―social mobilization.‖  
129 
 
By the final year of the project, social mobilization seemed to have completely 
disappeared from staff discussions. This was because of funding requirements associated 
with a project extension introduced by USAID. The 2009 project extension was 
contingent on bringing abandoned land back into cultivation. WUASP was required to 
bring over 4000 hectares of land back into production and subsequently, utilize 400,000 
USD in one year. Thus, the selection of WUAs in 2008 was heavily influenced by how 
much of their land could be brought back into cultivation by a series of rehabilitation 
projects. I did not detect any attention to potential equity issues and discussions about 
who would benefit from the rehabilitation. WUASP was focused on the ―numbers‖ 
(money spent and hectares being rehabilitated) and how quickly the rehabilitation could 
be implemented.
68
 Consequently, these 2008 WUAs received a very different treatment 
than previous WUAs. Social mobilization was reduced to a 2-3 week period. The entire 
staff, including Country Coordinator, spent most of the time in the fields trying to push 
through the rehabilitation efforts.  
Conclusion 
Regarding the mechanisms that link the program to better outcomes, the research 
finds that, on average, the treatment populations are more knowledgeable, active and 
express more positive attitudes about the WUA performance and irrigation management 
outcomes in their communities. Nevertheless, the program‘s ‗social mobilization‘ did not 
build social capital assets and improve communal relations; in some instances, it may 
have worsened them.  Thus, the success of WUASP in motivating broad-based collective 
action was contingent on program involvement in communities that already had a 
foundation of ‗good‘ communal relations. My research found evidence of this community 
dynamic in WUAs with significant Uzbek populations and/or relative equity in land-
holdings among a population.  
The following chapter explores the theoretical and methodological implications of 
the dissertation, along with several ideas for future research.  
 
                                                 
68
 The ―redistribution‖ or government owned land represented the largest tracts of contingent land that had 
gone out of cultivation. This land was the poorest quality land and it could be rented out by the local 
government.    
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Chapter 7 
Implications 
 
 
 
This research project seeks to determine whether, how and to what extent an 
external actor can improve collective action outcomes in irrigation water management. 
My research indicates that the Water Users‘ Association Support Program (WUASP) did 
have a positive effect on the lives of thousands of water users in Southern Kyrgyzstan, 
and in some cases, these effects were significant. Overall, WUASP was able to improve 
the performance of WUAs and irrigation management outcomes. Additionally, the 
research finds that the program results were mediated by size, economic and social 
heterogeneity, as well as ecological scarcity. Furthermore, the empirical analysis suggests 
a positive program association with the mechanisms of knowledge, participation and 
attitudes. I claim that these represent some of the critical factors linking WUASP to 
better outcomes, although a direct test of this linkage is not feasible for my study.  
However, the quantitative results do not provide evidence of a positive program 
effect for women or water users located at the end of a canal. Moreover, the program 
failed to generate a positive community dynamic over irrigation water management. 
Thus, I conclude based on my research findings that WUASP was not capable of 
motivating broad-based collective action in communities with a weak foundation for 
cooperation.  Instead, in cases of significant social inequality, while WUASP may have 
promoted efficiency gains among the elite or privileged groups, the program either had 
no effect or may have inadvertently worsened equity issues by increasing the gap 
between powerful and powerless water users.   
This study has important implications for collective action theories, 
methodological approaches to the study of collective action, and development work on 
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irrigation water management in Central Asia. First, the dissertation conducted a rigorous 
quantitative analysis of variables of interest for collective action research, and the 
empirical results both confirm and refute common property theories about the effects of 
these variables. Second my methodological approach to the study in natural resource 
management highlights the essential need for both aggregate and individual level data. 
Specifically, it is my contention that researchers should exercise caution when using 
aggregate measures as proxies for ―collective action‖ without an understanding of the 
micro-level processes at work. Third, regarding the practical implications for 
development projects in the post-Soviet context, the positive WUASP results provide 
evidence that a community-driven development approach will achieve more desirable 
outcomes. However, the evaluation suggests that despite the advancements, WUASP 
failed to address some significant criticisms of the blue-print approach, such as 
eliminating the potential for elite capture and providing benefits to a community‘s most 
vulnerable groups. 
 
Practical/Policy Implications 
 
There are multiple policy implications that emerge from my research. I have 
many suggestions regarding how to help Water Users‘ Associations (WUAs) achieve 
their fundamental mandate of providing adequate, timely and equitable water supplies to 
all water users within a command area.  
Whereas most WUAs have been rapidly set-up with little attention to social 
mobilization and institutional development, WUASP represents a correction strategy for 
this blue-print approach to establishing and supporting WUAs. WUASP‘s program 
theory emphasizes the importance of education and institutional capacity for promoting 
better collective action outcomes. The program‘s bottom-up approach, which supports the 
mobilization of human capital within local communities through training and educational 
programs, is clearly an improvement over the one-size fits all approach to development.  
Nevertheless, the results of my dissertation also highlight concerns that development 
projects can privilege efficiency gains over equity and open the door for elite capture.  
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However, before dismissing community-driven development, it is important to 
note my field observations regarding discrepancies between the program theory and 
implementation in the field. While WUAs in the program received a much more 
extensive bottom-up development approach than that received by the overwhelming 
majority of WUAs in Kyrgyzstan, the pronounced ‗social mobilization‘ was still often 
directed at the most active farmers and leadership of the WUA and not the general 
population of water users. This means that we cannot discount the benefits of a more 
genuine bottom-up approach in cases where it is actually implemented according to 
design. Although I believe that the structural obstacles in many Kyrgyz communities 
require a much longer and more intense program than even an ideal version of WUASP 
could provide, there is no empirical evidence to substantiate my claims. Therefore, the 
question of whether comprehensive bottom-up development methods could achieve the 
predicted results for community-driven development remains open. 
Nevertheless, there is little reason to expect that water users will behave 
cooperatively in cases where WUAs are defined by extreme structural inequalities that 
restrict the fair distribution of water to a large number of users. There needs to be a 
greater impetus to change than a one or two year development program can provide; the 
solution to deeply embedded social inequalities extends well beyond a relatively small-
scale and short term project like WUASP.  Even if bottom-up methods are implemented 
according to design and this results in a well-informed majority of water users, the 
influence of ‗powerful actors‘ may not be easily minimized. Although the population 
may be informed of their rights to elect new leadership for the WUA, fear of powerful 
actors could reduce their desire or capacity to take forceful direct action against 
individuals who control or have close connections with the WUA. As my research 
suggests, wealthy farmers have the financial means to control the flow of water by 
opening and closing water-gates, regardless of the consent of the WUA. Compounding 
this problem is an absence of a strong external independent actor or legal system that can 
support a group or individual‘s claims for greater justice and equality in water 
distribution. As anthropologist David Mosse argues, ―In societies with power 
asymmetries, there is no guarantee that increased information will ensure that rules will 
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be put into force. Even when individuals are cognizant of rule violations, their social 
position may restrict them from pursuing sanctions for defectors‖ (Mosse, 2008: 89). 
Development projects can improve the performance of WUAs, as my impact 
assessment shows. However, a greater impact can be achieved if two changes are made. 
First, projects should undertake an honest assessment of what they are capable of 
completing, given significant historical and structural problems in treatment sites, limited 
resources, and a limited time-frame. To avoid doing more harm than good, this may 
ultimately mean that some development work should remain focused in areas where 
conditions are most favorable, thereby eliminating some communities in need of help.  
Towards the end of my field research, a staff member involved in social 
mobilization told me that it was impossible to mobilize a large portion of the water users 
in a community. An information campaign led by the mobilizers was seen as too time-
consuming and not an appropriate use of resources. Although it is clearly not feasible for 
a three man crew to hold conversations with all water users in the project, I believe that 
large-scale information campaigns can be completed in developing countries in an 
affordable manner. In particular, the cost of my survey project, which involved a 30-45 
minute survey in 120 to 230 households for six WUAs, was approximately 700.00 USD 
per WUA. Thus, a survey firm could be hired to affordable rates to gather and/or 
disseminate information, and the information collected from an exploratory survey 
project could help a development project like WUASP determine where its efforts would 
yield the greatest benefits to the population. For example, the results of my large N and 
exploratory survey project provided abundant evidence of significant problems in certain 
communities. In selecting treatment sites, a project should focus on WUAs where there is 
evidence of an appropriate community dynamic concerning irrigation management to 
avoid involvement in cases where the project can do more harm than good, such as 
Toichebek Chek and Kyzyl Koshchy.  
Second, international agencies should implement their projects according to the 
program design and/or in the best possible manner. This is especially problematic given 
donor requirements and the lack of human capital/qualified staff in developing countries. 
The major impetus for change with this issue must come from a re-evaluation of the 
incentive structure created by donors. As the country director for Mercy Corps in 
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Kyrgyzstan stated, “There are implementation problems; time is always a factor with aid. 
The donor system has short time horizons but development happens slowly. Bureaucracy 
is a huge problem. You have to get the money out the door, and there is no time to really 
implement the project‖ (Mercy Corps, 2008). The problems that arise from this 
requirement that money be spent immediately are well-known and openly discussed in 
the development community, but there seems to be no progress with the policy.  
In addition to the time constraints, there was a strict set of control mechanisms in 
place that dictated how WUASP was to utilize the funds. The purpose of these measures 
was to minimize corruption and encourage accountability; however, in Kyrgyzstan, they 
created large obstacles to implementation by restricting flexibility of action and forcing a 
frenzied approach to the project. More importantly, WUASP‘s objectives and questions 
shifted from ‗how can we make the biggest impact in community X‘ to ‗what is the 
quickest and most efficient way for us to spend these resources in community X.‘ 
Moreover, the problems associated with funding exacerbated by the types of 
performance indicators required by donors. For almost two decades, the aid management 
regime has demanded concrete data about the impact of aid projects on fundamental 
economic development indicators. However, at least for development projects associated 
with WUAs throughout Central Asia, I have found no evidence of sophisticated program 
evaluations capable of meeting these requests for reliable quantitative evidence of 
program impacts. Implementing agencies, such as WUASP, do not have the capacity or 
resources to accurately collect data and conduct impact assessments, and USAID‘s 
constant demands for information concerning WUASP‘s economic impact shift the 
staff‘s focus away from WUASP‘s core competencies. Specifically, USAID required 
performance reports without any direction/training for the WUASP staff in Osh or 
concern for the validity and usefulness of the data that was actually collected. 
Consequently, WUASP mobilizers were required to collect ―economic data‖ from water 
users for the quarterly reports, although this data was worthless from a program 
evaluation standpoint, and, from my perspective, represented a very inefficient use of 
staff time and skills. The demand for rigorous program indicators could not and should 
not be fulfilled by WUASP.  The program staff did not have the skills or resources to 
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conduct a rigorous program evaluation and given general concerns of biased in-house 
evaluations, I believe that evaluation by an outside party is the most desirable alternative. 
Thus, these two requirements – the rapid dispersal of aid funds and proof from the 
implementing agencies of their economic impact – incentivized WUASP to focus on 
infrastructure to the detriment of ―genuine‖ social mobilization. A good example is the 
program extension for 2009 that involved the selection of WUAs on the basis of the 
amount of land that could be brought back into cultivation.  According to the terms of the 
project extension, WUASP had to spend approximately 400,000 USD in one year for 
these WUAs. Thus, for the final project year, the staff directed its energy towards 
emergency rehabilitation to the detriment of social mobilization objectives. Given the 
close of the project following the completion of this rehabilitation work, I doubt the 
feasibility of assessing whether the land was actually brought back into cultivation or 
which segments of the community actually benefited from the rehabilitation.  
In particular, the case of WUASP-support WUA Omursuu provides a good 
example of how these requirements can both lead to short-sighted and unsustainable 
projects, as well as restrict a community‘s ability to maximize the effectiveness of aid. 
WUA Omursuu is located in a remote part of Leilek rayon in Batken province. According 
to a staff member, despite the crucial help that WUASP provided to Omursuu, its work is 
only a temporary fix to a much greater infrastructure problem.  In particular, Omursuu is 
located in a glacial outwash; this means that people are farming in an active flood plain 
with constant floods and rapidly deteriorating dikes. The WUA has 750 hectares of land 
that it continues to lose due to the environmental situation and condition of the dikes. 
Although WUASP dedicated significant time and resources to WUA Omursuu, the 
project simply delayed a significant or complete lose of land for farming that could occur 
within the next decade, given the absence of major infrastructural change.  
In addition, WUASP‘s funding protocol restricted Omursuu‘s ability to maximize 
the effectiveness of aid funds for several rehabilitation projects. Specifically, Omursuu 
had gathered enough funds from the community to buy a pipeline and install it 
themselves. They also decided to use WUASP funding to help construct a wall that 
would save approximately 30 hectares of land.  Although the community‘s initiative in 
gathering funds and constructing the wall seemed to be a positive indicator of collective 
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action from my perspective, the WUASP staff was incredibly frustrated with the decision 
because it did not coincide with USAID funding regulations.  
Furthermore, during the course of my field research, there was evidence of 
ubiquitous human capital and staff problems that exacerbated and created considerable 
obstacles for the project implementation. I encountered many different forms of this 
problem during my time in the field. I provide one example here to illustrate the problem. 
In the fifth and final year of the project, the two engineers who had been there during the 
third and fourth years of the project were replaced by engineers who had worked for the 
project in the earlier years.
69
 The circumstances surrounding the dismissal were relatively 
unclear for me, and I did not push for more information. While in one case there were 
concerns about competency, in the other case there may have been a problem with 
corruption.  The impression garnered from several staff members was that these two 
individuals should have been fired much earlier and that their dismissal improved the 
overall staff chemistry. More importantly, there were conflicts between these two 
individuals and the leadership of several WUAs. In certain cases, poor rehabilitation 
work and incorrect use of construction materials was initially blamed on the WUA, 
however, it later became apparent that it was actually the responsibility of these 
engineers. One staff member voiced the opinion that the program could have had a 
―bigger impact‖ if these two individuals were replaced earlier. Given a staff of ten with 
highly specialized staff roles, there are substantial consequences when any two 
individuals do not fulfill their duties.   
 Staffing is the responsibility of the implementing agency. In Southern 
Kyrgyzstan, WUASP was primarily staffed by Kyrgyz citizens; however, the position of 
Country Director was held by expatriates during a majority of the project. Although 
WUASP had staff members who performed exceptionally throughout the course of the 
project, the absence of a large pool of qualified individuals in Kyrgyzstan for certain 
positions and the short time-frame of WUASP, made it more difficult to find good 
employees for some positions and dismiss the bad ones. Using American or ―Western‖ 
expatriates to fill the role of Country Director is very costly. In my opinion, the largest 
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 The circumstances surrounding the initial dismissal of one of these individuals were also quite sketchy, 
and therefore, I did not fully understand why they were re-hired.  Perhaps it was due to project time 
constraints, the familiarity of the individual with the project and lack of other qualified individuals. 
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drawback of a foreign director revolves around language and trust issues in the rural 
communities.  Even with very good translators, valuable information is lost or cannot be 
obtained because of the way a foreigner is perceived by the population and local staff 
members.
70
  
Finally, the two primary objectives associated with the establishment of WUAs 
and introduction of irrigation service fees (ISF) are cost-recovery for the irrigation system 
and efficient water usage and distribution.  Although successful WUAs may promote 
equitable irrigation management and  cost-recovery for the system, unless the national 
level policy changes, WUAs and irrigation service fees will not be sufficient for ensuring 
efficient irrigation management. Successful collective action at the local level does not 
necessarily translate into efficient outcomes and vice versa. Even if WUAs are 
institutionally developed with high levels of cooperation, the government‘s continued 
supply of cheap water to WUAs will perpetuate wasteful water distribution and highly 
inefficient management.   
 
Empirical results of interest for common property resource scholarship 
 
The results of the quantitative analysis provide important empirical support for 
common property resource theories about the influence of collective action variables of 
interest. To begin, theoretically, both relative and absolute conceptions of scarcity have 
an important impact on collective action outcomes. My quantitative analysis offers 
evidence to support the claim that there is a quadratic or U shaped relationship between 
absolute ecological scarcity and collective action outcomes. Furthermore, my qualitative 
findings support claims concerning the importance of relative scarcity for cooperative 
outcomes. 
 I maintain that in WUAs with considerable social inequality, the effect of 
scarcity, combined with feelings of injustice over who receives the scarce water 
resources, drives uncooperative behavior. An important point is that the perception of 
why the water is scarce is what ultimately matters for determining cooperation in the face 
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 Although the last Country Director was a citizen of Uzbekistan, the language and cost concerns did not 
apply. 
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of significant scarcity. If water users believe that scarcity in their community is due to 
wealthy farmers who control the flow of water at the beginning of the canal, then it 
becomes rational for them to secure access to scarce water resources through 
uncooperative means. Conversely, if they believe water is scarce due to the climate, the 
incentive and justification for deviant behavior is reduced.  
The empirical results provide somewhat mixed support for the hypothesis that 
economic heterogeneity (in the form of economic inequality) is detrimental to 
cooperation. I find better outcomes in treatment sites for financial contributions and 
institutional development in more economically homogeneous areas. However WUASP-
support WUAs with greater heterogeneity have better outcomes for canal infrastructure. 
Indeed, my theory concerning the effect of inequality on rehabilitation predicts 
substantially better outcomes in homogeneous sites because WUASP‘s participatory 
rehabilitation requires large scale community involvement in the process. In situations 
where there is a poor community dynamic due to inequality, it will be difficult to 
motivate the community to contribute labor to the rehabilitation and to care for the canal. 
Hence, in areas where the community will not organize for voluntary labor, wealthy 
farmers may be able to subsidize the costs of rehabilitation by hiring temporary labor. 
Moreover, there is also not a single, straightforward result concerning the 
relationship between size and collective action outcomes; the influence of size depends 
on the outcome under investigation. While there is a U shaped relationship between size 
and institutional development, as well as the proportion of a WUA‘s budget dedicated to 
rehabilitation and staff salaries, WUASP-supported WUAs with larger populations are 
more likely to pay for water on-time. Furthermore, WUASP-supported WUAs with a 
smaller land size have better overall water delivery payments, whereas those with a larger 
land size have less resource/technical/human capital problems and greater improvements 
in canal infrastructure.  
Finally, my research finds evidence of positive program effects in ethnically 
heterogeneous communities. While some researchers have posited that ethnic and socio-
cultural heterogeneity reduces cooperative capacity and social cohesion (Bardhan and 
Dayton-Johnson 2002; Ruttan 2006, 2008), my research suggests otherwise and supports 
the findings of Poteete and Ostrom (2004). The mechanism results for attitudes and 
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social capital show positive results for Kyrgyz in heterogeneous WUAs. Furthermore, I 
find a better outcome for an important financial indicator among heterogeneous WUAs in 
comparison to treatment WUAs with ethnically homogeneous Kyrgyz populations. 
Nevertheless, this argument in favor of a positive social heterogeneity effect is limited to 
the comparison between ethnically homogenous Kyrgyz WUAs versus heterogeneous 
WUAs. If the comparison or inferences are between heterogeneous WUAs and 
homogeneous Uzbek communities, then I expect better results for homogeneous Uzbek 
communities due to the ―skill set‖ that they bring the program and irrigation management 
in general in their communities. Thus it is not the heterogeneity per se that motivates 
better outcomes but the trickle down benefits from the Uzbeks to the Kyrgyz. This is 
supported by the panel data analysis; however, the mechanisms could only be tested in 
heterogeneous versus homogeneous Kyrgyz communities.  
 
Methodological Implications 
 
 This work calls for a mixed methods approach to research on collective action 
concerning common property resources. My dissertation highlights the challenges 
inherent in using aggregate data to measure concepts such as cooperation and collective 
action. Given the inherent complexity of collective action research, I believe that rigorous 
research on cooperation regarding common property resources requires the integration of 
ethnographic and quantitative research methods.  
Consequently, in an attempt to bridge the gap between econometric and 
anthropological approaches, I employed a quantitative approach that was complemented 
and supported by qualitative research methods. I used econometric analysis of panel data, 
a large N survey project and qualitative data collected from nine months of field research 
which included case studies, focus groups and field notes from participant observation.  
Each data source proved to be critical for producing more accurate answers to the 
research question. In particular, without the panel data, there would have been no way to 
conduct a rigorous test of the program effect, and without the survey data, it would not be 
possible to explore arguments about the program effect on behavioral mechanisms. The 
qualitative data provided the foundation and context for interpreting and explaining the 
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quantitative results. For example, the panel data results of the heterogeneous treatment 
effects for the WUASP/equality interaction might have been interpreted to mean a more 
general positive program effect on cooperation or collective action, whereas the survey 
results and qualitative findings indicate that the program benefits were limited and may 
have improved the performance of WUAs in some areas to the detriment of community-
wide cooperation.  
 
Future Research 
 
To improve upon the current research, my goal is to acquire the 2010 Census 
results for Kyrgyzstan in order to obtain better demographic data on the ethnic 
composition of communities. I also plan to apply propensity score and matching methods 
to the panel data analysis for a different approach to investigating overall and 
heterogeneous treatment effects.  
For my future research objectives, I intend to conduct an analysis of WUAs 
located in both Southern and Northern Kyrgyzstan. The focus of the research project will 
be a program evaluation of the World Bank heavy infrastructure project and a more in-
depth examination of the influence time-invariant covariates such as WUA size, water 
scarcity, and ethnicity. In addition to using fixed and random effects regression methods 
for the analysis of the country-wide data set, I plan to apply a structural equation 
modeling approach to the data analysis. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a more 
flexible or general approach than regression and allows variables to function as both 
independent and dependent variables. This SEM approach may help me to determine a 
more accurate relationship between the variables of interest. I was not able to use an SEM 
approach for data analysis in my dissertation because the evaluation only utilized 
southern data which did not provide a large enough data-set to apply the SEM approach.   
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Appendix 1.A. Average Water Users’ Association Support Program (WUASP) 
effects 
 
                
VARIABLES Tariff Tariff 
Water 
delivery Water delivery 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
                
2001.year -0.234* -0.205 
     
 
(0.135) (0.134) 
     2002.year 0.0491 0.0886 
     
 
(0.135) (0.131) 
     2003.year 0.315** 0.337*** 
     
 
(0.131) (0.125) 
     2004.year 0.339* 0.433*** 
     
 
(0.188) (0.160) 
     2005.year 0.665*** 0.752*** 
     
 
(0.200) (0.184) 
     2006.year 1.402*** 1.475*** 
     
 
(0.195) (0.181) 
     2007.year 2.097*** 2.149*** 
     
 
(0.190) (0.179) 
     2008.year 2.522*** 2.624*** 
     
 
(0.228) (0.216) 
     2009.year 2.639*** 2.685*** 
     
 
(0.232) (0.224) 
     Post WUASP 0.192 0.282 -0.0953 -0.0590 -0.0532 -0.119* -0.0675 
 
(0.448) (0.400) (0.0612) (0.0942) (0.0739) (0.0674) (0.0706) 
World Bank 0.976** 0.940** 0.0684 0.0684 0.0606 0.0684 0.0607 
 
(0.403) (0.403) (0.104) (0.104) (0.0911) (0.101) (0.0894) 
Scarcity 
    
0.705*** 
 
0.703*** 
     
(0.261) 
 
(0.253) 
Dir. 
Education 
     
-0.138 -0.0814 
      
(0.170) (0.117) 
Constant 3.346*** 3.273*** 0.858*** 0.859*** 0.276 0.926*** 0.318* 
 
(0.138) (0.124) (0.0220) (0.0238) (0.215) (0.0869) (0.174) 
        Observations 1,444 1,376 826 780 822 823 819 
R-squared 0.349 0.379 0.001 0.000 0.057 0.003 0.058 
WUA 180 171 147 139 145 146 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
On-time 
payment On-time payment 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
            
2005.year -0.0679** -0.0685** -0.0680** -0.0686** -0.0687** 
 
(0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0273) 
2006.year -0.0656*** -0.0665*** -0.0656*** -0.0648*** -0.0648*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0251) (0.0240) (0.0237) (0.0238) 
2007.year 0.0645** 0.0672** 0.0617** 0.0654** 0.0625** 
 
(0.0271) (0.0282) (0.0272) (0.0269) (0.0270) 
2008.year 0.0601* 0.0611* 0.0601* 0.0615** 0.0615** 
 
(0.0309) (0.0316) (0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0306) 
2009.year 0.0985*** 0.0986*** 0.0987*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.0293) (0.0298) (0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0288) 
Post WUASP -0.0478 -0.0465 -0.0481 -0.0440 -0.0443 
 
(0.0681) (0.0886) (0.0685) (0.0679) (0.0683) 
World Bank -0.0907* -0.0913* -0.0901* -0.0918* -0.0912* 
 
(0.0523) (0.0525) (0.0522) (0.0531) (0.0530) 
Scarcity 
  
-0.00643 
 
-0.00592 
   
(0.0330) 
 
(0.0337) 
Dir. Education 
   
0.0301 0.0296 
    
(0.0408) (0.0412) 
Constant 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.476*** 0.456*** 0.462*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0203) (0.0339) (0.0267) (0.0414) 
      Observations 832 785 831 829 828 
R-squared 0.090 0.095 0.090 0.092 0.091 
WUA 145 137 145 144 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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VARIABLES 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
            
2005.year -0.0741** -0.0670* -0.0824** -0.0745** -0.0822** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0356) (0.0372) 
2006.year -0.0610** -0.0584* -0.0783** -0.0637** -0.0798** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0324) (0.0316) (0.0311) (0.0320) 
2007.year -0.0307 -0.0344 -0.0610** -0.0317 -0.0615** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0311) (0.0286) (0.0299) (0.0290) 
2008.year -0.0391 -0.0399 -0.0557* -0.0411 -0.0561* 
 
(0.0312) (0.0324) (0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0315) 
2009.year -0.0531* -0.0501 -0.0717** -0.0541* -0.0721** 
 
(0.0305) (0.0314) (0.0296) (0.0302) (0.0298) 
Post WUASP -0.0308 -0.0278 -0.0142 -0.0353 -0.0135 
 
(0.0259) (0.0365) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0267) 
World Bank -0.0210 -0.0205 -0.0197 -0.0197 -0.0191 
 
(0.0549) (0.0551) (0.0549) (0.0551) (0.0549) 
Scarcity 
  
0.173*** 
 
0.174*** 
   
(0.0502) 
 
(0.0495) 
Dir. Education 
   
-0.0267 0.00202 
    
(0.0390) (0.0331) 
Constant 0.787*** 0.782*** 0.655*** 0.800*** 0.653*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0232) (0.0446) (0.0304) (0.0427) 
      Observations 958 906 831 951 828 
R-squared 0.016 0.013 0.062 0.017 0.062 
WUA 179 170 145 177 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
            
2005.year -0.0178 -0.0263 -0.0212 -0.0172 -0.0207 
 
(0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0209) 
2006.year 0.0229 0.0185 0.0206 0.0233 0.0212 
 
(0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0217) (0.0204) (0.0219) 
2007.year 0.0551*** 0.0463** 0.0542** 0.0555*** 0.0546** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0202) (0.0216) 
2008.year 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.108*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0206) (0.0221) 
2009.year 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.129*** 0.119*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0200) (0.0213) 
Post WUASP 0.00920 0.0184 0.0117 0.00849 0.0108 
 
(0.0209) (0.0267) (0.0218) (0.0209) (0.0219) 
World Bank 0.00985 0.0141 0.0148 0.00951 0.0146 
 
(0.0258) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0258) (0.0264) 
Scarcity 
  
0.00956 
 
0.00915 
   
(0.0215) 
 
(0.0217) 
Dir. Education 
   
-0.00217 -0.00474 
    
(0.0144) (0.0162) 
Constant 0.573*** 0.579*** 0.509*** 0.573*** 0.512*** 
 
(0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0237) (0.0150) (0.0253) 
      Observations 955 903 828 948 825 
R-squared 0.216 0.215 0.239 0.216 0.239 
WUA 179 170 145 177 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
            
2005.year -0.197*** -0.184*** -0.212*** -0.199*** -0.213*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0337) (0.0340) (0.0325) (0.0343) 
2006.year -0.154*** -0.148*** -0.170*** -0.157*** -0.172*** 
 
(0.0348) (0.0373) (0.0360) (0.0351) (0.0364) 
2007.year -0.135*** -0.130*** -0.163*** -0.136*** -0.164*** 
 
(0.0360) (0.0387) (0.0361) (0.0363) (0.0363) 
2008.year -0.194*** -0.191*** -0.215*** -0.196*** -0.216*** 
 
(0.0372) (0.0389) (0.0384) (0.0375) (0.0387) 
2009.year -0.188*** -0.179*** -0.204*** -0.188*** -0.205*** 
 
(0.0367) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0370) (0.0388) 
Post WUASP  0.0477* 0.0381 0.0592** 0.0464* 0.0606** 
 
(0.0250) (0.0350) (0.0267) (0.0252) (0.0268) 
World Bank -0.000574 -0.00385 0.00811 0.000682 0.00913 
 
(0.0704) (0.0714) (0.0755) (0.0705) (0.0755) 
Scarcity 
  
0.0124 
 
0.0133 
   
(0.0371) 
 
(0.0373) 
Director educ.  
   
-0.00781 0.00622 
    
(0.0265) (0.0281) 
Constant 0.852*** 0.840*** 0.844*** 0.856*** 0.841*** 
 
(0.0260) (0.0273) (0.0365) (0.0306) (0.0408) 
      Observations 955 903 828 948 825 
R-squared 0.095 0.087 0.116 0.096 0.117 
WUAs 179 170 145 177 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Canal 
Infrastructure 
Canal 
Infrastructure 
Canal 
Infrastructure 
Canal 
Infrastructure 
Canal 
Infrastructure 
            
2005.year -0.00226*** -0.00258*** -0.00279*** -0.00229*** -0.00272** 
 
(0.000852) (0.000938) (0.00106) (0.000869) (0.00108) 
2006.year -0.00364*** -0.00420*** -0.00430*** -0.00368*** -0.00421*** 
 
(0.00130) (0.00144) (0.00151) (0.00133) (0.00154) 
2007.year -0.0293*** -0.0317*** -0.0352*** -0.0296*** -0.0353*** 
 
(0.00507) (0.00527) (0.00624) (0.00515) (0.00632) 
2008.year -0.00890* -0.00977* -0.0129* -0.00902* -0.0128* 
 
(0.00525) (0.00530) (0.00664) (0.00540) (0.00676) 
2009.year -0.00404 -0.00471 -0.00778 -0.00400 -0.00747 
 
(0.00519) (0.00523) (0.00642) (0.00537) (0.00661) 
Post WUASP 0.0151* 0.0193* 0.0171** 0.0153* 0.0175** 
 
(0.00901) (0.0106) (0.00709) (0.00884) (0.00709) 
World Bank 0.0318*** 0.0327*** 0.0301** 0.0319*** 0.0300** 
 
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
Scarcity 
  
-0.00131 
 
-0.00113 
   
(0.00550) 
 
(0.00556) 
Dir. Education 
   
0.000852 0.00295 
    
(0.00558) (0.00621) 
Constant 0.660*** 0.661*** 0.663*** 0.660*** 0.662*** 
 
(0.00274) (0.00284) (0.00636) (0.00396) (0.00782) 
      Observations 1,086 1,032 867 1,073 862 
R-squared 0.073 0.081 0.084 0.074 0.085 
WUA 181 172 145 179 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional  
Capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
 capacity 
            
2005.year 0.384*** 0.420*** 0.297*** 0.380*** 0.288*** 
 
(0.0735) (0.0761) (0.0780) (0.0753) (0.0789) 
2006.year 1.014*** 1.044*** 0.927*** 1.003*** 0.921*** 
 
(0.107) (0.110) (0.122) (0.108) (0.122) 
2007.year 1.052*** 1.076*** 0.956*** 1.035*** 0.944*** 
 
(0.109) (0.113) (0.125) (0.110) (0.125) 
2008.year 1.196*** 1.233*** 1.066*** 1.173*** 1.046*** 
 
(0.113) (0.115) (0.130) (0.112) (0.129) 
2009.year 1.260*** 1.294*** 1.120*** 1.231*** 1.092*** 
 
(0.115) (0.117) (0.133) (0.115) (0.132) 
Post WUASP 0.434* 0.706** 0.519** 0.408* 0.482* 
 
(0.225) (0.316) (0.240) (0.231) (0.247) 
World Bank -0.517*** -0.539*** -0.526*** -0.501*** -0.513*** 
 
(0.188) (0.190) (0.182) (0.190) (0.185) 
Scarcity 
  
-0.127 
 
-0.151 
   
(0.0986) 
 
(0.0979) 
Dir. Education 
   
-0.258 -0.318* 
    
(0.163) (0.174) 
Constant 3.306*** 3.302*** 3.830*** 3.448*** 4.024*** 
 
(0.0756) (0.0771) (0.111) (0.108) (0.144) 
      Observations 1,085 1,031 867 1,073 862 
R-squared 0.354 0.371 0.329 0.357 0.337 
WUA 181 172 145 179 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
            
2005.year 0.00231 0.00145 0.000829 0.00297 0.000946 
 
(0.0458) (0.0476) (0.0518) (0.0462) (0.0521) 
2006.year -0.0356 -0.0369 -0.0175 -0.0328 -0.0172 
 
(0.0470) (0.0490) (0.0531) (0.0474) (0.0535) 
2007.year -0.0883* -0.0861* -0.101* -0.0757 -0.0909* 
 
(0.0480) (0.0502) (0.0547) (0.0484) (0.0551) 
2008.year -0.0837* -0.0824 -0.0850 -0.0704 -0.0821 
 
(0.0491) (0.0502) (0.0561) (0.0496) (0.0566) 
2009.year -0.0757 -0.0739 -0.0800 -0.0619 -0.0707 
 
(0.0491) (0.0502) (0.0561) (0.0496) (0.0568) 
Post WUASP -0.0526 -0.0230 -0.0256 -0.0631 -0.0323 
 
(0.0770) (0.0988) (0.0811) (0.0774) (0.0814) 
World Bank -0.0161 -0.0170 0.00745 -0.0248 0.00331 
 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.129) (0.124) (0.129) 
Scarcity 
  
0.0234 
 
0.0181 
   
(0.0692) 
 
(0.0694) 
Dir. Education 
   
-0.00199 -0.00838 
    
(0.0667) (0.0755) 
Constant 
     
      
      Observations 1,061 1,007 867 1,049 862 
R-squared 
     WUA 177 168 145 175 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness Activeness Activeness Activeness Activeness 
 
2005.year 0.0128 0.0130 0.00955 0.0148 0.0118 
 
(0.0636) (0.0664) (0.0707) (0.0643) (0.0712) 
2006.year 0.0679 0.0760 0.0288 0.0727 0.0325 
 
(0.0638) (0.0668) (0.0717) (0.0645) (0.0724) 
2007.year 0.0284 0.0393 -0.0254 0.0405 -0.0136 
 
(0.0650) (0.0683) (0.0734) (0.0658) (0.0742) 
2008.year -0.0121 -0.00235 -0.0638 0.00191 -0.0563 
 
(0.0674) (0.0690) (0.0765) (0.0684) (0.0774) 
2009.year -0.00218 0.00152 -0.0618 0.0124 -0.0490 
 
(0.0673) (0.0690) (0.0766) (0.0684) (0.0779) 
Post WUASP -0.191* -0.168 -0.105 -0.190* -0.107 
 
(0.106) (0.138) (0.112) (0.107) (0.112) 
World Bank -0.194 -0.201 -0.142 -0.202 -0.148 
 
(0.188) (0.188) (0.197) (0.188) (0.197) 
Scarcity 
  
0.0207 
 
0.0187 
   
(0.0902) 
 
(0.0906) 
Dir. Education 
   
0.0771 0.0417 
    
(0.0899) (0.101) 
Constant 
     
      
      Observations 1,061 1,007 867 1,049 862 
R-squared 
     WUA 177 168 145 175 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1.B. Heterogeneous WUASP effects – WUA population size 
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water 
delivery Water delivery On-time payment 
On-time 
payment 
            
2001.year -0.216 
    
 
(0.222) 
    2002.year 0.139 
    
 
(0.247) 
    2003.year 0.380 
    
 
(0.239) 
    2004.year 0.259 
    
 
(0.352) 
    2005.year 0.587* 
  
-0.0831 -0.0830 
 
(0.344) 
  
(0.0524) (0.0525) 
2006.year 1.271*** 
  
-0.0998** -0.0998** 
 
(0.352) 
  
(0.0418) (0.0416) 
2007.year 1.641*** 
  
0.0674 0.0611 
 
(0.378) 
  
(0.0485) (0.0488) 
2008.year 1.677*** 
  
0.0605 0.0604 
 
(0.423) 
  
(0.0555) (0.0555) 
2009.year 1.999*** 
  
0.0587 0.0594 
 
(0.451) 
  
(0.0523) (0.0525) 
WUASP  0.540 -0.0427 0.0578 -0.154* -0.156* 
 
(0.704) (0.0772) (0.111) (0.0796) (0.0806) 
Het pop size -2.93e-05 -1.08e-05 -1.70e-05 1.57e-05*** 1.58e-05*** 
 
(5.04e-05) (1.32e-05) (1.54e-05) (5.52e-06) (5.55e-06) 
World Bank 0.862** 0.144 0.161 -0.0946* -0.0943* 
 
(0.361) (0.126) (0.115) (0.0529) (0.0528) 
2001.year#c.popcur1 -2.22e-06 
    
 
(1.96e-05) 
    2002.year#c.popcur1 -1.03e-05 
    
 
(1.73e-05) 
    2003.year#c.popcur1 -9.09e-06 
    
 
(1.53e-05) 
    2004.year#c.popcur1 2.74e-06 
    
 
(1.87e-05) 
    2005.year#c.popcur1 2.23e-06 -1.22e-05** -1.16e-05* 1.54e-06 1.53e-06 
 
(1.92e-05) (5.86e-06) (5.91e-06) (3.32e-06) (3.33e-06) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 7.82e-06 -1.39e-05** -1.55e-05*** 3.36e-06 3.37e-06 
 
(1.88e-05) (5.34e-06) (5.57e-06) (3.06e-06) (3.06e-06) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 4.22e-05* -2.01e-05 -2.32e-05* -4.00e-07 -5.84e-08 
 
(2.30e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.28e-05) (3.59e-06) (3.60e-06) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 8.21e-05** 8.50e-06 6.96e-06 0 2.43e-08 
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VARIABLES 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
            
2005.year -0.114** -0.140** 0.0166 -0.294*** -0.333*** 
 
(0.0572) (0.0601) (0.0335) (0.0584) (0.0628) 
2006.year -0.0496 -0.0778 0.0630* -0.216*** -0.255*** 
 
(0.0515) (0.0524) (0.0337) (0.0605) (0.0622) 
2007.year -0.0171 -0.0563 0.0871** -0.178*** -0.231*** 
 
(0.0510) (0.0479) (0.0349) (0.0663) (0.0666) 
2008.year -0.0681 -0.0981** 0.140*** -0.256*** -0.302*** 
 
(0.0522) (0.0496) (0.0364) (0.0661) (0.0695) 
2009.year -0.0374 -0.0608 0.146*** -0.233*** -0.263*** 
 
(0.0548) (0.0509) (0.0362) (0.0692) (0.0742) 
WUASP  -0.0287 0.00325 -0.00910 0.0382 0.0596 
 
(0.0345) (0.0351) (0.0315) (0.0406) (0.0441) 
Het pop size -3.33e-07 -2.27e-06 2.56e-06 2.28e-06 1.45e-06 
 
(2.76e-06) (2.89e-06) (2.60e-06) (3.80e-06) (3.89e-06) 
World Bank -0.0175 -0.0170 0.0188 -0.00582 0.00102 
 
(0.0569) (0.0578) (0.0270) (0.0715) (0.0768) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 3.78e-06 5.21e-06 -3.42e-06 9.10e-06* 1.10e-05** 
 
(5.01e-06) (5.16e-06) (2.34e-06) (4.95e-06) (5.18e-06) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 -1.19e-06 -1.67e-07 -3.85e-06* 5.86e-06 7.67e-06 
 
(4.50e-06) (4.72e-06) (2.30e-06) (5.38e-06) (5.52e-06) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -1.44e-06 -4.87e-07 -3.00e-06 3.85e-06 6.02e-06 
 
(4.62e-06) (4.65e-06) (2.40e-06) (5.68e-06) (5.79e-06) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 2.95e-06 3.83e-06 -2.14e-06 5.85e-06 7.75e-06 
 
(4.36e-06) (4.32e-06) (2.46e-06) (5.20e-06) (5.38e-06) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 -1.66e-06 -1.11e-06 -1.51e-06 4.00e-06 5.17e-06 
 
(4.19e-06) (4.23e-06) (2.58e-06) (5.75e-06) (6.02e-06) 
Scarcity 
 
0.175*** 0.00888 
 
0.0140 
  
(0.0491) (0.0210) 
 
(0.0368) 
Constant 0.787*** 0.653*** 0.508*** 0.857*** 0.845*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0438) (0.0237) (0.0257) (0.0362) 
      
 
(3.44e-05) (7.74e-06) (7.70e-06) (4.34e-06) (4.34e-06) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 6.05e-05* -6.49e-06 -8.96e-06* 3.72e-06 3.70e-06 
 
(3.64e-05) (5.23e-06) (5.39e-06) (4.14e-06) (4.16e-06) 
Scarcity 
  
0.733*** 
 
-0.00902 
   
(0.258) 
 
(0.0334) 
Constant 3.401*** 0.926*** 0.329 0.471*** 0.478*** 
 
(0.161) (0.0473) (0.213) (0.0196) (0.0344) 
      Observations 1,444 826 822 832 831 
R-squared 0.363 0.037 0.096 0.102 0.102 
WUAs 180 147 145 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Observations 958 831 828 955 828 
R-squared 0.023 0.071 0.245 0.103 0.129 
WUAs 179 145 145 179 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
 
 
 
 
          
VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
          
     2005.year 0.492*** 0.345*** 0.00205 -0.00133 
 
(0.111) (0.122) (0.0737) (0.0909) 
2006.year 1.334*** 1.205*** -0.0716 -0.0239 
 
(0.167) (0.211) (0.0751) (0.0923) 
2007.year 1.371*** 1.250*** -0.116 -0.149 
 
(0.171) (0.219) (0.0768) (0.0959) 
2008.year 1.513*** 1.360*** -0.124 -0.137 
 
(0.179) (0.235) (0.0795) (0.101) 
2009.year 1.560*** 1.386*** -0.113 -0.134 
 
(0.179) (0.235) (0.0795) (0.101) 
WUASP  0.0837 0.161 -0.0163 0.0263 
 
(0.298) (0.313) (0.110) (0.118) 
Het pop size 4.18e-05 4.02e-05 -4.59e-06 -5.98e-06 
 
(4.13e-05) (4.11e-05) (1.19e-05) (1.21e-05) 
World Bank -0.417** -0.472*** -0.0349 -0.00269 
 
(0.183) (0.179) (0.126) (0.130) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 -1.13e-05 -4.06e-06 1.13e-08 1.06e-07 
 
(7.48e-06) (7.64e-06) (6.68e-06) (7.46e-06) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 -3.40e-05*** -2.55e-05* 4.16e-06 5.43e-07 
 
(1.20e-05) (1.37e-05) (6.79e-06) (7.58e-06) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -3.45e-05*** -2.76e-05* 3.27e-06 4.78e-06 
 
(1.24e-05) (1.43e-05) (6.97e-06) (7.83e-06) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 -3.35e-05** -2.67e-05* 4.56e-06 4.86e-06 
 
(1.34e-05) (1.57e-05) (7.07e-06) (8.06e-06) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 -3.17e-05** -2.41e-05 4.24e-06 5.08e-06 
 
(1.34e-05) (1.56e-05) (7.07e-06) (8.05e-06) 
Scarcity 
 
-0.123 
 
0.0217 
  
(0.0950) 
 
(0.0695) 
Constant 3.297*** 3.821*** 
  
 
(0.0754) (0.109) 
  
     Observations 1,085 867 1,061 867 
R-squared 0.368 0.340 
  WUAs 181 145 177 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
     2005.year 0.0155 0.00734 -0.00163* -0.00310** 
 
(0.104) (0.124) (0.000853) (0.00122) 
2006.year 0.0946 0.0194 -0.00211 -0.00411** 
 
(0.103) (0.125) (0.00129) (0.00171) 
2007.year 0.0636 -0.0411 -0.0196*** -0.0296*** 
 
(0.105) (0.128) (0.00731) (0.0107) 
2008.year 0.0312 -0.0714 -0.0118 -0.0234** 
 
(0.109) (0.137) (0.00751) (0.0114) 
2009.year 0.0429 -0.0812 -0.0126* -0.0256** 
 
(0.109) (0.137) (0.00756) (0.0111) 
WUASP  -0.159 -0.0292 0.0103 0.0160* 
 
(0.154) (0.164) (0.0111) (0.00955) 
Het pop size -6.02e-06 -1.10e-05 8.48e-07 6.45e-07 
 
(1.64e-05) (1.66e-05) (7.07e-07) (7.41e-07) 
World Bank -0.175 -0.146 0.0320*** 0.0296** 
 
(0.190) (0.199) (0.0121) (0.0123) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 -4.51e-07 5.41e-10 -6.17e-08 2.69e-08 
 
(9.26e-06) (1.02e-05) (8.11e-08) (8.07e-08) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 -3.18e-06 7.97e-07 -1.65e-07 -3.57e-08 
 
(9.28e-06) (1.03e-05) (1.37e-07) (1.42e-07) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -4.07e-06 1.63e-06 -1.04e-06* -5.61e-07 
 
(9.53e-06) (1.06e-05) (6.01e-07) (7.30e-07) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 -5.03e-06 6.15e-07 2.92e-07 9.29e-07 
 
(9.81e-06) (1.11e-05) (7.12e-07) (8.70e-07) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 -5.22e-06 1.80e-06 8.90e-07 1.60e-06* 
 
(9.81e-06) (1.11e-05) (6.79e-07) (8.37e-07) 
Scarcity 
 
0.0229 
 
-0.000442 
  
(0.0906) 
 
(0.00560) 
Constant 
  
0.660*** 0.662*** 
   
(0.00273) (0.00642) 
     Observations 1,061 867 1,086 867 
R-squared 
  
0.086 0.101 
WUAs 177 145 181 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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WUA population size squared 
        
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
        
2001.year -0.290 
  
 
(0.255) 
  2002.year 0.108 
  
 
(0.296) 
  2003.year 0.460 
  
 
(0.306) 
  2004.year 0.227 
  
 
(0.476) 
  2005.year 0.667 
  
 
(0.461) 
  2006.year 1.078** 
  
 
(0.486) 
  2007.year 1.368*** 
  
 
(0.494) 
  2008.year 0.864* 
  
 
(0.507) 
  2009.year 0.887* 
  
 
(0.527) 
  WUASP 0.583 0.00604 0.165 
 
(0.868) (0.118) (0.174) 
Het pop size 1.04e-06 -3.94e-05 -5.93e-05 
 
(0.000167) (3.32e-05) (3.87e-05) 
Het pop size2 -1.60e-09 1.41e-09 1.88e-09 
 
(6.32e-09) (1.18e-09) (1.31e-09) 
World Bank  0.748** 0.0818 0.109 
 
(0.367) (0.143) (0.131) 
2001.year#c.popcur1 1.63e-05 
  
 
(3.77e-05) 
  2002.year#c.popcur1 -3.34e-06 
  
 
(3.82e-05) 
  2003.year#c.popcur1 -3.21e-05 
  
 
(3.97e-05) 
  2004.year#c.popcur1 -1.08e-07 
  
 
(5.98e-05) 
  2005.year#c.popcur1 -2.95e-05 -7.63e-06 -8.32e-06 
 
(6.15e-05) (1.92e-05) (1.90e-05) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 4.37e-05 -1.21e-05 -1.16e-05 
 
(6.44e-05) (1.70e-05) (1.71e-05) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 9.72e-05 2.38e-05 1.83e-05 
 
(6.56e-05) (3.01e-05) (3.00e-05) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 0.000271*** 2.88e-05 2.21e-05 
 
(7.64e-05) (2.34e-05) (2.31e-05) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 0.000326*** 5.59e-06 -3.67e-06 
 
(8.04e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.73e-05) 
2001.year#c.popsize2 -6.45e-10 
  
 
(1.18e-09) 
  2002.year#c.popsize2 -1.56e-10 
  
 
(1.26e-09) 
  2003.year#c.popsize2 1.04e-09 
  
 
(1.28e-09) 
  2004.year#c.popsize2 5.18e-10 
  
 
(1.78e-09) 
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2005.year#c.popsize2 1.69e-09 -2.08e-10 -1.46e-10 
 
(1.84e-09) (7.65e-10) (7.60e-10) 
2006.year#c.popsize2 -9.53e-10 -0 -1.61e-10 
 
(1.99e-09) (6.45e-10) (6.64e-10) 
2007.year#c.popsize2 -1.68e-09 -2.28e-09 -2.15e-09 
 
(2.02e-09) (1.97e-09) (1.97e-09) 
2008.year#c.popsize2 -6.95e-09*** -1.03e-09 -7.65e-10 
 
(2.49e-09) (9.46e-10) (9.40e-10) 
2009.year#c.popsize2 -9.95e-09*** -5.99e-10 -2.49e-10 
 
(2.71e-09) (7.07e-10) (6.96e-10) 
Scarcity 
  
0.730*** 
   
(0.261) 
Constant 3.397*** 0.907*** 0.316 
 
(0.155) (0.0587) (0.218) 
    Observations 1,444 826 822 
R-squared 0.381 0.050 0.108 
Number of wua_id 180 147 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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VARIABLES 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
          
2005.year -0.0610 -0.0610 -0.295*** -0.335*** 
 
(0.0703) (0.0704) (0.0709) (0.0730) 
2006.year -0.0895 -0.0892 -0.160** -0.204*** 
 
(0.0592) (0.0589) (0.0635) (0.0649) 
2007.year 0.127* 0.120* -0.127** -0.155** 
 
(0.0663) (0.0666) (0.0621) (0.0603) 
2008.year 0.0815 0.0809 -0.189*** -0.206*** 
 
(0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0670) (0.0653) 
2009.year 0.0392 0.0396 -0.159** -0.175** 
 
(0.0737) (0.0742) (0.0733) (0.0687) 
WUASP -0.137 -0.138 -0.00234 0.0382 
 
(0.105) (0.106) (0.0483) (0.0500) 
Het pop size 1.11e-05 1.14e-05 -3.56e-06 -8.28e-06 
 
(2.73e-05) (2.73e-05) (1.12e-05) (1.19e-05) 
Het pop size2 1.63e-10 1.57e-10 6.46e-11 1.67e-10 
 
(9.33e-10) (9.33e-10) (3.75e-10) (3.97e-10) 
World Bank  -0.0890 -0.0887 -0.0463 -0.0442 
 
(0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0608) (0.0622) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 -3.37e-06 -3.38e-06 4.35e-05*** 4.72e-05*** 
 
(9.34e-06) (9.36e-06) (1.31e-05) (1.34e-05) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 1.03e-06 9.54e-07 2.25e-05** 2.67e-05** 
 
(9.39e-06) (9.34e-06) (1.12e-05) (1.13e-05) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -1.35e-05 -1.30e-05 2.20e-05** 2.02e-05* 
 
(1.01e-05) (1.02e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.11e-05) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 -4.76e-06 -4.63e-06 2.88e-05** 2.62e-05** 
 
(1.27e-05) (1.27e-05) (1.13e-05) (1.15e-05) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 7.85e-06 7.84e-06 2.44e-05** 2.25e-05** 
 
(1.30e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.13e-05) (1.12e-05) 
2005.year#c.popsize2 1.81e-10 1.81e-10 -1.46e-09*** -1.53e-09*** 
 
(2.82e-10) (2.82e-10) (4.23e-10) (4.28e-10) 
2006.year#c.popsize2 8.43e-11 8.77e-11 -8.53e-10** -9.64e-10** 
 
(3.07e-10) (3.07e-10) (3.77e-10) (3.77e-10) 
2007.year#c.popsize2 4.82e-10 4.77e-10 -8.40e-10** -7.33e-10* 
 
(3.26e-10) (3.28e-10) (3.81e-10) (3.88e-10) 
2008.year#c.popsize2 1.76e-10 1.72e-10 -9.31e-10** -7.91e-10** 
 
(4.57e-10) (4.57e-10) (3.64e-10) (3.73e-10) 
2009.year#c.popsize2 -1.54e-10 -1.54e-10 -9.38e-10*** -8.36e-10** 
 
(4.74e-10) (4.75e-10) (3.52e-10) (3.63e-10) 
Scarcity 
 
-0.00656 
 
0.179*** 
  
(0.0343) 
 
(0.0493) 
Constant 0.470*** 0.476*** 0.795*** 0.654*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0350) (0.0219) (0.0443) 
     Observations 832 831 958 831 
R-squared 0.106 0.106 0.043 0.095 
Number of wua_id 145 145 179 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
        
2005.year 0.112** -0.442*** -0.499*** 
 
(0.0470) (0.0849) (0.0921) 
2006.year 0.160*** -0.326*** -0.375*** 
 
(0.0438) (0.0812) (0.0848) 
2007.year 0.184*** -0.319*** -0.378*** 
 
(0.0465) (0.0898) (0.0910) 
2008.year 0.231*** -0.381*** -0.431*** 
 
(0.0504) (0.0974) (0.108) 
2009.year 0.249*** -0.375*** -0.413*** 
 
(0.0469) (0.102) (0.113) 
WUASP -0.0682 0.0791 0.103 
 
(0.0425) (0.0600) (0.0673) 
Het pop size 1.59e-05* -4.64e-06 -5.30e-06 
 
(8.48e-06) (1.12e-05) (1.20e-05) 
Het pop size2 -4.79e-10* 2.22e-10 2.04e-10 
 
(2.68e-10) (3.66e-10) (3.86e-10) 
World Bank  0.0442 -0.0405 -0.0347 
 
(0.0307) (0.0747) (0.0803) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 -2.37e-05*** 4.13e-05*** 4.65e-05*** 
 
(7.85e-06) (1.39e-05) (1.47e-05) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 -2.43e-05*** 2.92e-05** 3.28e-05** 
 
(7.63e-06) (1.36e-05) (1.40e-05) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -2.35e-05*** 3.45e-05** 3.72e-05** 
 
(8.15e-06) (1.44e-05) (1.45e-05) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 -2.09e-05*** 3.21e-05** 3.44e-05** 
 
(7.94e-06) (1.59e-05) (1.70e-05) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 -2.29e-05*** 3.46e-05** 3.65e-05** 
 
(7.29e-06) (1.63e-05) (1.76e-05) 
2005.year#c.popsize2 7.25e-10*** -1.18e-09** -1.28e-09** 
 
(2.45e-10) (4.75e-10) (4.93e-10) 
2006.year#c.popsize2 7.29e-10*** -8.32e-10* -8.93e-10* 
 
(2.44e-10) (4.74e-10) (4.84e-10) 
2007.year#c.popsize2 7.36e-10*** -1.11e-09** -1.12e-09** 
 
(2.74e-10) (4.99e-10) (4.96e-10) 
2008.year#c.popsize2 6.63e-10*** -9.38e-10* -9.43e-10* 
 
(2.34e-10) (5.34e-10) (5.58e-10) 
2009.year#c.popsize2 7.60e-10*** -1.11e-09** -1.11e-09* 
 
(2.15e-10) (5.53e-10) (5.83e-10) 
Scarcity 0.00735 
 
0.0140 
 
(0.0214) 
 
(0.0383) 
Constant 0.506*** 0.865*** 0.850*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0375) 
    Observations 828 955 828 
R-squared 0.267 0.118 0.146 
Number of wua_id 145 179 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
          
2005.year 0.448*** 0.252 -0.00402 -0.00922 
 
(0.141) (0.160) (0.0965) (0.124) 
2006.year 1.364*** 1.169*** -0.129 -0.0583 
 
(0.222) (0.303) (0.0994) (0.127) 
2007.year 1.385*** 1.212*** -0.122 -0.160 
 
(0.224) (0.309) (0.100) (0.131) 
2008.year 1.514*** 1.334*** -0.133 -0.142 
 
(0.240) (0.351) (0.104) (0.141) 
2009.year 1.548*** 1.343*** -0.123 -0.146 
 
(0.240) (0.351) (0.104) (0.141) 
WUASP -0.299 -0.251 0.0834 0.112 
 
(0.367) (0.380) (0.147) (0.157) 
Het pop size 0.000157* 0.000169* -3.98e-05 -3.70e-05 
 
(9.32e-05) (9.51e-05) (3.60e-05) (3.73e-05) 
Het pop size2 -4.60e-09 -5.19e-09* 1.49e-09 1.33e-09 
 
(3.08e-09) (3.11e-09) (1.46e-09) (1.51e-09) 
World Bank  -0.414** -0.482** -0.0395 -0.00613 
 
(0.194) (0.191) (0.127) (0.132) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 1.53e-06 1.83e-05 1.18e-06 1.47e-06 
 
(2.77e-05) (3.04e-05) (1.95e-05) (2.24e-05) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 -4.05e-05 -1.62e-05 2.04e-05 8.82e-06 
 
(3.78e-05) (4.62e-05) (2.00e-05) (2.29e-05) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -3.80e-05 -1.95e-05 5.08e-06 7.67e-06 
 
(3.84e-05) (4.69e-05) (2.02e-05) (2.35e-05) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 -3.30e-05 -2.01e-05 6.82e-06 5.83e-06 
 
(3.94e-05) (5.08e-05) (2.06e-05) (2.45e-05) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 -2.81e-05 -1.37e-05 6.81e-06 7.74e-06 
 
(4.02e-05) (5.14e-05) (2.06e-05) (2.44e-05) 
2005.year#c.popsize2 -5.36e-10 -8.67e-10 -0 -0 
 
(1.04e-09) (1.12e-09) (7.86e-10) (8.57e-10) 
2006.year#c.popsize2 2.19e-10 -3.89e-10 -6.84e-10 -3.25e-10 
 
(1.25e-09) (1.44e-09) (8.09e-10) (8.75e-10) 
2007.year#c.popsize2 1.50e-10 -2.85e-10 -8.13e-11 -1.23e-10 
 
(1.27e-09) (1.46e-09) (8.12e-10) (8.90e-10) 
2008.year#c.popsize2 -0 -2.60e-10 -8.90e-11 -0 
 
(1.23e-09) (1.47e-09) (8.19e-10) (9.08e-10) 
2009.year#c.popsize2 -1.59e-10 -4.05e-10 -1.02e-10 -9.99e-11 
 
(1.26e-09) (1.50e-09) (8.19e-10) (9.07e-10) 
Scarcity 
 
-0.130 
 
0.0276 
  
(0.0938) 
 
(0.0701) 
Constant 3.296*** 3.828*** 
  
 
(0.0751) (0.109) 
  
     Observations 1,085 867 1,061 867 
R-squared 0.371 0.346 
  Number of wua_id 181 145 177 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
2005.year 0.0104 -0.00454 0.000432 -0.00118 
 
(0.140) (0.173) (0.00111) (0.00172) 
2006.year 0.0889 -0.0302 0.000806 -0.00158 
 
(0.139) (0.176) (0.00153) (0.00240) 
2007.year 0.0842 -0.0673 -0.00626 -0.0130 
 
(0.141) (0.179) (0.00922) (0.0150) 
2008.year 0.0467 -0.108 -0.00562 -0.0203 
 
(0.148) (0.195) (0.00892) (0.0157) 
2009.year 0.0787 -0.0999 -0.0127 -0.0318** 
 
(0.148) (0.194) (0.00881) (0.0149) 
WUASP -0.0587 0.0647 0.00585 0.0118 
 
(0.207) (0.220) (0.0104) (0.0125) 
Het pop size -4.37e-05 -4.38e-05 2.19e-06 2.22e-06 
 
(5.14e-05) (5.31e-05) (2.80e-06) (2.61e-06) 
Het pop size2 1.68e-09 1.44e-09 -5.72e-11 -6.81e-11 
 
(2.16e-09) (2.22e-09) (1.06e-10) (8.92e-11) 
World Bank  -0.167 -0.153 0.0343*** 0.0310** 
 
(0.192) (0.201) (0.0118) (0.0120) 
2005.year#c.popcur1 3.33e-07 2.16e-06 -5.88e-07* -4.02e-07 
 
(2.85e-05) (3.18e-05) (3.06e-07) (3.63e-07) 
2006.year#c.popcur1 -2.02e-06 1.26e-05 -9.16e-07** -6.20e-07 
 
(2.85e-05) (3.24e-05) (3.98e-07) (4.39e-07) 
2007.year#c.popcur1 -1.00e-05 7.98e-06 -4.47e-06** -4.27e-06* 
 
(2.89e-05) (3.29e-05) (1.74e-06) (2.31e-06) 
2008.year#c.popcur1 -9.67e-06 9.03e-06 -1.31e-06 1.70e-07 
 
(2.99e-05) (3.49e-05) (1.65e-06) (2.31e-06) 
2009.year#c.popcur1 -1.58e-05 5.70e-06 8.90e-07 2.89e-06 
 
(2.97e-05) (3.47e-05) (1.56e-06) (2.14e-06) 
2005.year#c.popsize2 -0 -7.37e-11 0 0 
 
(1.15e-09) (1.22e-09) (0) (0) 
2006.year#c.popsize2 -0 -4.67e-10 0 0 
 
(1.15e-09) (1.24e-09) (0) (0) 
2007.year#c.popsize2 2.48e-10 -2.59e-10 1.35e-10** 1.39e-10** 
 
(1.17e-09) (1.26e-09) (5.58e-11) (6.89e-11) 
2008.year#c.popsize2 2.02e-10 -3.30e-10 6.29e-11 0 
 
(1.20e-09) (1.32e-09) (5.43e-11) (6.73e-11) 
2009.year#c.popsize2 4.56e-10 -1.45e-10 -0 -0 
 
(1.19e-09) (1.30e-09) (5.12e-11) (6.16e-11) 
Scarcity 
 
0.0291 
 
-0.000119 
  
(0.0917) 
 
(0.00571) 
Constant 
  
0.659*** 0.662*** 
   
(0.00267) (0.00641) 
     Observations 1,061 867 1,086 867 
R-squared 
  
0.092 0.110 
Number of wua_id 177 145 181 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1.C. Heterogeneous WUASP effects – WUA land size 
 
        
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
        
2005.year -2.465*** 
  
 
(0.378) 
  2006.year -1.904*** 
  
 
(0.380) 
  2007.year -0.992*** 
  
 
(0.337) 
  2008o.year -0.671** 
  
 
(0.326) 
  2009.year -0.138 
  
 
(0.253) 
  WUASP 0.512 -0.0446 0.0719 
 
(1.007) (0.0708) (0.105) 
hetlsize -0.000213 -9.30e-05 -0.000135** 
 
(0.000439) (6.01e-05) (6.18e-05) 
World Bank  1.171** 0.0703 0.0940 
 
(0.580) (0.123) (0.114) 
2004.year#c.landsize 0.000908*** 
  
 
(0.000259) 
  2005.year#c.landsize 0.000725*** -4.42e-05 -4.30e-05 
 
(0.000251) (4.25e-05) (4.16e-05) 
2006.year#c.landsize 0.000600** -5.57e-05 -7.19e-05* 
 
(0.000253) (3.96e-05) (4.04e-05) 
2007.year#c.landsize 0.000880*** -6.23e-05 -8.99e-05 
 
(0.000271) (6.48e-05) (6.31e-05) 
2008.year#c.landsize 0.000708** 0.000123** 0.000108* 
 
(0.000313) (5.95e-05) (5.81e-05) 
2009.year#c.landsize 0.000901*** -7.29e-06 -2.93e-05 
 
(0.000315) (4.24e-05) (4.14e-05) 
Scarcity 
  
0.723*** 
   
(0.261) 
Constant 4.773*** 0.876*** 0.291 
 
(0.435) (0.0458) (0.216) 
    Observations 1,078 826 822 
R-squared 0.269 0.028 0.086 
Number of wua_id 180 147 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
          
2005.year -0.126** -0.126** -0.150** -0.177** 
 
(0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0680) (0.0681) 
2006.year -0.0640 -0.0642 -0.0872 -0.114** 
 
(0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0570) (0.0531) 
2007.year 0.0526 0.0460 -0.0469 -0.0657 
 
(0.0557) (0.0561) (0.0576) (0.0525) 
2008o.year -0.0356 -0.0358 -0.0382 -0.0671 
 
(0.0637) (0.0635) (0.0599) (0.0561) 
2009.year 0.0288 0.0292 -0.0493 -0.0790 
 
(0.0644) (0.0633) (0.0633) (0.0538) 
WUASP -0.0868 -0.0881 -0.0563 -0.00411 
 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.0419) (0.0392) 
Hetlsize 3.45e-05 3.53e-05 1.84e-05 -8.21e-06 
 
(6.33e-05) (6.29e-05) (2.50e-05) (2.19e-05) 
World Bank  -0.0984* -0.0980* -0.0243 -0.0250 
 
(0.0510) (0.0509) (0.0562) (0.0569) 
2005.year#c.landsize 3.77e-05 3.76e-05 5.01e-05 6.15e-05* 
 
(2.74e-05) (2.74e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.45e-05) 
2006.year#c.landsize -1.36e-06 -1.19e-06 1.78e-05 2.35e-05 
 
(3.01e-05) (3.02e-05) (3.04e-05) (2.84e-05) 
2007.year#c.landsize 6.99e-06 9.59e-06 1.11e-05 2.96e-06 
 
(3.30e-05) (3.37e-05) (3.49e-05) (3.35e-05) 
2008.year#c.landsize 6.44e-05* 6.45e-05* -1.30e-06 7.60e-06 
 
(3.69e-05) (3.70e-05) (3.29e-05) (3.17e-05) 
2009.year#c.landsize 4.65e-05 4.63e-05 -3.26e-06 4.85e-06 
 
(3.69e-05) (3.67e-05) (3.41e-05) (3.02e-05) 
Scarcity 
 
-0.00553 
 
0.177*** 
  
(0.0325) 
 
(0.0486) 
Constant 0.473*** 0.478*** 0.789*** 0.653*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0344) (0.0231) (0.0438) 
     Observations 832 831 958 831 
R-squared 0.103 0.102 0.022 0.071 
Number of wua_id 145 145 179 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
        
2005.year -0.00711 -0.272*** -0.301*** 
 
(0.0404) (0.0676) (0.0709) 
2006.year 0.0580 -0.208*** -0.239*** 
 
(0.0367) (0.0670) (0.0668) 
2007.year 0.0817** -0.185*** -0.213*** 
 
(0.0387) (0.0687) (0.0667) 
2008o.year 0.121*** -0.178** -0.204** 
 
(0.0406) (0.0785) (0.0822) 
2009.year 0.136*** -0.236*** -0.270*** 
 
(0.0392) (0.0754) (0.0770) 
WUASP 0.0136 0.0172 0.0446 
 
(0.0383) (0.0467) (0.0506) 
hetlsize -1.31e-06 2.33e-05 1.15e-05 
 
(1.89e-05) (2.36e-05) (2.54e-05) 
World Bank  0.0207 -0.00941 -0.00428 
 
(0.0261) (0.0694) (0.0746) 
2005.year#c.landsize -9.26e-06 4.93e-05 5.82e-05 
 
(1.68e-05) (3.47e-05) (3.62e-05) 
2006.year#c.landsize -2.50e-05 3.64e-05 4.56e-05 
 
(1.56e-05) (3.29e-05) (3.30e-05) 
2007.year#c.landsize -1.84e-05 3.45e-05 3.34e-05 
 
(1.83e-05) (3.33e-05) (3.20e-05) 
2008.year#c.landsize -3.25e-06 -1.38e-05 -8.27e-06 
 
(1.86e-05) (3.92e-05) (4.11e-05) 
2009.year#c.landsize -4.69e-06 3.30e-05 4.54e-05 
 
(1.93e-05) (3.79e-05) (3.87e-05) 
Scarcity 0.0115 
 
0.0152 
 
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0375) 
Constant 0.506*** 0.856*** 0.845*** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0275) (0.0373) 
    Observations 828 955 828 
R-squared 0.243 0.104 0.126 
Number of wua_id 145 179 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
          
2005.year 0.505*** 0.310** 0.0181 0.00410 
 
(0.135) (0.143) (0.0791) (0.0979) 
2006.year 1.429*** 1.247*** -0.102 -0.0625 
 
(0.186) (0.229) (0.0818) (0.0991) 
2007.year 1.486*** 1.299*** -0.113 -0.136 
 
(0.188) (0.232) (0.0836) (0.102) 
2008o.year 1.585*** 1.342*** -0.126 -0.127 
 
(0.195) (0.244) (0.0876) (0.108) 
2009.year 1.604*** 1.336*** -0.127 -0.140 
 
(0.196) (0.244) (0.0871) (0.107) 
WUASP 0.505 0.535 0.111 0.155 
 
(0.383) (0.403) (0.135) (0.145) 
hetlsize -6.10e-05 -2.79e-05 -0.000140 -0.000152 
 
(0.000212) (0.000210) (9.53e-05) (0.000101) 
World Bank  -0.369* -0.443** -0.0483 -0.0151 
 
(0.191) (0.188) (0.128) (0.133) 
2005.year#c.landsize -9.31e-05 -1.20e-05 -1.27e-05 -2.67e-06 
 
(7.48e-05) (8.12e-05) (5.29e-05) (6.21e-05) 
2006.year#c.landsize -0.000315*** -0.000219* 5.45e-05 3.32e-05 
 
(0.000113) (0.000129) (5.56e-05) (6.30e-05) 
2007.year#c.landsize -0.000331*** -0.000238* 2.18e-05 2.71e-05 
 
(0.000115) (0.000132) (5.73e-05) (6.47e-05) 
2008.year#c.landsize -0.000301** -0.000193 3.65e-05 3.18e-05 
 
(0.000127) (0.000146) (6.14e-05) (6.98e-05) 
2009.year#c.landsize -0.000267** -0.000153 4.38e-05 4.46e-05 
 
(0.000125) (0.000142) (6.05e-05) (6.85e-05) 
Scarcity 
 
-0.102 
 
0.0282 
  
(0.0958) 
 
(0.0697) 
Constant 3.292*** 3.801*** 
  
 
(0.0746) (0.110) 
  
     Observations 1,085 867 1,061 867 
R-squared 0.373 0.340 
  Number of wua_id 181 145 177 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness  Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
2005.year 0.0120 0.00465 -0.00156 -0.00190 
 
(0.109) (0.131) (0.00200) (0.00279) 
2006.year 0.0860 -0.00821 -0.00180 -0.00182 
 
(0.111) (0.132) (0.00219) (0.00290) 
2007.year 0.0602 -0.0571 -0.0188** -0.0286** 
 
(0.113) (0.133) (0.00905) (0.0125) 
2008o.year 0.00310 -0.125 -0.00460 -0.0120 
 
(0.120) (0.144) (0.00780) (0.0112) 
2009.year 0.0413 -0.0958 -0.00218 -0.00980 
 
(0.119) (0.143) (0.00780) (0.0107) 
WUASP -0.00808 0.127 0.0134 0.00152 
 
(0.185) (0.197) (0.0162) (0.0116) 
hetlsize -0.000155 -0.000193 1.24e-06 1.23e-05* 
 
(0.000129) (0.000136) (1.16e-05) (6.32e-06) 
World Bank  -0.178 -0.158 0.0333*** 0.0306** 
 
(0.192) (0.201) (0.0123) (0.0127) 
2005.year#c.landsize -4.35e-07 2.76e-06 -5.60e-07 -5.88e-07 
 
(6.95e-05) (8.23e-05) (1.70e-06) (2.18e-06) 
2006.year#c.landsize -1.66e-05 2.57e-05 -1.43e-06 -1.62e-06 
 
(7.36e-05) (8.25e-05) (1.98e-06) (2.45e-06) 
2007.year#c.landsize -2.75e-05 2.32e-05 -7.86e-06 -4.43e-06 
 
(7.55e-05) (8.44e-05) (6.41e-06) (7.74e-06) 
2008.year#c.landsize -1.35e-05 4.60e-05 -3.31e-06 -6.18e-07 
 
(8.28e-05) (9.27e-05) (5.41e-06) (6.49e-06) 
2009.year#c.landsize -3.71e-05 2.48e-05 -1.48e-06 1.39e-06 
 
(8.22e-05) (9.19e-05) (5.96e-06) (7.02e-06) 
Scarcity 
 
0.0268 
 
-0.00124 
  
(0.0907) 
 
(0.00554) 
Constant 
  
0.659*** 0.663*** 
   
(0.00272) (0.00643) 
     Observations 1,061 867 1,086 867 
R-squared 
  
0.076 0.088 
Number of wua_id 177 145 181 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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WUA land size squared  
 
 
      
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water 
delivery Water delivery 
2005.year -1.910*** 
  
 
(0.532) 
  2006.year -1.236** 
  
 
(0.514) 
  2007.year -0.406 
  
 
(0.469) 
  2008.year -0.164 
  
 
(0.442) 
  2009o.year 0.215 
  
 
(0.312) 
  WUASP  0.941 -0.167 0.0232 
 
(1.544) (0.162) (0.208) 
Hetlsize -0.000881 7.48e-05 -6.67e-05 
 
(0.00138) (0.000254) (0.000273) 
hetlsize2 1.90e-07 -3.44e-08 -1.06e-08 
 
(2.61e-07) (5.43e-08) (5.66e-08) 
World Bank  1.161** 0.0823 0.108 
 
(0.579) (0.124) (0.117) 
2004.year#c.landsize 0.000711 
  
 
(0.000797) 
  2005.year#c.landsize 0.000359 -0.000151 -0.000176 
 
(0.000779) (0.000116) (0.000115) 
2006.year#c.landsize 0.000356 -0.000187* -0.000223** 
 
(0.000773) (9.62e-05) (9.69e-05) 
2007.year#c.landsize 0.000757 -0.000192 -0.000240 
 
(0.000826) (0.000153) (0.000148) 
2008.year#c.landsize 0.00104 0.000110 8.22e-05 
 
(0.000937) (0.000136) (0.000133) 
2009.year#c.landsize 0.00135 -0.000100 -0.000146 
 
(0.000975) (0.000108) (0.000102) 
2004.year#c.landsize2 4.88e-08 
  
 
(1.46e-07) 
  2005.year#c.landsize2 9.44e-08 4.19e-08 5.23e-08 
 
(1.42e-07) (3.31e-08) (3.25e-08) 
2006.year#c.landsize2 6.39e-08 5.13e-08* 5.93e-08** 
 
(1.44e-07) (2.69e-08) (2.54e-08) 
2007.year#c.landsize2 3.18e-08 5.08e-08 5.88e-08 
 
(1.55e-07) (4.44e-08) (4.15e-08) 
2008.year#c.landsize2 -9.87e-08 3.73e-09 8.74e-09 
 
(1.92e-07) (4.00e-08) (3.81e-08) 
2009.year#c.landsize2 -1.29e-07 3.62e-08 4.54e-08 
 
(1.90e-07) (3.60e-08) (3.24e-08) 
Scarcity 
  
0.730*** 
   
(0.261) 
Constant 4.357*** 0.900*** 0.315 
 
(0.824) (0.0554) (0.218) 
    Observations 1,078 826 822 
R-squared 0.272 0.032 0.091 
WUAs 180 147 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
          
2004.year 
    
     2005.year 0.641*** 0.293 -0.0339 0.00891 
 
(0.207) (0.234) (0.112) (0.147) 
2006.year 1.690*** 1.418*** -0.198* -0.133 
 
(0.259) (0.356) (0.117) (0.152) 
2007.year 1.729*** 1.476*** -0.144 -0.148 
 
(0.260) (0.358) (0.118) (0.153) 
2008.year 1.796*** 1.442*** -0.161 -0.135 
 
(0.268) (0.374) (0.121) (0.158) 
2009o.year 1.794*** 1.407*** -0.137 -0.116 
 
(0.276) (0.385) (0.121) (0.159) 
WUASP  0.532 0.514 0.0128 0.0627 
 
(0.578) (0.658) (0.214) (0.233) 
hetlsize -9.91e-05 -1.49e-06 1.84e-05 -9.28e-06 
 
(0.000654) (0.000736) (0.000281) (0.000298) 
hetlsize2 1.10e-08 -3.51e-09 -4.36e-08 -3.82e-08 
 
(1.42e-07) (1.50e-07) (7.04e-08) (7.25e-08) 
World Bank  -0.348* -0.434** -0.0474 -0.0150 
 
(0.193) (0.190) (0.128) (0.133) 
2005.year#c.landsize -0.000296 9.43e-06 7.23e-05 -9.07e-06 
 
(0.000214) (0.000241) (0.000141) (0.000174) 
2006.year#c.landsize -0.000712** -0.000451 0.000214 0.000137 
 
(0.000281) (0.000356) (0.000149) (0.000179) 
2007.year#c.landsize -0.000699** -0.000478 7.20e-05 4.54e-05 
 
(0.000281) (0.000358) (0.000149) (0.000180) 
2008.year#c.landsize -0.000621** -0.000329 9.20e-05 4.39e-05 
 
(0.000295) (0.000375) (0.000153) (0.000185) 
2009.year#c.landsize -0.000556* -0.000251 5.83e-05 1.02e-05 
 
(0.000304) (0.000386) (0.000152) (0.000186) 
2005.year#c.landsize2 5.25e-08 -5.56e-09 -2.37e-08 1.49e-09 
 
(4.55e-08) (4.95e-08) (3.63e-08) (4.37e-08) 
2006.year#c.landsize2 1.07e-07 5.81e-08 -4.59e-08 -2.83e-08 
 
(6.92e-08) (7.81e-08) (3.94e-08) (4.48e-08) 
2007.year#c.landsize2 9.91e-08 6.03e-08 -1.48e-08 -5.42e-09 
 
(6.80e-08) (7.83e-08) (3.92e-08) (4.49e-08) 
2008.year#c.landsize2 8.61e-08 3.39e-08 -1.53e-08 -2.91e-09 
 
(7.21e-08) (8.11e-08) (4.16e-08) (4.73e-08) 
2009.year#c.landsize2 7.72e-08 2.42e-08 -3.32e-09 9.56e-09 
 
(7.17e-08) (8.11e-08) (4.07e-08) (4.67e-08) 
Scarcity 
 
-0.0954 
 
0.0241 
  
(0.0968) 
 
(0.0701) 
Constant 3.290*** 3.794*** 
  
 
(0.0748) (0.110) 
  
     Observations 1,085 867 1,061 867 
R-squared 0.376 0.342 
  WUAs 181 145 177 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness  Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
2004.year 
    
     2005.year 0.00830 -0.000866 -0.000826 0.00145 
 
(0.158) (0.193) (0.00376) (0.00569) 
2006.year 0.0782 -0.0719 -8.40e-05 0.00290 
 
(0.158) (0.197) (0.00392) (0.00594) 
2007.year 0.0725 -0.102 0.00186 -0.000844 
 
(0.160) (0.198) (0.0114) (0.0180) 
2008.year 0.0545 -0.129 0.00265 -0.00261 
 
(0.165) (0.207) (0.00963) (0.0158) 
2009o.year 0.0883 -0.107 0.00193 -0.00503 
 
(0.166) (0.210) (0.00905) (0.0143) 
WUASP  -0.0446 0.135 0.0345 0.00545 
 
(0.295) (0.318) (0.0254) (0.0163) 
hetlsize -9.21e-05 -0.000205 -2.98e-05 6.80e-06 
 
(0.000382) (0.000404) (2.91e-05) (1.73e-05) 
hetlsize2 -1.99e-08 1.02e-09 8.13e-09 1.73e-09 
 
(9.33e-08) (9.56e-08) (5.24e-09) (3.41e-09) 
World Bank  -0.179 -0.160 0.0340*** 0.0314** 
 
(0.192) (0.201) (0.0124) (0.0127) 
2005.year#c.landsize 5.89e-06 1.13e-05 -1.61e-06 -5.19e-06 
 
(0.000188) (0.000224) (4.83e-06) (6.76e-06) 
2006.year#c.landsize -3.14e-06 0.000119 -4.11e-06 -8.12e-06 
 
(0.000194) (0.000228) (5.23e-06) (7.24e-06) 
2007.year#c.landsize -4.67e-05 9.01e-05 -3.94e-05*** -4.21e-05** 
 
(0.000197) (0.000231) (1.37e-05) (1.90e-05) 
2008.year#c.landsize -9.84e-05 5.17e-05 -1.43e-05 -1.34e-05 
 
(0.000202) (0.000238) (1.19e-05) (1.65e-05) 
2009.year#c.landsize -0.000115 4.07e-05 -7.69e-06 -5.24e-06 
 
(0.000204) (0.000242) (1.13e-05) (1.56e-05) 
2005.year#c.landsize2 -1.86e-09 -2.25e-09 2.72e-10 1.16e-09 
 
(4.56e-08) (5.47e-08) (9.92e-10) (1.35e-09) 
2006.year#c.landsize2 -4.04e-09 -2.43e-08 7.59e-10 1.63e-09 
 
(4.97e-08) (5.55e-08) (1.05e-09) (1.39e-09) 
2007.year#c.landsize2 5.05e-09 -1.75e-08 8.66e-09** 9.50e-09** 
 
(5.01e-08) (5.61e-08) (3.34e-09) (4.14e-09) 
2008.year#c.landsize2 2.50e-08 -1.10e-09 2.93e-09 3.18e-09 
 
(5.22e-08) (5.83e-08) (2.48e-09) (3.18e-09) 
2009.year#c.landsize2 2.30e-08 -3.75e-09 1.61e-09 1.62e-09 
 
(5.29e-08) (5.95e-08) (2.41e-09) (2.98e-09) 
Scarcity 
 
0.0247 
 
-0.000178 
  
(0.0913) 
 
(0.00550) 
Constant 
  
0.659*** 0.662*** 
   
(0.00270) (0.00645) 
     Observations 1,061 867 1,086 867 
R-squared 
  
0.089 0.098 
WUAs 177 145 181 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1.D. Heterogeneous WUASP effects – WUA ecological scarcity 
 
 
 
 
          
VARIABLES Tariff Tariff 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
          
2005.year 0.245 0.234 
  
 
(0.155) (0.155) 
  2006.year 1.100*** 1.098*** 
  
 
(0.163) (0.163) 
  2007.year 1.850*** 1.857*** 
  
 
(0.205) (0.207) 
  2008.year 2.428*** 2.440*** 
  
 
(0.284) (0.285) 
  2009.year 2.492*** 2.458*** 
  
 
(0.304) (0.303) 
  WUASP  -2.273** -5.401*** 0.373 -0.313 
 
(1.027) (1.846) (0.298) (0.410) 
hetscarcity 2.734* 9.216** -0.527* 0.938 
 
(1.391) (3.846) (0.307) (0.680) 
hetscarcity2 
 
-2.925** 
 
-0.684** 
  
(1.367) 
 
(0.322) 
World Bank 0.944 0.955 0.0603 0.0761 
 
(0.620) (0.621) (0.0910) (0.0989) 
propwatrec -0.0114 -0.548 0.740*** -0.212 
 
(0.280) (0.893) (0.272) (0.515) 
Scarcity2 
 
0.213 
 
0.401 
  
(0.302) 
 
(0.280) 
Constant 4.109*** 4.385*** 0.250 0.721*** 
 
(0.268) (0.522) (0.223) (0.231) 
     Observations 862 862 822 822 
R-squared 0.284 0.289 0.059 0.076 
WUAs 144 144 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
Total prop 
payment  
Total prop 
payment  
          
2005.year -0.0681** -0.0684** -0.0822** -0.0819** 
 
(0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0368) (0.0369) 
2006.year -0.0656*** -0.0655*** -0.0778** -0.0782** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0316) (0.0317) 
2007.year 0.0616** 0.0610** -0.0602** -0.0571** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0275) (0.0286) (0.0288) 
2008.year 0.0603* 0.0596* -0.0572* -0.0540* 
 
(0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0312) (0.0313) 
2009.year 0.0987*** 0.0989*** -0.0714** -0.0741** 
 
(0.0291) (0.0293) (0.0296) (0.0290) 
WUASP  -0.0566 -0.0629 0.0659 -0.0649 
 
(0.120) (0.203) (0.0703) (0.0953) 
hetscarcity 0.0105 0.0256 -0.0986 0.180 
 
(0.137) (0.363) (0.0777) (0.158) 
hetscarcity2 
 
-0.00900 
 
-0.128** 
  
(0.126) 
 
(0.0620) 
World Bank -0.0901* -0.0906* -0.0198 -0.0169 
 
(0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0548) (0.0568) 
propwatrec -0.00709 0.0369 0.179*** -0.0315 
 
(0.0345) (0.0903) (0.0526) (0.102) 
Scarcity2 
 
-0.0185 
 
0.0893* 
  
(0.0372) 
 
(0.0527) 
Constant 0.476*** 0.455*** 0.650*** 0.754*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0504) (0.0463) (0.0487) 
     Observations 831 831 831 831 
R-squared 0.090 0.090 0.063 0.073 
WUAs 145 145 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
          
2005.year -0.0213 -0.0221 -0.212*** -0.211*** 
 
(0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0340) (0.0342) 
2006.year 0.0205 0.0204 -0.170*** -0.170*** 
 
(0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0360) (0.0361) 
2007.year 0.0541** 0.0539** -0.163*** -0.161*** 
 
(0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0361) (0.0362) 
2008.year 0.117*** 0.116*** -0.215*** -0.213*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0386) (0.0385) 
2009.year 0.129*** 0.127*** -0.204*** -0.204*** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0385) (0.0386) 
WUASP  -0.00601 -0.225*** 0.0639 0.0712 
 
(0.0704) (0.0693) (0.0590) (0.0898) 
hetscarcity 0.0217 0.493*** -0.00583 -0.0233 
 
(0.0856) (0.120) (0.0632) (0.156) 
hetscarcity2 
 
-0.230*** 
 
0.0126 
  
(0.0413) 
 
(0.0545) 
World Bank 0.0149 0.0149 0.00811 0.00965 
 
(0.0263) (0.0265) (0.0756) (0.0764) 
propwatrec 0.00815 0.0382 0.0128 -0.115 
 
(0.0219) (0.0574) (0.0393) (0.0810) 
Scarcity2 
 
-0.0125 
 
0.0539* 
  
(0.0201) 
 
(0.0295) 
Constant 0.510*** 0.496*** 0.843*** 0.906*** 
 
(0.0241) (0.0381) (0.0378) (0.0518) 
     Observations 828 828 828 828 
R-squared 0.239 0.248 0.116 0.119 
WUAs 145 145 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
  
171 
 
        
VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
        
2005.year 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.000563 
 
(0.0779) (0.0777) (0.0518) 
2006.year 0.918*** 0.913*** -0.0151 
 
(0.121) (0.121) (0.0532) 
2007.year 0.944*** 0.947*** -0.0993* 
 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.0547) 
2008.year 1.086*** 1.090*** -0.0873 
 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.0562) 
2009.year 1.117*** 1.109*** -0.0783 
 
(0.133) (0.132) (0.0563) 
WUASP  -0.547 -0.550 0.0586 
 
(0.364) (0.608) (0.371) 
hetscarcity 1.258*** 1.237 -0.0717 
 
(0.432) (1.140) (0.737) 
hetscarcity2 
 
0.0365 -0.0382 
  
(0.371) (0.344) 
World Bank -0.525*** -0.515*** 0.00299 
 
(0.182) (0.183) (0.129) 
propwatrec -0.192* -0.732*** 0.145 
 
(0.111) (0.201) (0.179) 
Scarcity2 
 
0.226*** -0.0471 
  
(0.0723) (0.0682) 
Constant 3.882*** 4.151*** 
 
 
(0.120) (0.135) 
 
    Observations 867 867 867 
R-squared 0.340 0.344 
 WUAs 145 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
2005.year 0.00951 0.00886 -0.00280*** -0.00280*** 
 
(0.0707) (0.0708) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
2006.year 0.0292 0.0309 -0.00436*** -0.00440*** 
 
(0.0717) (0.0718) (0.00151) (0.00149) 
2007.year -0.0246 -0.0255 -0.0352*** -0.0352*** 
 
(0.0735) (0.0735) (0.00623) (0.00623) 
2008.year -0.0652 -0.0664 -0.0128* -0.0127* 
 
(0.0766) (0.0767) (0.00668) (0.00666) 
2009.year -0.0618 -0.0592 -0.00780 -0.00785 
 
(0.0766) (0.0768) (0.00641) (0.00647) 
WUASP  -0.0420 0.0674 0.0100 0.0105 
 
(0.260) (0.495) (0.00997) (0.0179) 
hetscarcity -0.0763 -0.301 0.00839 0.00714 
 
(0.284) (0.947) (0.00942) (0.0352) 
hetscarcity2 
 
0.0946 
 
0.000794 
  
(0.413) 
 
(0.0129) 
World Bank -0.142 -0.146 0.0301** 0.0302** 
 
(0.197) (0.197) (0.0122) (0.0121) 
propwatrec 0.0252 0.157 -0.00175 -0.00626 
 
(0.0916) (0.242) (0.00559) (0.0157) 
Scarcity2 
 
-0.0521 
 
0.00189 
  
(0.0892) 
 
(0.00455) 
Constant 
  
0.663*** 0.666*** 
   
(0.00639) (0.0110) 
     Observations 867 867 867 867 
R-squared 
  
0.084 0.084 
WUAs 145 145 145 145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1.E. Heterogeneous WUASP effects – WUA social heterogeneity 
 
        
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
2001.year -0.241* 
  
 
(0.142) 
  2002.year 0.0623 
  
 
(0.144) 
  2003.year 0.306** 
  
 
(0.140) 
  2004.year 0.327* 
  
 
(0.193) 
  2005.year 0.661*** 
  
 
(0.208) 
  2006.year 1.382*** 
  
 
(0.203) 
  2007.year 2.064*** 
  
 
(0.206) 
  2008.year 2.432*** 
  
 
(0.234) 
  2009.year 2.623*** 
  
 
(0.253) 
  WUASP 0.0365 -0.00951 0.0520 
 
(0.609) (0.0565) (0.0827) 
Hetethnic 0.629 -0.418 -0.471 
 
(0.940) (0.280) (0.323) 
World Bank  0.977** 0.0746 0.0739 
 
(0.409) (0.106) (0.0926) 
2001.year#c.ethnicu -0.0107 
  
 
(0.0593) 
  2002.year#c.ethnicu -0.0634 
  
 
(0.0804) 
  2003.year#c.ethnicu 0.0121 
  
 
(0.106) 
  2004.year#c.ethnicu -0.000712 
  
 
(0.129) 
  2005.year#c.ethnicu -0.0304 -0.0727 -0.0853 
 
(0.205) (0.0662) (0.0714) 
2006.year#c.ethnicu 0.0406 -0.0889 -0.135** 
 
(0.112) (0.0551) (0.0647) 
2007.year#c.ethnicu 0.0836 -0.160 -0.203 
 
(0.109) (0.163) (0.171) 
2008.year#c.ethnicu 0.108 0.0991 0.0749 
 
(0.317) (0.129) (0.124) 
2009.year#c.ethnicu 0.0260 -0.0292 -0.0971* 
 
(0.233) (0.0468) (0.0518) 
Scarcity 
  
0.729*** 
   
(0.261) 
Constant 3.357*** 0.872*** 0.276 
174 
 
 
(0.145) (0.0249) (0.214) 
Observations 1,436 822 818 
R-squared 0.352 0.009 0.068 
WUA  179 146 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<.01, **p<.05,* p<.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
VARIABLES 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
Total prop 
payment  
Total prop 
payment  
          
2005.year -0.0605** -0.0607** -0.0635 -0.0704* 
 
(0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0390) (0.0412) 
2006.year -0.0741*** -0.0742*** -0.0443 -0.0594* 
 
(0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0331) (0.0338) 
2007.year 0.0603* 0.0569* -0.0125 -0.0437 
 
(0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0319) (0.0306) 
2008.year 0.0661* 0.0660* -0.0244 -0.0394 
 
(0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0334) 
2009.year 0.0896*** 0.0897*** -0.0356 -0.0506 
 
(0.0316) (0.0314) (0.0332) (0.0321) 
WUASP  -0.0403 -0.0408 -0.0417 -0.0266 
 
(0.0861) (0.0867) (0.0340) (0.0358) 
Hetethnic -0.0332 -0.0322 0.0417 0.0478 
 
(0.132) (0.133) (0.0565) (0.0642) 
World Bank  -0.0906* -0.0899* -0.0253 -0.0247 
 
(0.0516) (0.0515) (0.0556) (0.0553) 
2005.year#c.ethnicu -0.0252 -0.0251 -0.0393 -0.0419 
 
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0290) (0.0297) 
2006.year#c.ethnicu 0.0306 0.0310 -0.0538** -0.0583** 
 
(0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0258) (0.0252) 
2007.year#c.ethnicu 0.0237 0.0256 -0.0651** -0.0589** 
 
(0.0381) (0.0389) (0.0258) (0.0227) 
2008.year#c.ethnicu -0.0150 -0.0148 -0.0491* -0.0526** 
 
(0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0253) (0.0238) 
2009.year#c.ethnicu 0.0277 0.0281 -0.0623*** -0.0742*** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0237) (0.0247) 
Scarcity  
 
-0.00612 
 
0.178*** 
  
(0.0336) 
 
(0.0501) 
Constant 0.472*** 0.477*** 0.786*** 0.651*** 
 
(0.0196) (0.0344) (0.0225) (0.0447) 
     Observations 826 825 953 826 
R-squared 0.095 0.094 0.021 0.068 
WUAs 144 144 178 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
          
2005.year -0.0202 -0.192*** -0.208*** 0.409*** 
 
(0.0229) (0.0345) (0.0365) (0.0798) 
2006.year 0.0163 -0.141*** -0.159*** 1.069*** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0375) (0.0387) (0.115) 
2007.year 0.0509** -0.118*** -0.149*** 1.113*** 
 
(0.0237) (0.0390) (0.0387) (0.118) 
2008.year 0.112*** -0.180*** -0.204*** 1.279*** 
 
(0.0243) (0.0409) (0.0424) (0.122) 
2009.year 0.127*** -0.173*** -0.189*** 1.343*** 
 
(0.0232) (0.0394) (0.0413) (0.123) 
WUASP  0.0285 0.0226 0.0281 0.263 
 
(0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0293) (0.285) 
Hetethnic -0.0744 0.104 0.133** 0.665 
 
(0.0471) (0.0645) (0.0654) (0.865) 
World Bank  0.0157 -0.00421 0.00478 -0.529*** 
 
(0.0268) (0.0713) (0.0765) (0.187) 
2005.year#c.ethnicu -0.00302 -0.0181 -0.0121 -0.0911 
 
(0.0188) (0.0290) (0.0298) (0.0584) 
2006.year#c.ethnicu 0.0139 -0.0428 -0.0365 -0.210** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0334) (0.0315) (0.0870) 
2007.year#c.ethnicu 0.00912 -0.0581 -0.0432 -0.256** 
 
(0.0161) (0.0374) (0.0317) (0.101) 
2008.year#c.ethnicu 0.0138 -0.0446 -0.0350 -0.326*** 
 
(0.0167) (0.0407) (0.0376) (0.123) 
2009.year#c.ethnicu 0.00886 -0.0504 -0.0481 -0.324*** 
 
(0.0189) (0.0310) (0.0301) (0.118) 
Scarcity  0.00881 
 
0.0137 
 
 
(0.0217) 
 
(0.0371) 
 Constant 0.510*** 0.850*** 0.842*** 3.315*** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0262) (0.0367) (0.0755) 
     Observations 824 951 824 1,079 
R-squared 0.241 0.099 0.119 0.363 
WUAs 144 178 144 180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
        
2005.year 0.319*** 0.00273 0.00201 
 
(0.0859) (0.0520) (0.0602) 
2006.year 0.986*** -0.0544 -0.0282 
 
(0.134) (0.0529) (0.0612) 
2007.year 1.020*** -0.111** -0.127** 
 
(0.137) (0.0537) (0.0626) 
2008.year 1.154*** -0.104* -0.107* 
 
(0.144) (0.0548) (0.0641) 
2009.year 1.207*** -0.0990* -0.106* 
 
(0.146) (0.0548) (0.0642) 
WUASP  0.396 -0.0687 -0.0511 
 
(0.299) (0.0982) (0.102) 
Hetethnic 0.451 0.0282 0.0823 
 
(0.947) (0.227) (0.235) 
World Bank  -0.548*** -0.0196 0.00807 
 
(0.182) (0.124) (0.129) 
2005.year#c.ethnicu -0.0674 0.000101 -0.00392 
 
(0.0508) (0.124) (0.126) 
2006.year#c.ethnicu -0.181** 0.0951 0.0455 
 
(0.0840) (0.118) (0.123) 
2007.year#c.ethnicu -0.212** 0.113 0.0989 
 
(0.0908) (0.120) (0.123) 
2008.year#c.ethnicu -0.279** 0.120 0.104 
 
(0.111) (0.120) (0.122) 
2009.year#c.ethnicu -0.274** 0.118 0.101 
 
(0.107) (0.120) (0.122) 
Scarcity  -0.120 
 
0.0228 
 
(0.0969) 
 
(0.0697) 
Constant 3.839*** 
  
 
(0.112) 
  
    Observations 861 1,055 861 
R-squared 0.337 
  WUAs 144 176 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
2005.year 0.0134 0.0116 -0.00220** -0.00296*** 
 
(0.0717) (0.0821) (0.000881) (0.00112) 
2006.year 0.0682 0.0244 -0.00344** -0.00443*** 
 
(0.0715) (0.0826) (0.00133) (0.00157) 
2007.year 0.0218 -0.0444 -0.0277*** -0.0343*** 
 
(0.0724) (0.0839) (0.00523) (0.00669) 
2008.year -0.0244 -0.0910 -0.00800 -0.0123* 
 
(0.0747) (0.0870) (0.00546) (0.00717) 
2009.year -0.0136 -0.0900 -0.00402 -0.00832 
 
(0.0749) (0.0873) (0.00544) (0.00699) 
WUASP  -0.233* -0.147 0.00602 0.0159* 
 
(0.134) (0.139) (0.0106) (0.00901) 
Hetethnic 0.136 0.149 0.0336 0.00257 
 
(0.312) (0.324) (0.0263) (0.0109) 
World Bank  -0.197 -0.144 0.0314*** 0.0296** 
 
(0.188) (0.197) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
2005.year#c.ethnicu -0.000428 -0.00648 9.82e-06 0.000714 
 
(0.169) (0.181) (0.000656) (0.000596) 
2006.year#c.ethnicu 0.00437 0.0227 -0.000579 0.000727 
 
(0.167) (0.178) (0.00127) (0.000754) 
2007.year#c.ethnicu 0.0325 0.0762 -0.00436 0.000331 
 
(0.169) (0.177) (0.00462) (0.00585) 
2008.year#c.ethnicu 0.0891 0.137 -0.000427 0.00142 
 
(0.164) (0.171) (0.00417) (0.00433) 
2009.year#c.ethnicu 0.0641 0.119 0.00231 0.00444 
 
(0.167) (0.174) (0.00405) (0.00479) 
Scarcity  
 
0.0203 
 
-0.00195 
  
(0.0908) 
 
(0.00550) 
Constant 
  
0.659*** 0.663*** 
   
(0.00274) (0.00640) 
     Observations 1,055 861 1,080 861 
R-squared 
  
0.074 0.081 
WUAs 176 144 180 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1.F. Heterogeneous WUASP effects – WUA economic heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Tariff 
Water 
delivery 
Water 
delivery 
2001.year -0.445 
  
 
(0.293) 
  2002.year -0.155 
  
 
(0.239) 
  2003.year 0.209 
  
 
(0.257) 
  2004.year -0.0632 
  
 
(0.415) 
  2005.year 0.143 
  
 
(0.409) 
  2006.year 1.357*** 
  
 
(0.401) 
  2007.year 2.121*** 
  
 
(0.452) 
  2008.year 3.497*** 
  
 
(0.578) 
  2009.year 3.720*** 
  
 
(0.596) 
  Post WUASP -1.417 -0.109 0.0474 
 
(1.146) (0.0667) (0.159) 
Het equal 2.636* -0.115 -0.295 
 
(1.354) (0.163) (0.264) 
World Bank  0.605* 0.0905 0.0885 
 
(0.310) (0.116) (0.106) 
2001.year#c.equal 0.530 
  
 
(0.366) 
  2002.year#c.equal 0.422 
  
 
(0.292) 
  2003.year#c.equal 0.234 
  
 
(0.315) 
  2004.year#c.equal 0.755 
  
 
(0.496) 
  2005.year#c.equal 0.959** -0.252** -0.245** 
 
(0.474) (0.103) (0.103) 
2006.year#c.equal 0.231 -0.147 -0.156 
 
(0.465) (0.0992) (0.102) 
2007.year#c.equal 0.0513 -0.151 -0.174 
 
(0.550) (0.179) (0.175) 
2008.year#c.equal -1.403** 0.251 0.247 
 
(0.708) (0.164) (0.162) 
2009.year#c.equal -1.595** -0.0703 -0.101 
 
(0.696) (0.0953) (0.0923) 
Scarcity  
  
0.744*** 
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(0.266) 
Constant 3.408*** 0.895*** 0.288 
 
(0.127) (0.0506) (0.230) 
    Observations 1,338 788 784 
R-squared 0.391 0.028 0.087 
WUAs 165 140 138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
             
VARIABLES 
On-time 
payment 
On-time 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
Total prop 
payment 
          
2005.year -0.0671 -0.0667 0.112 0.113 
 
(0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0872) (0.0917) 
2006.year -0.0884** -0.0869* -0.0247 -0.0562 
 
(0.0446) (0.0449) (0.0659) (0.0673) 
2007.year -0.0378 -0.0327 -0.0177 -0.0231 
 
(0.0559) (0.0562) (0.0615) (0.0617) 
2008.year -0.0458 -0.0444 0.0478 -0.00105 
 
(0.0612) (0.0604) (0.0689) (0.0701) 
2009.year 0.138** 0.141** 0.0563 -0.0132 
 
(0.0613) (0.0601) (0.0672) (0.0633) 
post WUASP 0.102 0.0996 -0.0366 0.0359 
 
(0.114) (0.116) (0.0514) (0.0540) 
hetequal -0.268 -0.264 -0.0120 -0.100 
 
(0.191) (0.192) (0.0814) (0.0865) 
World Bank  -0.0776 -0.0776 -0.00103 0.00375 
 
(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0584) (0.0575) 
2005.year#c.equal -0.00526 -0.00611 -0.316*** -0.335*** 
 
(0.0783) (0.0783) (0.118) (0.122) 
2006.year#c.equal 0.0328 0.0307 -0.0878 -0.0695 
 
(0.0730) (0.0732) (0.0984) (0.0952) 
2007.year#c.equal 0.167* 0.154* -0.0650 -0.0949 
 
(0.0853) (0.0863) (0.0951) (0.0886) 
2008.year#c.equal 0.153 0.151 -0.160 -0.109 
 
(0.0978) (0.0973) (0.100) (0.0960) 
2009.year#c.equal -0.0762 -0.0794 -0.208** -0.123 
 
(0.0956) (0.0948) (0.0965) (0.0884) 
Scarcity  
 
-0.00938 
 
0.187*** 
  
(0.0344) 
 
(0.0497) 
Constant 0.474*** 0.482*** 0.797*** 0.649*** 
 
(0.0189) (0.0339) (0.0233) (0.0438) 
     Observations 794 793 897 792 
R-squared 0.110 0.108 0.047 0.102 
WUAs 138 138 165 138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
O & M/rehab 
budget 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
O & M/rehab 
payment 
        
2005.year -0.0156 -0.141* -0.135* 
 
(0.0465) (0.0750) (0.0796) 
2006.year -0.00121 -0.0664 -0.0633 
 
(0.0474) (0.0774) (0.0819) 
2007.year 0.0652 -0.0562 -0.0258 
 
(0.0465) (0.0728) (0.0749) 
2008.year 0.111** -0.0410 -0.0486 
 
(0.0502) (0.0813) (0.0869) 
2009.year 0.0993** -0.0976 -0.133 
 
(0.0482) (0.0780) (0.0826) 
post WUASP -0.00800 0.0364 0.0610 
 
(0.0372) (0.0402) (0.0456) 
hetequal 0.0439 0.0229 0.00809 
 
(0.0563) (0.0698) (0.0768) 
World Bank  0.0121 0.000111 0.0106 
 
(0.0288) (0.0726) (0.0788) 
2005.year#c.equal -0.00311 -0.111 -0.145 
 
(0.0609) (0.116) (0.121) 
2006.year#c.equal 0.0465 -0.178 -0.213* 
 
(0.0602) (0.119) (0.120) 
2007.year#c.equal -0.0106 -0.183 -0.270** 
 
(0.0620) (0.117) (0.111) 
2008.year#c.equal 0.0195 -0.279** -0.301** 
 
(0.0637) (0.124) (0.126) 
2009.year#c.equal 0.0628 -0.185 -0.149 
 
(0.0620) (0.126) (0.130) 
Scarcity  0.00664 
 
0.0209 
 
(0.0216) 
 
(0.0402) 
Constant 0.504*** 0.870*** 0.850*** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0270) (0.0390) 
    Observations 789 894 789 
R-squared 0.253 0.122 0.149 
WUAs 138 165 138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES 
Institutional 
capacity 
Institutional 
capacity 
Development 
problems 
Development 
problems 
          
2005.year -0.0461 -0.0831 0.00594 0.00689 
 
(0.123) (0.120) (0.0971) (0.107) 
2006.year 0.465** 0.368* -0.00618 0.0442 
 
(0.190) (0.198) (0.0986) (0.108) 
2007.year 0.526*** 0.419** -0.0313 0.000689 
 
(0.196) (0.206) (0.100) (0.110) 
2008.year 0.637*** 0.517** -0.0255 0.00356 
 
(0.197) (0.206) (0.105) (0.117) 
2009.year 0.707*** 0.627*** -0.0241 -7.55e-05 
 
(0.206) (0.221) (0.105) (0.117) 
post WUASP -0.336 -0.258 -0.178 -0.193 
 
(0.300) (0.320) (0.145) (0.153) 
hetequal 1.462** 1.486** 0.216 0.294 
 
(0.576) (0.637) (0.220) (0.235) 
World Bank  -0.464** -0.490** -0.0284 -0.0120 
 
(0.208) (0.198) (0.125) (0.130) 
2005.year#c.equal 0.728*** 0.665*** -0.00508 -0.00949 
 
(0.229) (0.229) (0.142) (0.161) 
2006.year#c.equal 0.934*** 0.938*** -0.0514 -0.0988 
 
(0.309) (0.325) (0.144) (0.163) 
2007.year#c.equal 0.869*** 0.893*** -0.0948 -0.160 
 
(0.320) (0.340) (0.147) (0.167) 
2008.year#c.equal 0.927*** 0.938*** -0.0913 -0.142 
 
(0.317) (0.336) (0.153) (0.174) 
2009.year#c.equal 0.882*** 0.821** -0.0854 -0.123 
 
(0.325) (0.347) (0.152) (0.174) 
Scarcity  
 
-0.105 
 
0.000946 
  
(0.0942) 
 
(0.0716) 
Constant 3.378*** 3.809*** 
  
 
(0.0800) (0.115) 
  
     Observations 990 827 978 827 
R-squared 0.388 0.366 
  WUAs 165 138 163 138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VARIABLES Activeness Activeness 
Canal 
infrastructure 
Canal 
infrastructure 
          
2005.year 0.0111 0.00851 -0.00275 -0.00346 
 
(0.134) (0.147) (0.00179) (0.00216) 
2006.year 0.0159 0.0178 -0.00570** -0.00671** 
 
(0.135) (0.148) (0.00278) (0.00324) 
2007.year 0.0244 0.0176 -0.0602*** -0.0685*** 
 
(0.136) (0.150) (0.0138) (0.0159) 
2008.year -0.0398 -0.0440 -0.0371*** -0.0463*** 
 
(0.146) (0.162) (0.0137) (0.0157) 
2009.year -0.0180 -0.0291 -0.0233* -0.0288* 
 
(0.145) (0.163) (0.0138) (0.0161) 
posttreat -0.201 -0.175 0.0265 0.0486*** 
 
(0.199) (0.210) (0.0178) (0.0151) 
hetequal 0.00101 0.101 -0.0143 -0.0509*** 
 
(0.311) (0.332) (0.0272) (0.0186) 
postwbstart -0.188 -0.155 0.0387*** 0.0365*** 
 
(0.190) (0.198) (0.0128) (0.0132) 
2005.year#c.equal 0.00535 0.00487 -0.000433 -3.14e-05 
 
(0.198) (0.223) (0.00248) (0.00301) 
2006.year#c.equal 0.0784 0.0267 0.00174 0.00312 
 
(0.197) (0.224) (0.00341) (0.00392) 
2007.year#c.equal 0.00204 -0.0590 0.0457*** 0.0535** 
 
(0.201) (0.228) (0.0175) (0.0208) 
2008.year#c.equal 0.0479 -0.0116 0.0389** 0.0479** 
 
(0.211) (0.241) (0.0173) (0.0207) 
2009.year#c.equal 0.0230 -0.0331 0.0253 0.0276 
 
(0.211) (0.242) (0.0181) (0.0217) 
Scarcity  
 
0.00945 
 
0.00119 
  
(0.0940) 
 
(0.00574) 
Constant 
  
0.659*** 0.664*** 
   
(0.00284) (0.00656) 
     Observations 978 827 990 827 
R-squared 
  
0.107 0.124 
WUAs 163 138 165 138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2.A. Final Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
1. Rayon: __________________________________  2. Village: _____________________________ 
 
3. Date of Birth:      day_________  month________   year _____________  
 
4. Sex:           Male  Female                 
 
5.Nationality/Ethnicity______________________________________________ 
 
6. How many people are in your household, including yourself? _______________ 
(Please count all individuals who live in this dwelling for three or more months out of the year.) 
 
 7. What is the name of your local Water Users‘ Association? 
_______________________________________________________________________      Don't know 
 
 8. Are you a member of the local Water Users' Association? 
 Yes     No                                 Don't know 
 
9.  In general, do you consider yourself to be active in the Water Users' Association, such as by attending 
meetings or by volunteering your time in other ways? 
 
 Very Active (leader/zonal representative/mirab/staff)  Active (but not a leader, staff, etc.) 
 Somewhat active      Not very active 
 Inactive (no participation) 
 
10. What is the name of the director of your local Water Users‘ Association? 
___________________________________________________________  Don't know 
 
  Each irrigated area under the management of a Water Users‘ Association is divided into zones and has a 
"zonal representative."  
 
11. Which zone is your irrigated land located 
in?_________________________________________________________ Don't know   
 
12. What is the name of your zonal representative? 
__________________________________________________ Don't know 
 
13. Have you ever voted for a zonal representative?    Yes   No 
 
14. How many times in the past 12 months did you attend a ―zonal meeting‖ to discuss irrigation issues?  
 Once   Twice    Three times or more   Never 
 
15. How is the Director of the Water Users‘ Association selected? 
 
 Leadership of the Ayil Okmotu selects the Director 
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 The WUA Council hires the Director 
The previous Director appoints his successor 
 Don‘t know 
 
16.  In your opinion, which of the following groups is most responsible for the long term success of the 
Water Users' Association? 
 Kyrgyz Government   The World Bank   The community and members of 
the WUA   
 The Local Government  Farmers with large land holdings 
 
17. Thinking about your local Water Users' Association and the services it provides, please indicate how 
informed you feel about the following items? Please mark an X in the box that best applies. 
 
 Completely 
informed 
Somewhat 
informed 
Somewhat 
uninformed 
Not at all 
informed 
a. Schedule and location for 
WUA meetings ( ex. Posted 
schedules, agendas, etc.) 
    
b. The benefits of WUA 
membership 
    
c. The responsibilities of WUA 
membership 
    
d. Information on the  
WUA budget 
    
e. Schedules for water delivery      
 
 
18. How is your irrigation service fee determined? Please mark all that apply. 
 
 Volume of water received     Based on crops    Amount of hectares irrigated     Don‘t know 
 
 
19. Thinking about your payment of the irrigation service fee, please indicate to what degree you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. Please mark an X in the box that best applies. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree  
nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
a. My payment of ISF ensures my right 
to water 
     
b. My payment of ISF ensures that I will 
receive on-time water delivery 
     
c. My household will be fined by the 
WUA if we do not pay the ISF. 
     
d. My household will not receive 
irrigation water if we do not pay the ISF. 
     
e. My household will be shamed by the 
community if we do not pay the ISF. 
     
f. The aksakals will hold my household 
accountable if we do not pay the ISF. 
     
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20. Thinking about your local community and Water Users' Association, please indicate to what degree you 
agree or disagree with the following statements. Please mark an X in the box that best applies. 
 
 Strongly Agree Agree Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
a. Water is 
delivered on-time  
     
b.Water is 
distributed in-line 
or by a schedule 
     
c.There is enough 
water for irrigation  
     
d. The Mirabs do a 
good job 
     
e. Beside the 
mirabs, the WUA 
personnel does a 
good job 
 
     
 
21. Have you ever been involved in discussions with zonal representatives OR the WUA leadership about 
the budget for Operation and Maintenance?        Yes      No 
 
22. In general, how satisfied are you with the work of your community's WUA? 
 Very satisfied  Satisfied  Neutral      Unsatisfied  Very unsatisfied  
 
23. What is the size (in hectares) of your irrigated field area? _______________ 
 
24. Do you rent your land?             Yes   No 
 
25.  What were the most important crops planted by your household during this past spring and summer? 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
26.  In this community, where are your irrigated lands located with regards to the source of irrigation 
water?   
 Head (Beginning)   Middle (Middle   Tail (End)   
 
27. Did you make any profit from your crop yields this year?        Yes    No 
 
28.  In comparison to spring and summer of 2008, did your household experience an increase in land under 
cultivation during spring and summer of 2009?   Yes   No 
 
 
29. Besides winter wheat, did you plant any late season (or second) crops?    Yes 
  No 
 
 
30. In comparison to spring and summer of 2008, did your overall crop yields increase or decrease during 
spring and summer of 2009? 
 Increased significantly  
 Increased a little  
 Remained the same  
 Decreased  a little 
  Decreased significantly 
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31.  In comparison to spring and summer of 2008, was there an increase in the amount of irrigation water 
available for your crops in the spring and summer of 2009? 
 Increased significantly 
 Increased a little 
 Remained the same 
 Decreased a little  
 Decreased significantly   
 
 
32.  If you had unlimited water for irrigation, how many times would you irrigate your fields during the 
following months?  
Month April May June July August 
Number of irrigations 
 
 
 
 
    
 
33. Thinking about your local community, please indicate in your opinion, how often the following events 
occur. Please mark an X in the box that best applies.  
 
 Very Often Often Occasionally Rarely Never 
a. People violate 
water schedules by 
taking water out of 
turn 
     
b. There are 
tensions over 
irrigation water 
     
c. People damage 
the canals  
     
 d.  People damage 
the water gates 
     
 
34.  In your opinion, how fairly is irrigation water distributed among farmers in your village? 
 Very fair  Fair   Not fair or unfair  Unfair  Very Unfair 
 
35. Thinking about your local community and Water Users' Association, please indicate to what degree you 
agree or disagree with the following statements. Please mark an X in the box that best applies. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree  
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
a. Farmers who own large land plots 
get more water than farmers with 
smaller plots of land. 
     
b. People often take water by force      
c. Water is distributed by acquaintance, 
such as kin or clan  
     
d. Farmers who own large land plots 
get water first. 
     
e. People who pay bribes get water first      
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36. If there is a very dry period with very little water for irrigation, who would deal with the situation? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
37.  Thinking about your local community, please indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. Please mark an X in the box that best applies. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree  
nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
a. The relationships among people in this 
village/neighborhood are generally 
harmonious. 
     
b. In this village, people generally trust 
each other to follow the schedules for crop 
watering during the irrigation season. 
     
c. Everyone in this community  has equal 
access to irrigation water 
     
 
38. Differences often exist between people living in the same village/neighborhood. Thinking about your 
own village/neighborhood, please indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. Please mark an X in the box that best applies. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
agree  
nor disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongl
y 
disagree 
a. Differences in size of landholdings tend to 
cause irrigation water problems. 
     
b. Differences in social status tend to cause 
irrigation water problems. 
     
c. Differences in religious beliefs tend to cause 
irrigation water problems. 
     
d. Differences in ethnicity tend to cause irrigation 
water problems. 
     
 
39.  If tensions arise between people over irrigation water, how are these tensions usually settled?  
 
 People work it 
out between 
themselves 
 
Family/household 
members 
intervene 
 
Aksakals 
mediate 
 
WUA 
leaders 
mediate 
 
Religious 
leaders 
mediate 
 
Leaders 
from the 
Ayil 
Okmotu 
mediate  
 
Yes       
No       
 
 
Commentary (Any additional comments, statements or feedback from the respondent?) 
 
 
Observations/comments from Interviewer 
 
 
Interviewer: _____________________________________  Date: ________________ 
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Appendix 2.B. IBM results for WUASP, women and end-users in table format 
 
 
The Tables for each of the individual behavioral mechanisms provides a summary of the 
significant interaction categories and their difference in estimated marginal means (demms) for 
the IBM I proxy measures along with their corresponding significance levels (i.e. 90%, 95%, 
99%).  There are three columns for each table. The first column includes the proxy measure under 
investigation. The second column summarizes the respondent categories where we find evidence 
of statistically significant positive and/or negative effects between program versus control 
respondents for the individual proxy measures. The respondent category is listed and the demm 
and significance level of the difference is parenthetically noted after the category. For example, 
Q7 asks respondents to name the WUA. In the second column of the table below I have written 
―begin(.45)***.‖  This means that program respondents located at the beginning of the canal are 
45% more likely than control respondents at the beginning of the canal to know the name of their 
WUA. The three asterisks (***) indicate that this is significant at the 99% level. The third column 
assesses whether or not the results provide support for the proxy measure/alternative hypotheses 
listed in column 1. The presence of a majority of significant and positive program effects leads 
me to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypotheses. Finally, the row at the 
bottom of the table indicates whether or not we have overall support for the primary hypothesis 
under consideration.  
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Average WUASP Results for knowledge 
Alternative Hypotheses Evidence for positive program effects? Support? 
WUASP respondents are more likely 
to know the name of the WUA. (Q7) 
Positive program effects:  begin(.45)***; mid(.55)***; 
zone 1(.39)***; zone 2(.57)***; zone 3(.43)*** 
 YES  
 
 
  
WUASP respondents are more likely 
to know the director of the WUA. 
(Q10) 
 
Positive program effects: members (.28)***; 
males(.24)***; females(.52)***, begin(.30)***; 
mid(.51)***; zone1(.29)***; zone 3(.46)*** 
YES 
 
  
WUASP respondents are more likely 
to know their zonal representative. 
(Q12) 
 
Positive program effects: uncertain(.55)***;  
males(.30)***; begin(.33)***; zone 3 (.39)*** 
YES 
WUASP respondents are more aware 
of WUA governance procedures. 
(Q15) 
 
Positive program effects: members(.21)**; 
uncertain(.55)***; begin(.42)***; end(.10)***; zone 
1(.23)***; zone 3(.33)*** 
YES  
WUASP respondents are more 
informed about WUA meetings. 
(Q17a) 
 
Positive program effects: members(.33)**; 
uncertain(.23)***; males(.28)***; zone 1(.26)***; zone 
2(.30)*** 
YES 
WUASP respondents feel more 
informed about the benefits of WUA 
membership. (Q17b) 
 
Positive control effects: (outcome 2) non-members 
(.21)*; begin(.14)**; zone 3(.22)*** & zone 3 for 
outcome 3(.17)** 
YES  
WUASP respondents feel more 
informed about the responsibilities of 
WUA membership (q17c) 
 
Positive program effects: (outcome 1) members(.25)*** 
 
Positive control effects: (outcome 1) zone 2(.12)**; zone 
3(.17)** 
 
NO 
WUASP respondents feel more 
informed about the WUA budget. 
(Q17d) 
 
Positive program effects: members(.38)***; 
males(.17)***; zone 1(.15)**; zone 2(.10)** 
YES 
    
WUASP respondents feel more 
informed about water delivery 
schedules. (Q17e) 
 
(1)Positive program effects: members(.22)***; 
middle(.22)** 
 
(2) Positive control effects: begin(.37)***; 
females(.32)***zone 1(.12)** 
YES 
   
H KNOWLEDGE: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP are more knowledgeable about the 
WUA and irrigation management.  
YES  
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71
 The PARTIC_C index was created from two questions. One question asked respondents to assess their activeness in 
the WUA based on their attendance at meetings and the overall amount of time that they dedicate to the WUA. The 
second questions asked respondents to indicate how many times they had attended a ―zonal meeting‖ in the past year to 
discuss irrigation issues. The average inter-item correlation for the index is .7587 and the scale reliability coefficient is 
.8628. In order to assess the magnitude of the program effect for index outcomes, it is important to note the index 
score‘s range and whether or not a lower score represents positive or negative effect. For example, the PARTIC index 
ranges from -3.42 to 1.14 with an overall mean of 0. A lower PARTIC_C index score indicates a more active 
participant in the WUA. Therefore, in table above where I present the demm results for PARTIC_C, the ―member(-
1.03)‖ demm score indicates that program members score one point lower on the index score than control members 
which is a positive and large program effect. 
Average WUASP Results for participation 
Hypotheses Evidence for positive program effects? Support 
WUASP respondents are more active 
participants in the WUA. (PARTIC 
index)
71
 
 
Positive program effects: members (-1.03)***; 
uncertain(-.93)***; begin (-.815)***; middle(-
.88)***; end(-.23)*** 
 
YES   
WUASP respondents are more likely to 
have voted for their zonal representative. 
(Q13) 
 
Positive program effects: uncertain(.15)***; zone 
3(.15)** 
 
Positive control effect: non-members(.29)*** 
 
YES     
HPARTICIPATION: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP are more active participants 
in the WUA.  
YES  
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72
 The STAFF index is based on two questions regarding respondents‘ satisfaction level with the work of the mirabs 
(―water masters‖) and with the work of WUA personnel other than the mirabs. The average inter-item correlation is 
.9218 and the scale reliability coefficient is .9593. The index has a mean of 1.386 and ranges from -2.087 to 2.93. A 
lower score on the index indicates that the respondent is more satisfied with the work of the WUA personnel. 
73
 The PUNISH_C index is comprised of three questions that attempt to assess how likely respondents found the threat 
of punishment by aksakals and the WUA for ISF non-payment. Although the question is specifically about punishment, 
it implicitly provides information on how well the WUA monitors defection. The average inter-item correlation for the 
index is .6872 and the scale reliability coefficient is .8683. The index has a mean of 1.547 and ranges from -2.483 to 
3.0547. A lower score on the index indicates that respondents feel more strongly that uncooperative behavior will be 
punished. 
74 The IRMAN index is based on two questions about whether or not water was delivered on-time and by a schedule. 
The average inter-item correlation is .83 and the scale reliability coefficient is .904.  The index has a mean of 1.35 and 
ranges from -2.12 to 1.963. A lower score indicates that respondents feel more strongly that the WUA is efficiently 
managing irrigation water.  
75 The ISF index is based on two questions. The first question asks respondents how strongly they agree with the 
statement that irrigation service fee (ISF) payments ensure the right to water. The second question asks respondents 
how strongly they agree with the statement that ISF payments ensure on-time delivery of irrigation water.  The average 
inter-item correlation for the index is .83 and the scale reliability coefficient is .91.The ISF index has a mean of 1.35 
and ranges from -1.76 to 3.66. A lower score on the index indicates that the respondent holds a stronger belief that their 
ISF payment entitles them to adequate and on-time water delivery.  
 
Average WUASP Results for attitudes 
Hypotheses Evidence for positive program effects? 
Support
? 
 
WUASP respondents provide a higher 
evaluation of the work of the WUA personnel. 
(STAFF)
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Positive program effect: middle(-.87)**; 
zone 3(-1.02)*** 
 
YES 
WUASP respondents express a higher degree 
of certainty than non-cooperative behaviors 
will be punished. (PUNISH)
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Positive program effects: members(-.79)***; 
uncertain(-1.32)*; zone 1(-.55)***; zone 3(-
2.02)*** 
YES 
WUASP respondents provide a better 
performance evaluation for their WUA. (Q22)  
 
Positive program effect (outcome 1): 
members(.12)** 
 
YES 
WUASP respondents perceive more efficient 
irrigation management outcomes.(IRMAN)
74
 
Positive program effects: zone 3(-1.32)*** YES 
 
WUASP respondents have a stronger 
association between ISF payment and water 
rights. (ISF index)
75
 
 
Positive program effects: members(-.36)*; 
zone 3(-.87)*** 
 
 YES 
 
 
WUASP respondents are more likely to accept 
responsibility & ownership for the WUA. 
(Q16) 
 
 
Positive program effect: uncertain(.31)**; 
zone 3(.31)*** 
 
YES 
HATTITUDES: Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP express more positive attitudes 
about the WUA and irrigation management in comparison to those in control sites.  
 
YES 
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76The TRUST_REC index is based on two questions. One question asks respondents how strongly they agree that 
people generally trust each other to follow the schedules for crop watering during the irrigation season in their village. 
The second question asks them if community members have equal access to irrigation water. The average inter-item 
correlation is .7985 and the scale reliability coefficient is .888. The index has a mean of 1.34 and ranges from -2.189 to 
2.398. A lower TRUST_REC index score indicates a higher assessment of trust and reciprocity.  
77 The COOP_NEW_C index was designed to investigate the perception of cooperative behavior between the 
populations within the treatment and control WUAs.  It was created from four questions about the perceived presence 
(or absence) of specific ―non-cooperative‖ behaviors that are argued to be hindrances to the long term success of the 
WUA. In particular, respondents were asked about the incidence rates of such acts as canal vandalism, ―water stealing‖, 
taking water out-of-turn and general ―tensions‖ or non-cooperative behavior over irrigation water.  The average inter-
item correlation is .68 and the scale reliability coefficient is .895. The mean of the COOP_NEW_C index is 1.75 and 
the index ranges from -2.53 to 3.30. Lower COOP_NEW_C index scores represent the perception of less cooperative 
community behavior. 
Average WUASP Results for social capital 
Hypotheses 
Evidence for positive program 
effects? 
   Support? 
There are better community relations in 
treatment WUAs. (TRUST_REC)
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Positive program effect: zone 
3(1.15)*** 
 
Positive control effect: zone 1(.76)* 
NO 
Divisions in economic and social status are not 
linked to tensions over irrigation water in 
WUASP WUAs. (ECON_STATUS) 
 
Positive control effects: 
members(1.22)***; 
uncertain(1.57)***; males(.67)***; 
females(1.28)***; zone 1(.68)***; 
zone 2(.56)***; zone 3(.75)*** 
NO 
 
Divisions in religion and ethnicity are not linked 
to tensions over irrigation water in WUASP 
WUAs. (REL_ETH) 
 
 
Positive control effects: 
begin(.80)***;end(.48)***; zone 
1(.96)***; zone 2 (.65)***; zone 
3(.33)*** 
 
NO 
Individuals in WUASP WUAs are more likely to 
solve tensions over irrigation water on their own. 
(Q39a) 
 
Positive program effect: 
uncertain(.42)**; males(.28)*** 
YES 
There is a stronger norm of community shaming 
for uncooperative behavior in WUASP WUAs. 
(Q19e) 
 
No evidence of program effect for 
outcome 1; Positive program effect 
outcome 2(zone 3): (.08)* 
 
Positive control effect outcome 2(zone 
1)(.08)***; zone 2(.14)** 
 
NO 
There is evidence of more cooperative behaviors 
in WUASP sites in comparison to control sites. 
(COOP_C) 
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Positive program effect: zone 3(.83)*** 
 
Positive control result: 
members(1.31)***; zone 1(.79)* 
NO 
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78 The FAIR_C index is based on three questions about whether or not water is distributed equitably among land 
parcels regardless of kin, land size and the payment of bribes. A higher score means that respondents believe that 
irrigation water is distributed more equally among land parcels. 
 
 
There is less evidence of individuals damaging 
water gates in WUASP sites. (Q33d)  
 
Positive control effect(outcome 1): 
females(.04)**; zone 1(.01)* ;zone 
3(.01)* 
Positive program effect (outcome 2): 
non-members(.24)***; uncertain(.15)*; 
zone 2(.26); zone 3(.16)*** 
 
YES 
WUASP respondents perceive more equitable 
irrigation management outcomes.(FAIR)
78
 
No positive program effect 
 
Positive control effects: 
members(.70)***; uncertain (1.46)***; 
zone 1(.35)***; zone 2(1.50)***; zone 
3(.94)*** 
NO 
 
Q34(fair distribution) 
 
No positive program effect 
 
Positive control effects: 
members(.15)***; end(.13)***; 
females(.13)***; zone 1(.09)** 
 
NO 
HSOCIAL CAPITAL:Respondents in WUAs treated by WUASP exhibit more cooperative 
communal behaviors regarding irrigation water.  
NO 
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Appendix 2.C.1. Regression output for the mechanisms – WUASP 
 
  
KNOWLEDGE 
 
  Logit 
VARIABLES Q7 Q10 Q12 Q15 Q17a Q17d 
    
    
  
rent 0.118 -0.299 -0.128 0.359* -0.532 -0.627 
 
(0.227) (0.361) (0.396) (0.218) (0.505) (0.822) 
program 1.466* 1.237 0.838 1.588** 1.858** 4.447*** 
 
(0.890) (0.946) (1.052) (0.680) (0.843) (0.922) 
1.location -1.042** -1.088** -0.548** 0.0184 -0.340** 0.315 
 
(0.504) (0.525) (0.241) (0.401) (0.140) (0.235) 
2.location -0.293 0.341 0.0860 0.976** -0.663 -0.513 
 
(0.362) (0.548) (0.234) (0.434) (0.412) (0.379) 
1.sex -1.004*** -0.711*** -0.231 -0.869** -0.492*** 0.421 
 
(0.244) (0.187) (0.254) (0.412) (0.154) (0.357) 
1.ethnic -0.0382 0.812* -0.376 0.217 1.329* 0.554 
 
(0.400) (0.476) (0.439) (0.238) (0.693) (0.429) 
1.cropsX 0.470*** 0.516 0.492 0.233*** -0.391*** 0.0769 
 
(0.0984) (0.369) (0.384) (0.0800) (0.124) (0.0745) 
2.cropsX 0.0992 -0.139 -0.516 -0.823*** 0.961*** 3.270*** 
 
(0.160) (0.101) (0.419) (0.220) (0.360) (0.759) 
agec -0.0108 0.00271 -0.00235 -0.00600 0.00989* 0.0142 
 
(0.0121) (0.0190) (0.0103) (0.0129) (0.00570) (0.0113) 
logsizec 0.304 0.205 -0.137 -0.104 -0.168 -0.137 
 
(0.223) (0.134) (0.117) (0.280) (0.132) (0.267) 
1.wuapair 0.551 -2.078*** -1.928*** -0.940*** 0.610 1.999*** 
 
(0.362) (0.322) (0.639) (0.308) (0.393) (0.258) 
2.wuapair -0.000197 0.228 0.628 -0.810*** 4.081*** 5.972*** 
 
(0.413) (0.231) (0.670) (0.249) (0.598) (0.733) 
2.member -0.609 0.282 -0.338 -0.713 -0.943** -1.748*** 
 
(1.096) (0.413) (0.567) (0.801) (0.392) (0.432) 
3.member -2.658*** -2.371*** -2.160*** -2.813** -1.808*** -0.492 
 
(0.779) (0.458) (0.677) (1.256) (0.629) (0.570) 
program#2.member -1.291 -2.486*** -0.731 -0.975 -1.864** -1.435* 
 
(1.407) (0.883) (0.877) (0.932) (0.850) (0.750) 
program#3.member 0.260 -0.524 0.787 3.150*** 0.0265 -1.334*** 
 
(0.808) (1.040) (0.575) (0.978) (0.303) (0.359) 
1.program#1.location 0.569** 0.947*** 0.0848 -0.711 0.293 -0.499* 
 
(0.232) (0.301) (0.178) (0.483) (0.213) (0.256) 
1.program#2.location -0.0719 0.363 -0.821** -1.751*** 0.695 -0.633 
 
(0.298) (0.577) (0.387) (0.414) (0.772) (0.638) 
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1.program#1.sex 0.494 0.839* -1.199*** -0.426 -0.905** -2.057* 
 
(0.583) (0.481) (0.368) (0.451) (0.410) (1.152) 
1.program#1.cropsX 1.028*** 0.852 0.989 -0.0869 0.497*** -0.601*** 
 
(0.360) (0.612) (0.808) (0.308) (0.169) (0.171) 
1.program#2.cropsX 0.0955 0.871** 1.598** 0.947*** -1.374*** -3.284*** 
 
(0.266) (0.433) (0.690) (0.301) (0.494) (0.592) 
2.member#1.location 0.377 0.425 -0.240 0.617 0.622** -0.130 
 
(0.750) (0.522) (0.582) (0.448) (0.297) (0.341) 
2.member#2.location -0.318 -0.795* -0.324 -0.617 0.134 0.108 
 
(0.509) (0.414) (0.258) (0.477) (0.747) (0.497) 
3.member#1.location 1.531* 0.567* 1.545* 0.422 -0.995*** -2.141 
 
(0.898) (0.343) (0.833) (1.069) (0.379) (1.609) 
3.member#2.location -0.155 -0.505* 0.630 -0.470 -0.0881 -1.226 
 
(0.621) (0.303) (1.034) (1.231) (1.139) (1.132) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -0.304 -1.367*** 0.589 0.468 1.420*** 1.895 
 
(0.679) (0.509) (0.408) (0.314) (0.313) (1.202) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.245 -0.00142 0.505** 0.115 0.270 0.712*** 
 
(0.189) (0.572) (0.207) (0.251) (0.264) (0.190) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.534*** -0.437 1.239*** -0.0675 -0.184 1.141* 
 
(0.203) (0.300) (0.250) (0.190) (0.507) (0.665) 
Constant 0.418 1.839*** 1.682** -0.374 -2.578*** -6.476*** 
 
(0.621) (0.572) (0.697) (0.577) (0.762) (0.757) 
       Observations 1,131 1,131 1,123 1,131 1,127 1,114 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
  Multinomial 
VARIABLES 
Q17b 
(outcome 1) 
         Q17b 
(outcome 2) 
Q17b 
(outcome 3) 
Q17c  
(out 1) 
Q17c     
(out 2) 
Q17c   
(out 3) 
              
rent -1.373 -0.379 -0.201 -0.750 -0.452 0.345 
 
(1.087) (0.563) (0.373) (0.873) (0.701) (0.239) 
program 1.988*** 1.368** 0.790* 2.274*** 0.465 0.954 
 
(0.493) (0.594) (0.475) (0.802) (0.718) (0.719) 
1.location -0.929*** -0.616*** -0.374* 
-
1.435*** -0.568** 0.473 
 
(0.172) (0.130) (0.224) (0.234) (0.234) (0.622) 
2.location -0.706* -0.776*** -0.171** -0.779** -0.582** 0.587 
 
(0.399) (0.125) (0.0870) (0.370) (0.279) (0.376) 
1.sex -0.0881 -0.590*** 0.0586 -0.441* -0.163 -0.122 
 
(0.392) (0.166) (0.424) (0.249) (0.341) (0.722) 
1.ethnic 0.718 0.823 -0.827 0.320 0.798 -0.552* 
 
(0.798) (0.720) (0.641) (0.786) (0.866) (0.311) 
1.cropsX -0.269 -0.183 0.389 0.514* -0.288 -0.169 
 
(0.556) (0.132) (0.262) (0.281) (0.339) (0.162) 
2.cropsX 2.643*** 1.165*** 1.081** 1.032 1.273 1.058* 
 
(0.396) (0.174) (0.455) (1.037) (0.831) (0.551) 
agec 0.0239*** 0.00956 -0.000923 0.0115 -0.00423 -0.0121 
 
(0.00898) (0.00891) (0.00854) (0.0155) (0.00910) (0.0159) 
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logsizec -0.180 0.207 0.376 0.0900 0.162 0.111 
 
(0.264) (0.288) (0.256) (0.350) (0.477) (0.288) 
1.wuapair 1.345** 2.180*** 1.529*** 2.250* 2.515** 0.893 
 
(0.551) (0.589) (0.452) (1.303) (1.189) (0.649) 
2.wuapair 3.986*** 4.117*** 1.138*** 3.815*** 2.599*** -0.682* 
 
(0.468) (0.677) (0.389) (0.760) (0.819) (0.407) 
2.member -2.498*** -0.748* -1.522*** -0.347 -1.329*** 
-
2.133**
* 
 
(0.308) (0.419) (0.526) (0.675) (0.433) (0.578) 
3.member -17.65*** -2.379*** -2.123*** -1.414 -1.461 
-
2.828**
* 
 
(0.721) (0.241) (0.787) (1.156) (0.892) (0.887) 
program#2.member -0.586 -2.425*** 0.0676 -1.538** 0.0652 0.163 
 
(0.538) (0.683) (0.667) (0.780) (0.414) (0.697) 
program#3.member 14.06*** -1.552*** 0.575 
-
15.08*** -1.058 0.524 
 
(0.841) (0.310) (1.010) (1.598) (0.911) (1.032) 
1.program#1.locatio
n 0.328 0.995*** 0.315 1.026** 0.980 -0.465 
 
(0.278) (0.215) (0.383) (0.411) (0.613) (0.850) 
1.program#2.locatio
n 0.114 0.367 -0.0219 -0.218 0.463 -0.711* 
 
(0.634) (0.584) (0.322) (0.564) (0.449) (0.430) 
1.program#1.sex -2.121*** -1.288*** -1.638** -0.717 -0.691* -0.678 
 
(0.768) (0.189) (0.777) (0.455) (0.379) (0.750) 
1.program#1.cropsX 0.860* 0.370 0.451 -0.326 0.363 0.775* 
 
(0.471) (0.343) (0.285) (0.423) (0.689) (0.426) 
1.program#2.cropsX -2.794*** -2.989*** -1.794*** 
-
3.012*** -4.181*** 
-
2.922**
* 
 
(0.403) (0.395) (0.461) (0.813) (0.829) (0.510) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 2.022*** 1.501*** 1.343* 
   
 
(0.573) (0.186) (0.717) 
   1.ethnic#1.location 0.648** -0.208 -0.238 0.366 -0.285 0.538 
 
(0.271) (0.525) (0.393) (0.572) (0.620) (0.693) 
1.ethnic#2.location -0.0407 -0.0299 -0.131 
-
0.910*** -1.430** 
-
0.834**
* 
 
(0.414) (0.489) (0.323) (0.320) (0.579) (0.289) 
Constant -2.135** -2.419*** -0.325 -1.687 -0.397 0.122 
 
(0.933) (0.810) (0.503) (1.153) (0.834) (0.790) 
       Observations 1,129 1,129 1,129 1,128 1,128 1,128 
       
  Multinomial 
VARIABLES Q17e(out. 1) Q17e(out. 2) Q17e(out. 3) 
        
rent -0.956 -0.351 0.0881 
 
(0.903) (0.633) (0.309) 
program 1.284** 0.0999 0.557 
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(0.517) (0.350) (0.562) 
1.location -0.956* -0.783 0.580** 
 
(0.567) (0.598) (0.243) 
2.location -0.881*** -0.952*** 0.626*** 
 
(0.188) (0.212) (0.0849) 
1.sex -1.013*** 0.0956 -0.353 
 
(0.382) (0.377) (0.540) 
1.ethnic 0.657 0.124 -1.096* 
 
(0.804) (0.569) (0.570) 
1.cropsX 0.738 0.608 0.318 
 
(0.510) (0.685) (0.441) 
2.cropsX 0.0399 0.272 0.386 
 
(0.414) (0.428) (0.311) 
agec 0.0153** 0.00220 -0.00963* 
 
(0.00616) (0.00934) (0.00526) 
logsizec -0.274 0.214 -0.0361 
 
(0.195) (0.335) (0.179) 
1.wuapair 0.867* 1.179** -1.548*** 
 
(0.518) (0.471) (0.158) 
2.wuapair 3.987*** 1.853*** -2.165*** 
 
(0.409) (0.281) (0.398) 
2.member -1.341** -1.490*** -0.278 
 
(0.527) (0.444) (0.570) 
3.member -4.312*** -1.630** -0.577 
 
(0.317) (0.742) (0.879) 
program#2.member -1.130** -0.322 -0.772 
 
(0.505) (0.463) (0.615) 
program#3.member 1.539*** -0.803 -0.324 
 
(0.475) (0.809) (0.875) 
1.program#1.location 0.802 0.784 -0.465 
 
(0.566) (0.684) (0.504) 
1.program#2.location -0.471 0.642* -0.833*** 
 
(0.584) (0.341) (0.205) 
1.program#1.sex -0.563 -1.572** -1.182 
 
(0.763) (0.797) (1.100) 
1.program#1.cropsX -0.162 0.351 1.303 
 
(0.763) (0.922) (1.202) 
1.program#2.cropsX -0.301 -1.337*** -0.347 
 
(0.350) (0.335) (0.516) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 1.335* 1.027 0.495 
 
(0.732) (0.820) (0.970) 
1.ethnic#1.location 0.296 0.0481 0.636 
 
(0.317) (0.313) (0.554) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.0675 -0.234 1.046*** 
 
(0.444) (0.323) (0.182) 
Constant -1.088 0.524 0.916 
 
(0.907) (0.724) (0.575) 
    Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.01 
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PARTICIPATION 
 
  Logit OLS 
VARIABLES Q13 PARTIC 
      
rent -0.0148 0.370** 
  (0.519) (0.120) 
1.program -0.0597 -1.323*** 
  (0.634) (0.235) 
1.location -1.079** 0.342 
  (0.460) (0.188) 
2.location -0.735*** -0.145 
  (0.277) (0.180) 
1.sex -0.272 0.488* 
  (0.333) (0.207) 
1.ethnic -1.037*** 0.0194 
  (0.337) (0.0509) 
1.cropsX 0.660*** -0.0687 
  (0.150) (0.239) 
2.cropsX -0.179 -0.0580 
  (0.582) (0.0886) 
agec 0.0111 -0.00381 
  (0.00829) (0.00388) 
logsizec -0.0345 0.0192 
  (0.177) (0.0775) 
1.wuapair -2.549*** 0.424** 
  (0.693) (0.108) 
2.wuapair 0.716* -0.356*** 
  (0.383) (0.0874) 
2.member -1.305** 0.808 
  (0.539) (0.402) 
3.member -3.050** 1.056** 
  (1.203) (0.281) 
1.program#2.member -1.702** 0.929** 
  (0.711) (0.348) 
1.program#3.member 1.958*** -0.0148 
  (0.459) (0.353) 
1.program#1.location 0.425 -0.0766 
  (0.273) (0.122) 
1.program#2.location 0.0176 0.586*** 
  (0.397) (0.133) 
1.program#1.sex -1.337*** 0.274 
  (0.423) (0.395) 
1.program#1.cropsX 0.109 0.215 
  (0.600) (0.253) 
1.program#2.cropsX 1.204** 0.113 
  (0.536) (0.0726) 
2.member#1.location 0.722 -0.409 
  (0.693) (0.246) 
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2.member#2.location 0.578 0.0630 
  (0.505) (0.252) 
3.member#1.location 0.267 -0.287 
  (1.189) (0.310) 
3.member#2.location -0.264 0.189 
  (1.059) (0.238) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -0.217 -0.00522 
  (0.457) (0.240) 
1.ethnic#1.location 1.183*** -0.0984 
  (0.277) (0.131) 
1.ethnic#2.location -0.0262 -0.235 
  (0.329) (0.120) 
Constant 1.745** -0.545 
  (0.786) (0.315) 
      
Observations 1,123 1,101 
R-squared   0.415 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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ATTITUDES 
 
  OLS Logit 
VARIABLES STAFF PUNISH IRMAN ISF Q16 
            
Rent 0.0124 0.117 0.0411 -0.0722 -0.284 
 
(0.103) (0.147) (0.0923) (0.105) (0.247) 
1.program 0.249 -0.411 0.492* 0.625 0.260 
 
(0.403) (0.242) (0.238) (0.412) (0.368) 
1.location 0.391 0.111 0.469 0.371 0.339 
 
(0.253) (0.147) (0.282) (0.322) (0.418) 
2.location 0.519* 0.399 1.221*** 0.559 -0.183 
 
(0.255) (0.206) (0.287) (0.354) (0.432) 
1.sex 0.0416 0.0673 -0.0861 0.149 0.114 
 
(0.105) (0.0705) (0.0723) (0.0765) (0.395) 
1.ethnic -0.881* -0.809** -0.720* -0.592** 1.919*** 
 
(0.430) (0.241) (0.335) (0.168) (0.495) 
1.cropsX -0.337 -0.184 -0.527* 0.294** 0.178* 
 
(0.225) (0.116) (0.221) (0.0980) (0.0960) 
2.cropsX 0.773 0.471 0.431 1.033*** -0.561 
 
(0.503) (0.376) (0.449) (0.164) (0.430) 
agec -0.00303 -0.000376 0.000843 -0.00305 -0.000988 
 
(0.00336) (0.00116) (0.00324) (0.00415) (0.00764) 
logsizec 0.314** 0.108 0.247* 0.0870 -0.138 
 
(0.121) (0.0794) (0.102) (0.0502) (0.189) 
1.wuapair 1.089 -0.455 0.306 0.395** -0.635 
 
(0.576) (0.368) (0.584) (0.141) (0.389) 
2.wuapair -0.696* -1.988*** -0.325 0.0546 0.628 
 
(0.299) (0.260) (0.252) (0.229) (0.420) 
2.members 0.208 0.991 0.545 0.434 -0.688 
 
(0.305) (0.522) (0.339) (0.256) (0.687) 
3.members -0.0485 0.701** -0.112 0.504 -1.064* 
 
(0.300) (0.272) (0.363) (0.325) (0.622) 
1.program#2.members 0.740 -0.246 0.136 0.745* -0.373 
 
(0.427) (0.488) (0.306) (0.308) (0.456) 
1.program#3.members 0.0317 -0.533 -0.169 -0.00816 1.436*** 
 
(0.248) (0.302) (0.312) (0.397) (0.503) 
1.program#1.location -0.635 -0.0936 -0.613 -0.475 0.318 
 
(0.407) (0.256) (0.343) (0.273) (0.329) 
1.program#2.location -0.308 -0.117 -0.779* -0.437 0.150 
 
(0.398) (0.231) (0.313) (0.350) (0.362) 
1.program#1.sex -0.0147 0.273 0.399 -0.307 -0.724 
 
(0.304) (0.282) (0.411) (0.242) (0.491) 
1.program#1.cropsX -0.204 0.464** 0.202 -0.340 -0.811** 
 
(0.391) (0.174) (0.344) (0.256) (0.344) 
1.program#2.cropsX -2.163*** -1.428*** -1.580*** -1.297*** 1.290*** 
 
(0.335) (0.228) (0.300) (0.205) (0.309) 
2.members#1.location 0.322* -0.0849 0.235 -0.194 -0.304 
 
(0.156) (0.228) (0.182) (0.253) (0.539) 
2.members#2.location 0.160 -0.335 0.230 0.0379 0.0752 
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(0.207) (0.182) (0.226) (0.189) (0.619) 
3.members#1.location 0.0780 -0.0541 0.398 -0.405 -0.428 
 
(0.368) (0.298) (0.588) (0.407) (0.587) 
3.members#2.location 0.187 -0.515 0.342 -0.149 -0.637 
 
(0.309) (0.290) (0.423) (0.383) (0.803) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 0.0288 -0.302 -0.370 0.184 0.0630 
 
(0.319) (0.294) (0.392) (0.226) (0.234) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.0153 -0.209 -0.169 0.0452 -0.711** 
 
(0.243) (0.249) (0.184) (0.114) (0.287) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.269 0.227 -0.0798 0.646* -1.222*** 
 
(0.214) (0.123) (0.232) (0.261) (0.430) 
Constant -0.503** 0.466 -0.733** -0.948 0.623 
 
(0.195) (0.373) (0.230) (0.493) (0.469) 
      Observations 1,106 1,107 1,104 1,105 1,130 
R-squared 0.437 0.487 0.436 0.205   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Multinomial 
VARIABLES 
Q22 
(outcome 1) Q22 (out. 2) Q22 (out. 4) 
        
Rent -0.298 0.0941 0.0973 
 
(0.781) (0.317) (0.219) 
1.program -0.439 -1.476** -0.647* 
 
(0.732) (0.595) (0.392) 
1.location -1.818*** -0.328 -0.907** 
 
(0.197) (0.326) (0.390) 
2.location -2.723*** -0.957*** -0.128 
 
(0.615) (0.244) (0.820) 
1.sex 0.512 0.857*** 0.534*** 
 
(0.497) (0.211) (0.0708) 
1.ethnic 15.69*** 16.22*** 15.62*** 
 
(0.875) (0.635) (1.772) 
1.cropsX 0.999* 0.847*** -0.250* 
 
(0.525) (0.202) (0.141) 
2.cropsX -16.12*** -1.478* -0.500** 
 
(0.815) (0.778) (0.223) 
Agec 0.0267 0.00442 0.00151 
 
(0.0167) (0.0142) (0.0140) 
Logsizec -0.488* -0.277 0.451** 
 
(0.267) (0.211) (0.228) 
1.wuapair -0.537 -1.290 1.623*** 
 
(0.600) (0.856) (0.271) 
2.wuapair 2.403*** -0.479 -1.009*** 
 
(0.422) (0.443) (0.310) 
2.member -0.768 -1.797*** -2.186*** 
 
(0.737) (0.649) (0.521) 
3.member -2.030 -2.054** -2.544** 
 
(1.810) (0.977) (1.008) 
1.program#2.member -0.499 1.460*** 2.196*** 
 
(0.808) (0.474) (0.465) 
1.program#3.member 1.647** 2.194** 0.149 
 
(0.643) (1.015) (0.469) 
1.program#1.sex -0.293 -1.338*** 0.129 
 
(0.844) (0.314) (0.474) 
1.program#1.cropsX -0.195 -0.648 -0.759*** 
 
(0.848) (0.467) (0.293) 
1.program#2.cropsX 18.71*** 3.431*** -2.251*** 
 
(1.158) (0.478) (0.218) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 0.0571 0.639** -1.111** 
 
(0.797) (0.323) (0.465) 
1.ethnic#1.location -14.20*** -15.12*** -30.49*** 
 
(1.389) (1.425) (1.884) 
1.ethnic#2.location -14.61*** -15.74*** -14.94*** 
203 
 
 
(1.378) (1.103) (2.027) 
2.member#1.location 0.120 -0.0247 2.112*** 
 
(0.710) (0.576) (0.639) 
2.member#2.location 0.654 -0.0700 1.554*** 
 
(0.578) (0.644) (0.603) 
3.member#1.location -0.245 0.287 3.170*** 
 
(2.041) (1.624) (0.603) 
3.member#2.location -14.66*** -0.103 2.424** 
 
(1.729) (1.297) (1.069) 
Constant 0.0534 3.579*** -0.430 
 
(1.069) (0.510) (0.735) 
    Observations 1,101 1,101 1,101 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                ***p<.01, **p<.05,*p.1 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 
 
  OLS Logit 
VARIABLES COOP TRUST ECSTAT RELETHC FAIR Q39a 
              
2.q24 0.283* -0.000297 0.0302 -0.113 0.0214 -0.529** 
 
(0.129) (0.0934) (0.123) (0.0762) (0.0839) (0.233) 
1.program -1.981*** 0.948*** -1.208*** -1.224*** -1.825*** 0.889*** 
 
(0.286) (0.194) (0.263) (0.302) (0.320) (0.240) 
1.location -0.444* 0.131 -0.402 -0.114 -0.424 1.131*** 
 
(0.177) (0.135) (0.287) (0.135) (0.297) (0.239) 
2.location -0.723* 0.535** -0.665** -0.244** -0.456* 1.061* 
 
(0.295) (0.186) (0.207) (0.0661) (0.187) (0.616) 
1.sex 0.156 -0.0738 0.241** -0.0151 -0.0109 0.182 
 
(0.225) (0.154) (0.0830) (0.0624) (0.107) (0.136) 
1.ethnic 1.382** -1.318*** 0.0217 -0.658** 0.426 0.377 
 
(0.406) (0.327) (0.215) (0.211) (0.268) (0.297) 
1.cropsX 0.289 -0.190 0.0700 -0.124 0.0560 -0.0682 
 
(0.273) (0.163) (0.141) (0.0863) (0.0688) (0.199) 
2.cropsX -0.314 0.779 0.133 -0.343*** -0.157 0.418*** 
 
(0.678) (0.535) (0.279) (0.0829) (0.288) (0.156) 
agec 
-
0.00513*** -0.00149 -0.00339 1.24e-05 -0.00243 0.000139 
 
(0.000974) (0.00264) (0.00409) (0.00268) (0.00294) (0.00679) 
logsizec -0.0879 0.311** 0.141 0.124 0.0931 -0.440*** 
 
(0.0691) (0.0839) (0.0867) (0.0943) (0.103) (0.142) 
1.wuapair -0.874 0.481 -0.548* -0.897*** -0.314 -1.669*** 
 
(0.850) (0.562) (0.258) (0.0783) (0.303) (0.198) 
2.wuapair 0.0945 -0.343 0.543*** 0.190 0.900*** -3.180*** 
 
(0.337) (0.319) (0.0898) (0.0978) (0.137) (0.0728) 
2.member -2.088*** 0.588* -1.458*** -0.373** -1.032** 0.300 
 
(0.415) (0.263) (0.279) (0.111) (0.262) (0.551) 
3.member -1.676** 0.736* 0.0138 -0.135 -0.353 -0.353 
 
(0.467) (0.325) (0.224) (0.154) (0.264) (0.542) 
1.program#2.member 1.244** -0.233 1.143** 0.525 0.875** 0.141 
 
(0.442) (0.396) (0.347) (0.338) (0.297) (0.487) 
1.program#3.member 1.885** -0.472 -0.321 -0.256 -0.0372 1.612*** 
 
(0.667) (0.331) (0.164) (0.131) (0.607) (0.462) 
1.program#1.location 0.443 -0.364 0.412 0.142 0.515 -0.633 
 
(0.263) (0.239) (0.332) (0.176) (0.380) (0.503) 
1.program#2.location 0.388 -0.343 0.429 0.349* 0.255 -0.202 
 
(0.450) (0.296) (0.270) (0.156) (0.304) (0.436) 
1.program#1.sex -0.632* 0.150 -0.502** 0.0379 0.143 -0.945*** 
 
(0.258) (0.296) (0.155) (0.163) (0.340) (0.344) 
1.program#1.cropsX 0.434 0.191 -0.295* 0.339** 0.103 0.375 
 
(0.482) (0.204) (0.132) (0.0968) (0.192) (0.280) 
1.program#2.cropsX 1.853** -1.851*** 0.212 0.620*** 0.572** 0.243 
 
(0.473) (0.316) (0.170) (0.0836) (0.186) (0.172) 
2.member#1.location 0.234 0.390* -0.0416 -0.0497 -0.0695 -0.784** 
 
(0.225) (0.164) (0.208) (0.124) (0.176) (0.348) 
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2.member#2.location 0.174 0.0577 0.157 -0.0672 -0.0555 -0.738 
 
(0.305) (0.108) (0.112) (0.118) (0.149) (0.613) 
3.member#1.location 1.300** -0.233 -0.156 -0.0389 0.473 -1.041* 
 
(0.398) (0.281) (0.217) (0.235) (0.345) (0.588) 
3.member#2.location 0.0765 -0.0923 -0.0375 0.00638 0.0735 -0.645 
 
(0.346) (0.205) (0.148) (0.191) (0.256) (0.725) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 0.632** -0.00921 0.398* 0.378* -0.665 1.209* 
 
(0.205) (0.247) (0.176) (0.148) (0.489) (0.650) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.201 0.134 0.318** 0.0722 0.139 0.306 
 
(0.178) (0.154) (0.122) (0.175) (0.249) (0.613) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.0765 0.0186 0.819*** 0.671*** 0.200 -1.076*** 
 
(0.381) (0.190) (0.154) (0.157) (0.239) 
 Constant 
     
1.841*** 
 
(0.235) (0.149) (0.256) (0.0990) (0.201) (0.415) 
       Observations 
     
1,121 
R-squared 
      Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    ***p<.001,**p<.05,*p<0.1 
      
 
 
 
  Multinomial  
VARIABLES 
Q34 
(outcome 2) 
Q34  
(outcome 3) 
Q19e 
(outcome 2) 
Q19e 
(outcome 3) 
Q19e 
(outcome 4) 
            
Rent 0.373*** 0.139 0.226 0.111 0.0870 
 
(0.110) (0.481) (0.221) (0.226) (0.523) 
1.program 0.644 1.740* -0.260 0.138 -0.595 
 
(0.527) (0.917) (0.503) (0.837) (0.739) 
1.location 1.260*** 0.979** 0.167 -0.221 0.411 
 
(0.346) (0.475) (0.402) (0.475) (0.649) 
2.location 1.599*** 1.447*** 0.894*** 1.270*** 1.684 
 
(0.462) (0.458) (0.166) (0.308) (1.211) 
1.sex -0.298 -0.152 0.327** 0.0947 0.859*** 
 
(0.206) (0.278) (0.134) (0.122) (0.162) 
1.ethnic 0.361 0.131 -0.0866 -1.528* -0.951 
 
(0.355) (2.302) (0.255) (0.917) (0.747) 
1.cropsX -0.00427 -0.642 0.387 0.321** 0.348 
 
(0.149) (0.793) (0.308) (0.143) (1.127) 
2.cropsX 0.215 0.445 1.753*** 2.346** 2.170** 
 
(0.521) (0.617) (0.669) (1.097) (0.996) 
Agec 0.00408 0.0117 -0.00581*** -0.0142* -0.00896 
 
(0.00819) (0.0178) (0.00200) (0.00803) (0.0104) 
Logsizec -0.220 0.0680 -0.121 -0.120 -0.233 
 
(0.163) (0.330) (0.137) (0.165) (0.364) 
1.wuapair 1.119*** 1.469* -2.113*** -0.245 1.724 
 
(0.410) (0.882) (0.595) (1.008) (1.257) 
2.wuapair 0.244 -0.941* -2.672*** -2.481*** -0.675 
 
(0.276) (0.546) (0.376) (0.887) (0.977) 
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2.member 0.970*** 0.760*** 1.650*** 1.854*** 2.717** 
 
(0.337) (0.178) (0.418) (0.383) (1.244) 
3.member 0.281 0.0562 0.903 1.307* 0.857 
 
(0.550) (0.298) (0.833) (0.692) (1.350) 
1.program#1.location -0.944** -1.624** 
   
 
(0.374) (0.659) 
   1.program#2.location -0.0487 -0.693 
   
 
(0.570) (0.649) 
   1.program#1.sex 0.720*** 0.845** 
   
 
(0.255) (0.412) 
   1.program#1.cropsX -0.221 -1.918 -0.133 0.483 -0.157 
 
(0.519) (1.397) (0.444) (0.433) (1.340) 
1.program#2.cropsX -1.367*** -4.387*** -2.308*** -4.025*** -4.531*** 
 
(0.486) (0.830) (0.780) (1.058) (1.070) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -0.798*** -1.363*** 
   
 
(0.295) (0.215) 
   1.ethnic#1.location 0.483* 0.0658 
   
 
(0.257) (2.567) 
   1.ethnic#2.location 0.300 0.515 
   
 
(0.313) (2.663) 
   2.member#1.location 
  
0.538 1.398** 1.020 
   
(0.640) (0.606) (0.722) 
2.member#2.location 
  
-1.149** -0.644 -1.071 
   
(0.511) (0.559) (1.332) 
3.member#1.location 
  
-0.792 -0.271 0.463 
   
(0.680) (0.860) (1.032) 
3.member#2.location 
  
-2.107*** -1.428** -2.330* 
   
(0.472) (0.580) (1.337) 
Constant -3.324*** -3.989*** 2.281*** 0.285 -3.099** 
 
(0.586) (0.907) (0.360) (0.604) (1.398) 
      Observations 1,118 1,118 1,130 1,130 1,130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
  Multinomial 
VARIABLES 
Q33d 
(outcome 1) 
Q33d 
(outcome 2) 
Q33d 
(outcome 3) 
        
Rent -0.706*** -0.285 -0.138 
 
(0.247) (0.351) (0.316) 
1.program 1.524 0.982* 0.259 
 
(1.098) (0.530) (0.464) 
1.location -0.335 0.804* 0.715*** 
 
(0.402) (0.477) (0.250) 
2.location 0.523 0.385 0.331** 
 
(0.380) (0.456) (0.163) 
1.sex 0.478 0.235 -0.0648 
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(0.651) (0.456) (0.361) 
1.ethnic -13.97*** 0.614 -0.915*** 
 
(1.405) (0.477) (0.211) 
1.cropsX -0.980*** 0.436** -0.0624 
 
(0.319) (0.217) (0.386) 
2.cropsX 0.514 1.094*** 0.979*** 
 
(0.499) (0.205) (0.165) 
Agec 0.0264** 0.0101 0.00608 
 
(0.0103) (0.00620) (0.00530) 
Logsizec 0.0115 -0.127 -0.200 
 
(0.304) (0.216) (0.246) 
1.wuapair -2.162** -1.412*** -1.655*** 
 
(0.980) (0.227) (0.121) 
2.wuapair -1.021 -1.107** -1.323*** 
 
(1.147) (0.551) (0.176) 
2.member 0.339 1.199 0.892 
 
(0.464) (0.771) (0.689) 
3.member -11.71*** 2.899** 3.440*** 
 
(0.798) (1.390) (1.007) 
1.program#2.q8 0.332 -1.481*** -0.450 
 
(0.652) (0.484) (0.789) 
1.program#3.q8 -2.577*** -2.607** -3.163*** 
 
(0.612) (1.162) (0.966) 
1.program#1.cropsX -2.864** -1.998*** -0.289 
 
(1.170) (0.559) (0.496) 
1.program#2.cropsX -1.046 -1.574*** -0.718*** 
 
(0.901) (0.316) (0.202) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -1.118 -0.721** -0.0620 
 
(0.779) (0.320) (0.333) 
1.ethnic#1.location 15.01*** -0.410 0.520 
 
(1.075) (0.359) (0.320) 
1.ethnic#2.location 13.67*** -0.369 0.643*** 
 
(0.885) (0.428) (0.156) 
2.q8#1.location 0.181 -0.769 -0.926** 
 
(0.763) (0.904) (0.387) 
2.q8#2.location 0.237 0.130 -0.519 
 
(0.519) (0.738) (0.440) 
3.q8#1.location 13.58*** -3.558*** -3.014*** 
 
(1.234) (1.122) (0.626) 
3.q8#2.location 14.71*** -1.087 -1.883** 
 
(0.874) (0.893) (0.743) 
Constant -0.960 -0.456 0.535 
 
(1.132) (0.608) (0.442) 
    Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2.C.2. Regression output for the mechanisms – Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
program respondents  
 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
Logit 
VARIABLES q7 q10 q12 q15 
     
1.location -0.158 0.0337 -0.665*** -0.462*** 
 
(0.308) (0.231) (0.250) (0.171) 
2.location -0.588*** 0.0778 -0.949*** -0.811*** 
 
(0.0697) (0.357) (0.332) (0.105) 
1.sex -0.311* 0.274 -1.354*** -1.112*** 
 
(0.168) (0.444) (0.0773) (0.0470) 
1.ethnic 2.761*** 1.098** 0.133 -0.145 
 
(0.278) (0.450) (0.159) (0.358) 
1.cropsX 1.575*** 1.345*** 1.462*** -0.865*** 
 
(0.176) (0.295) (0.396) (0.209) 
2.cropsX 0.648** -0.621*** 0.109 -0.331 
 
(0.283) (0.0887) (0.0716) (0.323) 
agec -0.0223*** -0.0145** -0.00415 -0.0105 
 
(0.00656) (0.00625) (0.0245) (0.0197) 
logsizec 0.644*** 0.757*** 0.359 0.170 
 
(0.0887) (0.0664) (0.438) (0.497) 
2.member -1.742*** -1.797*** -0.763 -1.509** 
 
(0.531) (0.574) (0.500) (0.607) 
3.member -1.579*** -2.466*** 0.113 0.0521 
 
(0.398) (0.918) (0.110) (0.134) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -1.100*** -1.627*** 0.657*** 0.290*** 
 
(0.177) (0.437) (0.0963) (0.0539) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX -1.073*** -1.416*** -1.626*** 1.118*** 
 
(0.180) (0.280) (0.491) (0.302) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX -0.778*** -0.0524 -0.701*** 0.417 
 
(0.280) (0.0892) (0.149) (0.417) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.365 -0.0306 1.010*** -0.143 
 
(0.322) (0.231) (0.250) (0.152) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.476*** -0.579* 0.834*** -0.483*** 
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(0.0837) (0.342) (0.261) (0.0320) 
2.member#1.ethnic -2.352*** -1.073* -1.256** -1.721*** 
 
(0.514) (0.585) (0.579) (0.517) 
3.member#1.ethnic -0.885** -0.797 -1.084*** 0.388*** 
 
(0.365) (0.917) (0.111) (0.121) 
Constant 1.807*** 2.237*** 1.970*** 1.218*** 
 
(0.306) (0.498) (0.418) (0.187) 
 
 
 
Logit 
VARIABLES q17a q17b q17c q17d q17e 
      
1.location -0.0715 -0.186 0.0397 -0.353** -0.133 
 
(0.0892) (0.175) (0.182) (0.159) (0.299) 
2.location -0.175 -0.486 -0.552*** -0.784** -0.441** 
 
(0.650) (0.673) (0.0972) (0.339) (0.221) 
1.sex -1.438** -1.213* -0.723 -1.285*** -0.673*** 
 
(0.631) (0.682) (0.641) (0.270) (0.0201) 
1.ethnic 1.963** 2.022*** 1.742*** 2.147** 2.300*** 
 
(0.767) (0.752) (0.492) (0.884) (0.621) 
1.cropsX 1.553** 1.286*** 1.691*** 1.577* 1.894** 
 
(0.649) (0.232) (0.462) (0.853) (0.875) 
2.cropsX -0.195 -0.424 -0.772** 1.112 0.466 
 
(0.589) (0.577) (0.313) (0.860) (0.476) 
agec -0.0132 -0.00752 -0.0145 0.00171 -0.0169 
 
(0.0249) (0.0213) (0.0263) (0.0191) (0.0220) 
logsizec 0.701*** 0.420*** 0.957*** 0.560** 0.684 
 
(0.196) (0.110) (0.297) (0.281) (0.480) 
2.member -1.324*** -1.642*** -0.268 -1.245* -0.927 
 
(0.157) (0.320) (0.582) (0.665) (0.609) 
3.member -1.322** -3.172*** -1.831*** -3.435*** -2.409*** 
 
(0.619) (0.196) (0.159) (0.173) (0.306) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 1.707*** 1.149* 0.681 1.625*** 0.738*** 
 
(0.614) (0.671) (0.623) (0.258) (0.0535) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX -1.207 -1.690*** -1.613*** 0.758*** -0.0285 
 
(0.743) (0.242) (0.580) (0.157) (0.309) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX -0.285 -0.314 0.412 0.245 -0.430 
 
(0.657) (0.642) (0.378) (0.394) (0.283) 
1.ethnic#1.location 0.445*** 0.609*** -0.153 -2.506*** -1.750 
 
(0.0922) (0.186) (0.181) (0.864) (1.076) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.214 0.311 -0.0615 -1.876** -1.082** 
 
(0.777) (0.793) (0.174) (0.857) (0.524) 
2.member#1.ethnic -0.455*** 
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(0.0427) 
    
3.member#1.ethnic -2.029*** 
    
 
(0.542) 
    
Constant -0.849 -0.984 -0.583 -1.327 -0.512 
 
(0.776) (0.720) (0.558) (1.065) (0.737) 
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PARTICIPATION 
 
  OLS Logit 
VARIABLES PARTIC_C  Q13 
    
 
1.location 0.203 -0.499 
 
(0.0925) (0.433) 
2.location 0.532*** -0.567*** 
 
(0.0229) (0.132) 
1.sex 0.806 -1.552*** 
 
(0.366) (0.249) 
1.ethnic 0.384* -2.191*** 
 
(0.0936) (0.353) 
1.cropsX 0.197** 0.251* 
 
(0.0290) (0.144) 
2.cropsX 0.308 -0.610 
 
(0.135) (0.451) 
agec 0.00375 -0.00359 
 
(0.00226) (0.0114) 
logsizec -0.289* 0.724 
 
(0.0837) (0.455) 
2.member 1.561*** -2.040*** 
 
(0.0782) (0.331) 
3.member 0.989 -1.358*** 
 
(0.420) (0.211) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -0.260 0.0316 
 
(0.367) (0.198) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX -0.203** 0.477** 
 
(0.0305) (0.197) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX -0.197 0.759 
 
(0.163) (0.535) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.290* 1.037** 
 
(0.0873) (0.422) 
1.ethnic#2.location -0.254** -0.853*** 
 
(0.0571) (0.197) 
2.q8#1.ethnic 0.0913 
 
 
(0.100) 
 
3.q8#1.ethnic 0.438 
 
 
(0.412) 
 
Constant -1.487*** 1.206*** 
 
(0.0235) (0.102) 
   
Observations 542 542 
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R-squared 0.330   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
  
  
213 
 
ATTITUDES 
 
  OLS  
VARIABLES IRMAN ISF STAFF PUNISH 
          
1.location 0.0545 -0.145* 0.0173 0.209 
 
(0.131) (0.0406) (0.338) (0.247) 
2.location 0.597** 0.156 0.374 0.413 
 
(0.0872) (0.177) (0.336) (0.175) 
1.sex 0.444 -0.100 0.150 0.423 
 
(0.373) (0.220) (0.233) (0.196) 
1.ethnic -0.792* 0.279 -0.450 -0.959 
 
(0.238) (0.152) (0.428) (0.392) 
1.cropsX -0.358 0.174 -0.706 -0.831 
 
(0.151) (0.352) (0.384) (0.318) 
2.cropsX -1.282* 0.143 -0.845* -1.325* 
 
(0.337) (0.0729) (0.281) (0.428) 
Agec -0.00192 -0.0105 -0.00819 0.00533 
 
(0.000708) (0.00426) (0.00710) (0.00697) 
Logsizec 0.237 0.0442 0.245 0.0697 
 
(0.176) (0.137) (0.201) (0.181) 
2.q8 0.699*** 1.138 0.614 0.281** 
 
(0.0641) (0.424) (0.237) (0.0554) 
3.q8 -0.0160 0.360 0.361 0.0303 
 
(0.0259) (0.131) (0.154) (0.405) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -0.518 0.215 -0.144 -0.269 
 
(0.387) (0.219) (0.244) (0.197) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 0.0962 -0.920 0.424 0.725 
 
(0.166) (0.364) (0.418) (0.345) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX 0.863 -0.778*** 0.267 0.830 
 
(0.361) (0.0733) (0.288) (0.431) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.221 0.111 -0.0754 -0.222 
 
(0.127) (0.0426) (0.343) (0.254) 
1.ethnic#2.location 0.116 0.607* 0.545 0.114 
 
(0.0760) (0.204) (0.356) (0.188) 
2.q8#1.ethnic -0.0900 -0.532 1.055* -0.721** 
 
(0.0562) (0.410) (0.246) (0.0843) 
3.q8#1.ethnic 0.167** -0.126 -0.351* 0.415 
 
(0.0341) (0.156) (0.105) (0.436) 
Constant -0.327 -0.407** -0.308 -0.222 
 
(0.158) (0.0784) (0.441) (0.355) 
     
Observations 543 546 543 542 
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R-squared 0.431 0.238 0.274 0.256 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
  Logit  Multinomial 
VARIABLES Q16 q22 (outcome 1) q22 (outcome 3) q22 (outcome 4) 
  
    
1.location 0.427** -1.471*** 0.0187 -0.352 
 
(0.173) (0.0794) (0.170) (0.274) 
2.location -0.144 -2.150 0.906*** 1.499** 
 
(0.132) (1.427) (0.226) (0.758) 
1.sex -0.638** 0.595 0.551 1.363** 
 
(0.299) (0.523) (0.359) (0.554) 
1.ethnic 0.446*** -0.334 -14.47*** -12.75*** 
 
(0.0774) (0.414) (0.778) (1.398) 
1.cropsX -0.568 1.340* -0.0709 -1.081*** 
 
(0.418) (0.721) (0.430) (0.156) 
2.cropsX 0.159** 0.968 -1.011*** -3.559*** 
 
(0.0632) (0.794) (0.0825) (0.130) 
Agec 0.000548 0.0105 -0.00549 -0.0331** 
 
(0.0164) (0.0328) (0.0107) (0.0153) 
Logsizec -0.0863 0.711*** 0.568 0.425 
 
(0.450) (0.164) (0.358) (0.263) 
2.member -1.027*** -0.136 0.527 1.536*** 
 
(0.324) (0.243) (0.437) (0.569) 
3.member -0.796*** 0.276 0.470 0.578 
 
(0.0342) (0.896) (0.429) (0.695) 
1.ethnic#1.sex -0.213 -0.131 -0.305 -1.924*** 
 
(0.305) (0.434) (0.413) (0.613) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 1.019* 
   
 
(0.522) 
   
1.ethnic#2.cropsX 0.644*** 
   
 
(0.0703) 
   
1.ethnic#1.location -0.615*** 1.134*** 14.98*** 0.235* 
 
(0.178) (0.0808) (1.315) (0.125) 
1.ethnic#2.location -1.044*** 1.065 15.23*** 15.22*** 
 
(0.194) (1.407) (1.057) (1.244) 
2.member#1.ethnic 1.131*** -15.95*** -16.32*** -0.561 
 
(0.282) (1.120) (1.617) (0.612) 
3.member#1.ethnic 1.339*** -16.93*** -1.983*** -1.425* 
 
(0.0484) (2.166) (0.568) (0.771) 
Constant 0.836*** -2.242** -2.035*** -3.229*** 
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(0.250) (1.136) (0.331) (0.759) 
     
Observations 545 531 531 531 
R-squared         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
  OLS  
VARIABLES COOP COMREL ECSTAT RELETH FAIR 
            
1.location -0.0354 0.0289 -0.0993 -0.0618 -0.0187 
 
(0.0673) (0.153) (0.131) (0.186) (0.296) 
2.location -0.397 0.345 -0.263 0.0177 -0.269 
 
(0.185) (0.253) (0.0914) (0.0929) (0.346) 
1.sex -0.513* 0.340 -0.397 -0.169 0.0801 
 
(0.136) (0.194) (0.149) (0.156) (0.330) 
1.ethnic 1.429** -1.078* -0.635 -0.951* 0.512 
 
(0.232) (0.276) (0.259) (0.274) (0.538) 
1.cropsX 0.644* -0.104 0.230 0.00461 0.486* 
 
(0.188) (0.0650) (0.129) (0.178) (0.150) 
2.cropsX 1.298** -1.077** -0.0817 -0.375** 0.476 
 
(0.237) (0.201) (0.139) (0.0756) (0.321) 
Agec -0.00313 -0.0103*** 0.00130 0.000412 -0.00158 
 
(0.00576) (0.000957) (0.00201) (0.00266) (0.00462) 
Logsizec -0.124 0.403* 0.0769 0.457** 0.247 
 
(0.163) (0.131) (0.115) (0.0651) (0.192) 
2.member -0.579*** 0.391 -0.205 0.243 -0.00530 
 
(0.0535) (0.209) (0.215) (0.394) (0.200) 
3.member -0.00569 0.0181 -0.598*** -0.460 -0.929** 
 
(0.407) (0.0342) (0.0444) (0.234) (0.103) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 0.665** -0.227 0.532* 0.531* -0.908 
 
(0.128) (0.200) (0.155) (0.156) (0.345) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX -0.364 -0.0878 -0.390 0.0515 -0.704* 
 
(0.221) (0.0826) (0.138) (0.178) (0.182) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX -1.156** 0.841* 0.297 0.253 -0.794 
 
(0.238) (0.213) (0.162) (0.0945) (0.340) 
1.ethnic#1.location -0.218* -0.0447 0.366 0.189 0.290 
 
(0.0689) (0.152) (0.132) (0.187) (0.297) 
1.ethnic#2.location -0.208 0.202 0.778** 0.578** -0.0556 
 
(0.206) (0.257) (0.107) (0.116) (0.370) 
2.member#1.ethnic 0.773*** -0.734* 0.384 -0.394 0.166 
 
(0.0683) (0.212) (0.205) (0.381) (0.188) 
3.member#1.ethnic 1.195* 0.385*** 0.0844 -0.313 1.855*** 
 
(0.368) (0.0178) (0.0592) (0.238) (0.0684) 
Constant -0.233 0.0510 0.104 -0.188 -0.548 
 
(0.175) (0.210) (0.198) (0.230) (0.480) 
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Observations 545 545 541 542 542 
R-squared 0.352 0.410 0.094 0.229 0.101 
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
      
  Logit Multinomial 
VARIABLES q39a 
q19e (outcome 
1) 
q19e (outcome 
3) 
q33d 
(outcome 1) 
q33d 
(outcome 3) 
  
     
1.location 0.235 -0.151 0.0816 -0.871** -0.294 
 
(0.539) (0.709) (0.299) (0.396) (0.216) 
2.location 0.699*** -0.877* 0.446 0.186 -0.440 
 
(0.249) (0.507) (0.421) (0.177) (0.320) 
1.sex -0.740*** 0.137 0.0799 1.236*** 0.00990 
 
(0.172) (0.360) (0.577) (0.311) (0.699) 
1.ethnic -0.861 2.195** 1.195*** -14.43*** 1.042** 
 
(0.637) (0.933) (0.0371) (1.099) (0.525) 
1.cropsX -1.163** 1.392*** 0.726*** -2.332*** 1.624*** 
 
(0.572) (0.200) (0.0817) (0.889) (0.484) 
2.cropsX -0.613 2.144*** 0.537*** -1.573*** 0.986*** 
 
(0.614) (0.783) (0.180) (0.393) (0.332) 
Agec 0.0219* 0.000496 -0.0174* 0.0295*** -0.0187* 
 
(0.0129) (0.0101) (0.00976) (0.00428) (0.00966) 
Logsizec -0.895*** 0.0520 0.0861 -0.566 0.157 
 
(0.111) (0.394) (0.178) (0.371) (0.311) 
2.member -0.712** -0.854** 0.998*** 1.263** 0.0697 
 
(0.340) (0.348) (0.326) (0.558) (0.457) 
3.member 0.836 0.394 1.194*** 0.876*** 1.561* 
 
(0.702) (1.011) (0.401) (0.0866) (0.898) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 0.858*** -0.0811 0.337 -1.834*** 0.164 
 
(0.170) (0.371) (0.589) (0.328) (0.715) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 1.258** -1.973*** -1.170*** -12.45*** -0.557 
 
(0.594) (0.219) (0.0554) (1.216) (0.556) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX 1.405** -2.252*** -1.537*** 1.333*** -0.610* 
 
(0.609) (0.800) (0.120) (0.378) (0.328) 
1.ethnic#1.location 0.621 0.0226 -0.128 14.30*** -0.388* 
 
(0.539) (0.716) (0.311) (1.544) (0.216) 
1.ethnic#2.location -0.897*** 0.0133 0.590 12.20*** 0.237 
 
(0.251) (0.538) (0.519) (1.268) (0.343) 
2.member#1.ethnic 0.712* -0.460 -2.138*** -14.04*** 0.807* 
 
(0.364) (0.340) (0.387) (1.337) (0.437) 
3.member#1.ethnic -0.291 -1.844* -1.448*** 2.838*** 0.295 
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(0.709) (1.085) (0.380) (0.192) (0.898) 
Constant 1.758*** -1.712** -1.853*** -1.374*** -0.921 
 
(0.668) (0.864) (0.137) (0.138) (0.635) 
      
Observations 540 546 546 547 547 
R-squared           
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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                  1.location -0.861*** 0.608 -0.518 -0.355 
 
(0.189) (0.417) (0.315) (0.310) 
2.location -0.410*** 0.842*** -0.861** -0.638*** 
 
(0.100) (0.149) (0.411) (0.124) 
1.sex -0.447*** 0.580* -1.426*** -1.186*** 
 
(0.0776) (0.304) (0.166) (0.0499) 
1.KYRGYZ 0.310 -1.342*** -0.232 0.552** 
 
(0.264) (0.208) (0.187) (0.224) 
1.cropsX 1.308*** 1.837*** 2.498*** -0.755*** 
 
(0.329) (0.345) (0.638) (0.188) 
2.cropsX 0.225** 0.631*** 0.693*** -0.278*** 
 
(0.0999) (0.0973) (0.130) (0.0566) 
Agec -0.0214*** -0.0214*** -0.0180 -0.0154 
 
(0.00586) (0.00450) (0.0143) (0.0226) 
Logsizec 0.847*** 0.501*** 0.0953 -0.0579 
 
(0.0535) (0.0759) (0.556) (0.349) 
2.member -1.637*** -1.156** -0.830 -1.620*** 
 
(0.109) (0.553) (0.542) (0.543) 
3.member -2.473*** -2.514*** 0.176*** 0.0191 
 
(0.518) (0.700) (0.0371) (0.259) 
2.q8#1.location 1.442*** -0.747 
  
 
(0.338) (0.624) 
  
2.q8#2.location -0.409* -1.388*** 
  
 
(0.227) (0.261) 
  
3.q8#1.location 1.391 -0.0591 
  
 
(1.314) (0.593) 
  
3.q8#2.location 0.794*** 0.422** 
  
 
(0.150) (0.200) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
KNOWLEDGE  
Appendix 2.C.3. Regression output for the mechanisms – Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
respondents in Ykbol WUA 
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1.KYRGYZ#2.q8 
-4.776*** 
(0.437) 
   
        1.KYRGYZ#1.location 
    
 
2.237*** 
(0.158) 
-.239 
(0.440) 
-.721 
(0.321) 
-.830 
(0.396) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.location 0.119 -0.477** -0.774** -1.188*** 
 
(0.115) (0.221) (0.392) (0.257) 
Constant 1.791*** 1.986*** 2.065*** 1.195*** 
 
(0.248) (0.441) (0.508) (0.152) 
     
     
Observations 388 387 386 383 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Logit 
VARIABLES q17a q17b q17c q17d q17e 
  
     
1.location -0.0796 -0.0964 0.183 -0.487*** -0.248 
 
(0.208) (0.139) (0.301) (0.126) (0.313) 
2.location 0.381 -0.0660 -0.243 -0.361** -0.571*** 
 
(0.358) (0.335) (0.255) (0.153) (0.133) 
1.sex -2.046*** -1.081 -0.460 -1.109*** -0.457*** 
 
(0.474) (0.718) (0.589) (0.329) (0.114) 
1.KYRGYZ -0.392 0.102 -0.636*** -0.159 0.186 
 
(0.378) (0.673) (0.0912) (0.921) (0.378) 
1.cropsX 1.731*** 1.373*** 1.489*** 1.371*** 1.527** 
 
(0.523) (0.138) (0.508) (0.488) (0.644) 
2.cropsX 0.401** -0.505*** 0.0774 1.147*** 0.0919 
 
(0.185) (0.0740) (0.182) (0.213) (0.117) 
Agec -0.0238 -0.0310 -0.0301 -0.0313*** -0.0450 
 
(0.0315) (0.0249) (0.0397) (0.00583) (0.0348) 
Logsizec 0.816*** 0.494** 1.096*** 0.909*** 0.986 
 
(0.220) (0.243) (0.356) (0.0928) (0.643) 
2.member -1.334*** -1.372*** 0.618 -0.922 -0.256*** 
 
(0.203) (0.246) (0.495) (0.828) (0.0827) 
2.member#1.location 0.737*** -0.230 0.166 -0.143 0.0374 
 
(0.0870) (0.244) (0.421) (0.0910) (0.291) 
2.member#2.location -1.663*** -2.413 -0.716 -1.252*** -0.144 
 
(0.429) (1.515) (0.687) (0.121) (0.316) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.member 0.273** 1.386** -1.227*** 0.00744 -1.842*** 
 
(0.113) (0.664) (0.0833) (0.780) (0.150) 
1.KYRGYZ#1.location 
   
0.900*** 0.797** 
    
(0.200) (0.386) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.location 
   
-0.549*** 0.883*** 
    
(0.145) (0.165) 
2.member#1.sex 
  
-1.635*** 
 
-0.682** 
   
(0.584) 
 
(0.278) 
Constant -1.106* -1.221** -0.896* -1.643 -0.740 
 
(0.614) (0.565) (0.507) (1.109) (0.486) 
      
      
Observations 363 367 367 365 365 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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PARTICIPATION 
 
  OLS Logit  
VARIABLES PARTIC_C Q13 
    
 
1.location 0.557** -0.347 
 
(0.110) (0.494) 
2.location 0.755** -0.571*** 
 
(0.105) (0.196) 
1.sex 0.921 -1.500*** 
 
(0.352) (0.200) 
1.KYRGYZ 0.265 -1.302*** 
 
(0.373) (0.113) 
1.cropsX 0.166* 0.493** 
 
(0.0562) (0.224) 
2.cropsX 0.0293 0.576*** 
 
(0.0478) (0.0909) 
Agec 0.00327 -0.00881 
 
(0.00155) (0.00771) 
Logsizec -0.222 0.413 
 
(0.0969) (0.252) 
2.member 2.059*** -2.032*** 
 
(0.0381) (0.326) 
3.member 1.660*** -1.036*** 
 
(0.0952) (0.394) 
2.member#1.location -0.984*** 
 
 
(0.0839) 
 
2.member#2.location -0.534** 
 
 
(0.123) 
 
3.member#1.location -1.736 
 
 
(0.686) 
 
3.member#2.location -0.732** 
 
 
(0.0828) 
 
1.KYRGYZ#2.member 0.797** 
 
 
(0.110) 
 
1.KYRGYZ#3.member 1.174 
 
 
(0.419) 
 
1.KYRGYZ#1.location -0.0231 -0.388 
 
(0.227) (0.509) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.location -0.347 0.349** 
 
(0.201) (0.177) 
Constant -1.731*** 1.291*** 
 
(0.137) (0.166) 
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Observations 387 387 
R-squared 0.322   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 ***p<.001,**p<.05,*p<.01 
224 
 
ATTITUDES 
 
  OLS  
VARIABLES STAFF PUNISH IRMAN_NEW_C ISF_NEW_C 
    
  
  
1.location 0.103 0.418 0.174 0.0965 
 
(0.385) (0.292) (0.0718) (0.148) 
2.location 0.357 0.428 0.654*** 0.228 
 
(0.380) (0.225) (0.0321) (0.309) 
1.sex 0.200 0.393* 0.488 -0.0900 
 
(0.223) (0.119) (0.337) (0.184) 
1.KYRGYZ -1.170 -1.207* -1.473** 0.148 
 
(0.420) (0.294) (0.218) (0.357) 
1.cropsX -0.504 -0.646 -0.153* 0.0349 
 
(0.259) (0.238) (0.0446) (0.457) 
2.cropsX 0.0767 -0.217* -0.0503 -0.00394 
 
(0.0631) (0.0640) (0.0215) (0.135) 
agec -0.00640 0.00917 6.65e-05 -0.0132** 
 
(0.00796) (0.00754) (0.00244) (0.00276) 
logsizec 0.0852 -0.132 0.0196 0.140 
 
(0.172) (0.0622) (0.0662) (0.223) 
2.member 0.396 0.298 0.627*** 1.490 
 
(0.229) (0.130) (0.0523) (0.612) 
3.member 0.735 -0.145 0.185 1.407** 
 
(0.572) (0.155) (0.110) (0.143) 
2.member#1.location 0.0209 -0.134 -0.0627 -0.644* 
 
(0.0914) (0.276) (0.0220) (0.212) 
2.member#2.location 0.165 -0.224 -0.00394 -0.197 
 
(0.197) (0.0891) (0.0552) (0.170) 
3.member#1.location -0.483 0.167 -0.102 -1.783*** 
 
(0.168) (0.414) (0.0537) (0.151) 
3.member#2.location -0.0392 
 
-0.0663 -1.147* 
 
(0.711) 
 
(0.0463) (0.360) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.member 0.958** -0.428** 0.189 -0.695 
 
(0.183) (0.0598) (0.0747) (0.438) 
1.KYRGYZ#3.member -0.148 1.052*** 0.145 0.340 
 
(0.391) (0.0860) (0.0892) (0.156) 
1.KYRGYZ#1.location -0.0720 -0.520 -0.0686 0.0808 
 
(0.444) (0.277) (0.161) (0.104) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.location -0.0635 0.316 -0.0933 -0.0442 
 
(0.358) (0.263) (0.113) (0.242) 
Constant -0.196 -0.127 -0.217** -0.557 
 
(0.384) (0.341) (0.0345) (0.228) 
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Observations 390 384 390 386 
R-squared 0.238 0.231 0.381 0.246 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
  Logit Multinomial 
VARIABLES Q16 q22 (outcome 1) q22 (outcome 3) 
        
1.location 0.373* -1.488*** 0.0464 
 
(0.223) (0.0525) (0.171) 
2.location -0.144* -2.083 0.925*** 
 
(0.0869) (1.449) (0.258) 
1.sex -0.685* 0.799 0.573 
 
(0.376) (0.720) (0.366) 
1.KYRGYZ 1.369*** -14.43*** -15.54*** 
 
(0.372) (1.885) (1.249) 
1.cropsX -0.741 1.397** 0.530*** 
 
(0.543) (0.550) (0.0516) 
2.cropsX -0.680*** 15.25*** 13.98*** 
 
(0.132) (1.743) (1.242) 
agec 0.00378 -0.0141 0.000964 
 
(0.0215) (0.0110) (0.0123) 
logsizec 0.0590 0.550*** 0.111 
 
(0.564) (0.209) (0.171) 
2.member -1.057*** -0.123 0.366 
 
(0.310) (0.297) (0.402) 
3.member -0.718*** 0.504 0.742* 
 
(0.176) (1.221) (0.410) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.member 0.255 
  
 
(0.231) 
  
1.KYRGYZ#3.member -0.0935 
  
 
(0.218) 
  
1.KYRGYZ#1.location -0.335 
  
 
(0.272) 
  
1.KYRGYZ#2.location -1.055*** 
  
 
(0.189) 
  
Constant 0.785*** -2.129* -1.845*** 
 
(0.261) (1.126) (0.197) 
 
  
  
Observations 387 378 378 
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R-squared       
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
  
227 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
  OLS 
VARIABLES COOP_NEW_C COMREL_C ECSTAT_C 
RELETH_NEW_
C 
FAIR_NEW_
C 
            
1.location -0.216** 0.0832 -0.293 0.0177 -0.154 
 
(0.0361) (0.214) (0.328) (0.242) (0.338) 
2.location -0.250* 0.144 -0.311 -0.000806 -0.311 
 
(0.0587) (0.251) (0.138) (0.138) (0.425) 
1.sex -0.537* 0.347 -0.425* -0.113 0.118 
 
(0.142) (0.233) (0.138) (0.142) (0.446) 
1.KYRGYZ 1.516** -1.469** 0.310 -0.277 0.188 
 
(0.162) (0.304) (0.407) (0.375) (0.680) 
1.cropsX 0.402* -0.0461 0.0809 -0.0128 0.295* 
 
(0.134) (0.192) (0.170) (0.207) (0.0968) 
2.cropsX 0.0216 -0.0914 -0.302** 0.171 0.0868 
 
(0.0445) (0.0615) (0.0665) (0.0686) (0.0987) 
Agec -0.00672** -0.00780 0.000630 0.00326 -0.00714 
 
(0.00128) (0.00306) (0.00325) (0.00370) (0.00688) 
Logsizec 0.113 0.303 0.183 0.427* 0.446 
 
(0.0771) (0.113) (0.143) (0.135) (0.157) 
2.member -0.459*** 0.317 -0.344 0.315 0.0435 
 
(0.0369) (0.316) (0.366) (0.468) (0.407) 
3.member -0.0364 0.148 -1.141** -0.694 -1.650* 
 
(0.0386) (0.131) (0.258) (0.516) (0.522) 
2.member#1.location 0.283 -0.00259 0.486 0.0398 0.163 
 
(0.275) (0.120) (0.229) (0.155) (0.266) 
2.member#2.location -0.555*** 0.378* 0.135 0.131* -0.110 
 
(0.0550) (0.105) (0.166) (0.0378) (0.262) 
3.member#1.location 0.777* -0.232 1.103* 0.388 0.845 
 
(0.198) (0.163) (0.360) (0.809) (1.205) 
3.member#2.location -1.122** 0.0706 0.562 0.206 0.477 
 
(0.129) (0.232) (0.257) (0.524) (0.406) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.memb
er 0.456 -1.202** -0.406 -1.548* -0.294 
 
(0.228) (0.260) (0.240) (0.368) (0.355) 
1.KYRGYZ#3.memb
er 0.388*** -0.300 -0.342* 0.439** 0.386 
 
(0.0208) (0.112) (0.0883) (0.0679) (0.162) 
1.KYRGYZ#1.locatio
n -0.191 0.368 0.0516 -0.181 0.453 
 
(0.0689) (0.231) (0.300) (0.193) (0.336) 
1.KYRGYZ#2.locatio
n 0.402** 0.957* 0.0929 -0.0142 0.544 
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(0.0873) (0.268) (0.122) (0.118) (0.429) 
Constant -0.363*** 0.188 0.153 -0.211 -0.574 
 
(0.0360) (0.177) (0.309) (0.333) (0.506) 
      
Observations 390 387 385 389 388 
R-squared 0.282 0.337 0.078 0.145 0.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
Logit Multinomial 
VARIABLES Q39a 
q19e (outcome 
1) 
q19e 
(outcome 
3) 
q19e (outcome 
4) 
q33d 
(outcome 1) 
q33d 
(outcome 
3) 
1.location 0.634*** -0.301 0.0604 -1.321** -0.741*** -0.337 
 
(0.185) (0.647) (0.307) (0.556) (0.281) (0.258) 
2.location 0.768*** -1.011** 0.439 -2.101*** 0.179 -0.473 
 
(0.276) (0.458) (0.418) (0.697) (0.156) (0.289) 
1.sex -0.897*** 0.0359 0.0671 0.586* 1.335*** -0.0833 
 
(0.215) (0.282) (0.592) (0.308) (0.202) (0.710) 
1.KYRGYZ 1.321** 2.014*** 0.0428 3.691*** -14.97*** 1.137*** 
 
(0.524) (0.432) (0.183) (1.012) (1.323) (0.196) 
1.cropsX -1.135** 0.952*** 0.731*** 1.248 -2.026*** 1.452*** 
 
(0.466) (0.129) (0.0977) (0.866) (0.756) (0.423) 
2.cropsX -0.234 0.719*** 0.500*** -0.372*** 12.98*** 0.153 
 
(0.149) (0.0658) (0.0847) (0.0653) (1.235) (0.160) 
Agec 0.0236 -0.0142** -0.0206** -0.00761 0.0300*** -0.0200 
 
(0.0152) (0.00596) (0.00966) (0.0125) (0.00397) (0.0131) 
logsizec -1.030*** 0.548* 0.0636 -0.123 -0.970* 0.422 
 
(0.0842) (0.314) (0.233) (0.305) (0.562) (0.341) 
2.member -0.747** -0.760** 1.003*** -0.567*** 1.244** 0.102 
 
(0.328) (0.359) (0.337) (0.205) (0.538) (0.478) 
3.member 0.873 0.290 1.195*** -0.928*** 1.291** 1.474* 
 
(0.681) (1.079) (0.386) (0.0199) (0.525) (0.873) 
1.KYRGYZ#1.location -2.601*** 
    
  
 
(0.198) 
    
  
1.KYRGYZ#2.location -0.760*** 
    
  
 
(0.204) 
    
  
Constant 1.729*** -1.978*** -1.840*** -2.309*** -1.259*** -1.084** 
 
(0.635) (0.741) (0.142) (0.890) (0.110) (0.526) 
 
383 389 389 390 390 390 
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Appendix 2.C.4. Regression output for the mechanisms – Kyrgy respondents in 
Ykbol WUA and other program sites 
VARIABLES q7 q10 q12 q15 
      
  
1.location 1.491 -0.0805 -0.0601 -0.638 
 
(1.255) (0.524) (0.459) (0.406) 
2.location -0.487 -0.313 -0.700 -1.347*** 
 
(1.261) (0.585) (0.532) (0.474) 
1.sex -0.925 -0.185 -1.322*** -1.015*** 
 
(0.595) (0.786) (0.401) (0.377) 
1.ethnic 3.261** 0.887* 1.489** 0.0873 
 
(1.526) (0.504) (0.742) (0.342) 
1.cropsX 0.928 0.112 2.083 0.650 
 
(0.889) (0.616) (1.420) (0.461) 
2.cropsX 0.0463 -0.224 0.542 0.0378 
 
(0.650) (0.515) (0.632) (0.420) 
agec -0.0721*** -0.00129 0.0680*** -0.00853 
 
(0.0278) (0.0189) (0.0205) (0.0157) 
logsizec 1.310** 0.247 -0.0436 1.130*** 
 
(0.657) (0.479) (0.444) (0.405) 
2.member -5.207*** -3.311*** -2.880*** -2.721*** 
 
(0.816) (0.538) (0.547) (0.671) 
3.member -2.950*** -3.232*** -0.525 0.361 
 
(0.768) (0.568) (0.492) (0.467) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 
 
-1.294 
  
  
(0.941) 
  
1.ethnic#1.location -3.156* 
   
 
(1.726) 
   
1.ethnic#2.location -0.601 
   
 
(1.679) 
   
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 
  
-2.645 
 
   
(1.615) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
KNOWLEDGE 
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1.ethnic#2.cropsX  
   
-1.535* 
(0.895) 
 
Constant 2.784** 2.035*** 1.358* 1.459** 
 
(1.246) (0.754) (0.695) (0.587) 
     Observations 226 230 227 230 
231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Logit  
  VARIABLES q17a q17b q17c q17d q17e 
  
     
1.location 0.473 0.528 0.144 0.526 -0.0740 
 
(0.422) (0.427) (0.416) (0.414) (0.414) 
2.location 0.575 0.0309 -0.347 -0.594 -0.637 
 
(0.494) (0.489) (0.489) (0.522) (0.484) 
1.sex -0.277 -0.395 -0.368 0.136 -0.164 
 
(0.390) (0.402) (0.388) (0.399) (0.369) 
1.ethnic 2.767*** 2.134*** 2.307*** 3.606*** 1.482*** 
 
(0.875) (0.428) (0.436) (1.166) (0.364) 
1.cropsX 2.614** -0.181 -0.0684 2.260 0.0235 
 
(1.185) (0.497) (0.496) (1.437) (0.492) 
2.cropsX 0.468 -0.602 -0.161 1.626 -0.368 
 
(0.870) (0.456) (0.468) (1.110) (0.432) 
Agec -0.000253 0.0138 0.0113 0.0227 0.00767 
 
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0161) 
Logsizec 0.134 0.252 0.210 0.264 0.00814 
 
(0.412) (0.407) (0.411) (0.421) (0.388) 
2.member -1.603*** -1.388*** -1.972*** -1.720*** -2.524*** 
 
(0.503) (0.518) (0.591) (0.595) (0.587) 
3.member -2.610*** -2.955*** -1.588*** -3.290*** -2.099*** 
 
(0.633) (0.804) (0.552) (1.079) (0.536) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 
     
      
1.ethnic#1.location 
     
      
1.ethnic#2.location 
     
      
1.ethnic#1.cropsX -2.222* 
  
-3.381** 
 
 
(1.308) 
  
(1.542) 
 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX -0.578 
  
-2.462** 
 
 
(0.999) 
  
(1.237) 
 
Constant -2.331*** -1.422** -1.505** -2.799** -0.00369 
 
(0.872) (0.638) (0.653) (1.136) (0.588) 
                  Observations 229 229 228 228 227 
232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
1.location 
PARTIC_C 
0.00141 
Q13-
0.667 
 
(0.167) (0.810) 
2.location 0.211 -0.210 
 
(0.196) (0.943) 
1.sex 0.513*** -1.808*** 
 
(0.150) (0.602) 
1.ethnic -0.174 -1.418* 
 
(0.275) (0.860) 
1.cropsX -0.121 1.159* 
 
(0.438) (0.627) 
2.cropsX -0.0879 0.665 
 
(0.252) (0.565) 
Agec 0.000550 0.0300 
 
(0.00643) (0.0184) 
Logsizec -0.247 0.754 
 
(0.158) (0.466) 
2.member 1.774*** 
 
 
(0.193) 
 
3.member 1.373*** 
 
 
(0.197) 
 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 0.0766 
 
 
(0.497) 
 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX 0.0879 
 
 
(0.328) 
 
1.ethnic#1.location 
 
1.147 
  
(0.981) 
1.ethnic#2.location 
 
-1.211 
  
(1.201) 
2.q8#1.ethnic 
  
   
3.q8#1.ethnic 
  
   
Constant -0.867*** -0.281 
 
(0.270) (0.910) 
Observations 229 227 
R-squared 0.418   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
PARTICIPATION 
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ATTITUDES 
 
  OLS 
VARIABLES STAFF_NEW_C PUNISH3_C IRMAN_NEW_C ISF_NEW_C 
          
1.location -0.178 -0.0644 -0.0825 0.0221 
 
(0.373) (0.204) (0.137) (0.188) 
2.location 0.0596 0.765*** 0.551*** 0.608*** 
 
(0.428) (0.234) (0.159) (0.220) 
1.sex -0.0199 0.237 -0.120 0.0603 
 
(0.178) (0.183) (0.124) (0.170) 
1.ethnic -0.158 -0.209 0.422* 0.497 
 
(0.382) (0.175) (0.226) (0.311) 
1.cropsX -0.277 -0.119 0.215 0.163 
 
(0.225) (0.237) (0.362) (0.533) 
2.cropsX -0.243 -0.364* 0.0642 0.0956 
 
(0.201) (0.213) (0.208) (0.288) 
agec -0.0216*** -0.00193 0.00272 -0.00588 
 
(0.00744) (0.00790) (0.00530) (0.00748) 
logsizec 0.130 -0.0850 -0.136 -0.124 
 
(0.179) (0.188) (0.130) (0.177) 
2.q8 1.284*** -0.0552 0.604*** 0.691*** 
 
(0.219) (0.229) (0.157) (0.213) 
3.q8 0.147 0.552** 0.241 0.184 
 
(0.228) (0.242) (0.164) (0.231) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 
  
-0.721* -1.082* 
   
(0.412) (0.592) 
1.ethnic#2.cropsX 
  
-0.514* -0.839** 
   
(0.270) (0.368) 
1.ethnic#1.location 0.215 
   
 
(0.438) 
   
1.ethnic#2.location 1.083** 
   
 
(0.488) 
   
Constant -0.908** -1.201*** -1.590*** -0.583* 
 
(0.387) (0.293) (0.221) (0.310) 
     
Observations 230 229 229 227 
R-squared 0.321 0.177 0.261 0.222 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Logit Multinomial 
VARIABLES Q16 Q22(outcome 1) Q22 (outcome 3) 
  
   
1.location -0.0201 -0.0330 0.473 
 
(0.483) (0.388) (0.848) 
2.location -1.205** -1.100** 1.288 
 
(0.513) (0.473) (0.844) 
1.sex -1.082*** 0.0453 0.178 
 
(0.384) (0.369) (0.534) 
1.ethnic -0.360 0.946*** 0.260 
 
(0.650) (0.356) (0.519) 
1.cropsX 0.299 0.505 -0.0729 
 
(1.249) (0.491) (0.623) 
2.cropsX -0.307 0.0847 -0.385 
 
(0.626) (0.440) (0.568) 
agec -0.00855 -0.00914 -0.00449 
 
(0.0166) (0.0158) (0.0223) 
logsizec 0.830** 0.261 -0.242 
 
(0.419) (0.383) (0.527) 
2.q8 -0.499 0.856* 0.0822 
 
(0.499) (0.468) (0.743) 
3.q8 0.123 -1.466*** -0.379 
 
(0.518) (0.538) (0.665) 
1.ethnic#1.cropsX 0.393 
  
 
(1.381) 
  
1.ethnic#2.cropsX 1.237 
  
 
(0.814) 
  
1.ethnic#1.location 
  
    
1.ethnic#2.location 
  
    
Constant 2.118*** -0.410 -2.271** 
 
(0.714) (0.586) (0.985) 
    
Observations 229 230 230 
    Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
  OLS         
VARIABLES COOP ECSTAT RELETH FAIR COMREL 
            
1.location -0.448* 0.186 0.0530 0.229 0.0673 
 
(0.233) (0.149) (0.213) (0.262) (0.186) 
2.location -0.722*** 0.349** 0.461* -0.100 0.681*** 
 
(0.268) (0.171) (0.245) (0.300) (0.212) 
1.sex -0.899** 0.110 0.330* 1.185*** 0.0755 
 
(0.377) (0.134) (0.194) (0.446) (0.169) 
1.ethnic 0.123 0.0332 -0.382** 0.221 -0.308* 
 
(0.220) (0.128) (0.185) (0.247) (0.161) 
1.cropsX 0.408 -0.269 -0.156 0.0144 -0.161 
 
(0.265) (0.173) (0.249) (0.299) (0.216) 
2.cropsX 0.0476 -0.00415 -0.0841 -0.0765 -0.117 
 
(0.240) (0.156) (0.224) (0.269) (0.194) 
agec 0.00373 0.000514 0.00499 0.00731 -0.00206 
 
(0.00876) (0.00578) (0.00842) (0.0100) (0.00717) 
logsizec 0.237 0.0234 0.207 0.0248 0.00910 
 
(0.213) (0.137) (0.203) (0.239) (0.173) 
2.q8 0.255 0.0865 -0.466* 0.0955 -0.364* 
 
(0.263) (0.168) (0.249) (0.292) (0.212) 
3.q8 0.917*** -0.466*** -0.515** 0.373 0.416* 
 
(0.272) (0.177) (0.256) (0.310) (0.220) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 1.073** 
  
-1.793*** 
 
 
(0.452) 
  
(0.529) 
 
Constant 1.437*** -0.336 -0.764** -0.560 -1.035*** 
 
(0.350) (0.215) (0.308) (0.390) (0.265) 
      
Observations 226 228 227 228 230 
R-squared 0.167 0.093 0.105 0.068 0.126 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Logit Multinomial 
VARIABLES q39a 
q19e (outcome 
2) 
q19e (outcome 
2) 
q19e 
(outcome 2) 
q33d 
(outcome 1) 
q33d 
(outcome 
3) 
  
 
          
1.location -0.160 0.348 -0.254 0.0382 0.234 0.797 
 
(0.537) (0.403) (0.773) (1,637) (0.390) (0.835) 
2.location -0.0830 1.842*** 2.506*** 17.09 -0.528 1.412* 
 
(0.603) (0.516) (0.824) (1,386) (0.463) (0.851) 
1.sex -0.196 -0.200 -0.765 -0.0909 -0.204 -0.00195 
 
(0.462) (0.381) (0.712) (1.142) (0.369) (0.548) 
1.ethnic 0.351 -0.573 0.433 0.914 1.059*** 0.346 
 
(0.425) (0.359) (0.607) (1.301) (0.357) (0.521) 
1.cropsX 0.311 0.539 -1.023 0.367 0.139 -0.168 
 
(0.568) (0.520) (0.854) (0.872) (0.480) (0.653) 
2.cropsX 0.706 0.631 0.298 -14.68 0.245 -0.0799 
 
(0.501) (0.467) (0.658) (787.1) (0.432) (0.580) 
agec -0.000636 0.00595 -0.00662 -0.0158 0.00500 -0.00686 
 
(0.0201) (0.0162) (0.0272) (0.0385) (0.0157) (0.0235) 
logsizec -0.934* -0.174 -0.275 0.258 0.0601 0.0203 
 
(0.527) (0.406) (0.620) (0.905) (0.375) (0.553) 
2.q8 0.695 0.473 3.687*** 2.478** 0.657 0.0488 
 
(0.664) (0.679) (0.700) (1.237) (0.454) (0.730) 
3.q8 1.246 0.812* 1.335 -14.51 -1.576*** -0.624 
 
(0.797) (0.481) (0.850) (1,359) (0.570) (0.720) 
1.ethnic#1.sex 
     
       
Constant 0.683 -1.126* -3.246*** -17.90 -0.880 -2.502** 
 
(0.704) (0.606) (1.027) (1,386) (0.586) (0.996) 
       
Observations 
 
230 230 230 230 230 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
237 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Abdullaev, I., M. Ul Hassan, H. Manthrithilake and M. Yakubov. 2005. ―Making Water 
Distribution More Transparent: Application of the Time-based Water Distribution 
Method to Tertiary Canals in Central Asia.‖ Journal of Applied Irrigation Science 
40:2-3. 
Abdullaev, I., K. Jumaboe, J. Kazbekov, and H. Manthritilake. 2008. ―Water User 
Groups in Central Asia: Emerging Form of Collective Action in Irrigation Water 
Management.‖ Water Resource Management 24:1029-1043. 
Agrawal, Arun, 1994. ―Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit 
between Rule Systems and Resource Use.‖ In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool 
Resources, ed. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, 267-82. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
______. 2001. ―Common property, forest management, and the Indian Himalaya.‖ 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 35:181-212. 
______. 2002. ―Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability.‖ In The Drama of 
the Commons, National Research Council, Committee on the Human Dimensions 
of Global Change, ed. Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolšak, Paul Stern, 
Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber, 41-85. Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press.  
______. 2008. ―Sustainable governance of common-pool resources: context, method, and 
politics.‖ In The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists and 
Anthropologists, ed. B. Pranab and Isha Ray. Maidan MA: Wiley Blackwell.   
Allison, Paul D. 2008. Fixed Effects Regression Models. Sage Publications, Inc.  
Asankanov, A. 1996. ―Ethnic conflict in the Osh Region in Summer 1990: Reasons and 
Lessons.‖ In Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, ed. K. Rupesinghe 
and V.A. Tishkov. Tokyo: United Nations University. 
Baland, Jean-Marie.1999. ―The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource 
Management.‖ World Development 27(5):773-788.  
Baland, Jean-Marie, and Jean-Philippe Platteau. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural 
Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Baland, Jean-Marie, Pranab Bardhan, and S. Bowleds, eds. 2006. Inequality, cooperation, 
and environmental sustainability. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Bardhan, Pranab. 2000. ―Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 
Irrigation Communities in South India.‖ Economic Development and Cultural 
Change. 48 (4): 847-865.  
Bardhan Pranab and Isha Ray. 2008. ―Economists, anthropologists, and the contested 
commons.‖ In The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists and 
Anthropologists, ed. B. Pranab and I. Ray. Maidan MA: Wiley Blackwell.   
238 
 
Basurto, Xavier and Elinor Ostrom. 2009. ―The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond 
Garett Hardin.‖ Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 1(3):255-259. 
Baxter, John. 2005. ―Problems Facing Water User Associations in Uzbekistan.‖ USAID 
Natural Resources Management Project.  
Berkes, Fikret, ed. 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based 
Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.  
Beyer, J. 2006. ‗Revitalization, Invention and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz 
Aksakal Courts: Listening to Pluralistic Accounts of History‘, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, special issues 53/54: 141-176. 
Bichsel, Christine. 2006. Conflict Transformation in Central Asia: Irrigation Disputes in 
the Ferghana Valley. London: Taylor and Francis. 
Campbell, Ian W. 2011. ―Knowledge and Power on the Kazakh Steppe, 1845-1917.‖ 
Ph.D. diss,. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  
Church, Larry and Michael Roth. 1996. ―Legal Underpinnings of Land Reform and Farm 
Restructuring in the Kyrgyz Republic: Assessment and Recommendations.‖ In 
Irrigation and Land reform in the Kyrgyz Republic, ed. Bloch, P., Delehanty, J. 
and Roth, M., Land Tenure Center Research Paper 128. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin-Madison 
Coleman, James. 1988. ―Social capital in the creation of human capital.‖ American 
Journal of Sociology 94(supplement): S95-S120.  
Degnbol, P., H. Gislason, S. Hanna, S. Jentoft, J. Nielsen Raakjaer, D. Sverdrup-Jensen, 
and D.C. Wilson. 2006. ―Painting the floor with a hammer: technical fixes in 
fisheries management.‖ Marine Policy 30(5):534-543.  
Deitz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern. 2003. ―The Struggle to Govern the 
Commons.‖ Science 302(5652):1907-12. 
Dolšak, Nives, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 2003. The Commons in the New Millennium: 
Challenges and Adaptations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Edwards, Victoria M. and Nathalie A. Steins. 1999. Collective Action in Common-Pool 
Resource Management: The Contribution of a Social Constructivist Perspective to 
Existing Theory. Society & Natural Resources 12: 539-557. 
Ensminger, Jean. 1990. ―Co-opting the Elders: The Political Economy of State 
Incorporation in Africa.‖ American Anthropologist 92:662-75.  
ENVSEC. 2005. ―Environment and Security: Transforming risks into cooperation.‖ 
http://www.envsec.org/ 
Everett-Heath, Tom ed. 2003.Central Asia: Aspects of Transition. London: Routledge 
Curzon. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, Maria E. and Cheryl L. Wagner. 2008. ―Does Community-Based 
Collaborative Resource Management Increase Social Capital?‖ Society & Natural 
Resources 21(4):324-344.  
Fumagalli, Matteo. 2007. ―Informal Ethnopolitics and Local Authority Figures in Osh, 
Kyrgyzstan.‖ Ethnopolitics 6(2): 211-233. 
Garces-Restrepo, C., D. Vermillion, and G. Muñoz. 2007. ―Irrigation Management 
Transfer: Worldwide efforts and results.‖ Water Reports 32: 1-62. 
Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games and Common-Pool 
Resources. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.  
239 
 
Gebremedhin, Berhanu, John Pender and Girmay Tesfay. 2004. ―Collective action for 
grazing land management in crop-livestock mixed systems in the highlands of 
northern Ethiopia.‖ Agricultural Systems 82 (3) 273-290.  
Geiss, P.G. 2003. Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment and 
Political Order in Change. London: Routledge.  
Gibson, Clark, Krister Andersson, Elinor Ostrom, and Sujai Shivakumar. 2005. The 
Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Goldberg, Joseph. 2004. ―Assisting Irrigation in Central Asia.‖ Presentation at World 
Bank Water Week. 
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 
2009. Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation.  
Hardin, Garett. 1968. ―The Tragedy of the Commons.‖ Science 162:1243-1248. 
Hardin, Russell. 1995. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Hierman, Brent. 2010. ―What use was the election to us? Clientalism and political trust 
amongst ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.‖ Nationalities Papers 38(2) 
245- 263. 
Hirsch, Francine. 2005. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of 
the Soviet Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2001. Kyrgyzstan at ten: Trouble in the “Island of 
Democracy. ICG Asia Report 22, Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group.  
IWRMI (Integrated Water Resources Management Institute). 2003. ―How to establish a 
Water User‘s Association: Practical Steps for Social Mobilizers.‖  
Kandiyoti, D. 2000.‖Modernisation with the Market? The Case of the ―Soviet East.‖ In 
Anthropology, Development and Modernities: Exploring Discourses, Counter-
tendencies, and Violence, ed. A. Arce and N. Long  London: Routledge. 
Katz, Elizabeth G. 2000. ―Social Capital and Natural Capital: A Comparative Analysis of 
Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management in Guatemala.‖ Land Economics 
76(1):114-132.  
Koichiev, Arslan. 2003. ―Ethno-Territorial Claims in the Ferghana Valley During the 
Process of National Delimitation, 1924-7.‖ In Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, 
ed. Tom Everett-Heath. London: Routledge Curzon. 
Krishna, Anirudh. 2004. ―Understanding, measuring and utilizing social capital: 
clarifying concepts and presenting a field application from India.‖ Agricultural 
Systems 82 (3) 291-305.  
Kupatdze, Alexander. 2008. ―Organized Crime before and after the Tulip revolution: the 
changing dynamics of upperworld-underworld networks.‖ Central Asian Survey 
27(3): 279-299.  
Lansing, John Stephen. 2006. Perfect Order: Recognizing Complexity in Bali. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Li, Tania Murray.1999. ―Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in 
Indonesia.‖ Cultural Anthropology 14(3): 295-322. 
Lowe, Robert. 2003. ―Nation Building and Identity in the Kyrgyz Republic.‖ In Central 
Asia: Aspects of Transition, ed. Tom Evertt-Heath. London: Routledge Curzon. 
240 
 
Matveeva, A. 2006. Central Asia: A Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. London: 
International Alert.  
McGinnis, Michael D. ed. 2000. Polycentric Games & Institutions: Readings from the 
Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 
McKean, Margaret A. 1992. ―Success on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of 
Institutions for Common Property Resource Management.‖ Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 4(3): 247-82. 
Megoran, Nick. 2010. ―The Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary: Stalin‘s Cartography, 
Post-Soviet Geography.‖ In Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at 
the Edge of the Nation-State, ed. A. Diener. A and J. Hagen. New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  
Meinzen-Dick, Ruth. 2007. ―Beyond Panaceas in Water Institutions.‖ PNAS 
104(39):15200-05.  
Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, Monica DiGregorio and Nancy McCarthy. 2004. ―Methods for 
Studying Collective Action in Rural Development.‖ Agricultural Systems 82 (3): 
197-214.  
Michaels, Paula A., 1998. ―Medical Traditions, Kazakh women, and Soviet medical 
politics to 1941. Nationalities Papers 26(3): 493-509.  
Mosse, David. 2003. The rule of water: statecraft, ecology and collective action in south 
India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
______. 2005. Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. 
Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.  
______. 2008. ―Collective action, common property, and social capital in South India : an 
anthropological commentary.‖ In The Contested Commons: Conversations 
between Economists and Anthropologists, ed. B. Pranab and I. Ray. Maidan MA: 
Wiley Blackwell.   
Mott Macdonald. 2003. ―Final Report: Privatization and Transfer of Irrigation 
Management in Central Asia.‖ Mott Macdonald: Department for International 
Development Knowledge and Research Services.  
Nagendra, Harini. 2007. ―Drivers of reforestation in human-dominated forests.‖ PNAS 
104(39): 15218-23.  
North, Douglas. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O‘Hara, G. and Sarah L. 2000. ―Lessons from the past: Water management in Central 
Asia.‖ Water Policy 2(4-5): 365-384. 
Olson, Mancur. 1974. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, Revised edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
O‘Neill, Gerard. 2003. ―Land and Water ‗Reform‘ in the 1920s: Agrarian Revolution or 
Social Engineering?‖ In Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, ed. Tom Everett-
Heath. London: Routledge Curzon. 
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
______ .1998. ―A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory for Collective 
Action.‖ American Political Science Review 92: 1-22. 
241 
 
______. 2001. ―Reformulating the Commons.‖ In Protecting the Commons: A 
Framework for Resource Management in the Americas, ed. Joanna Burger, Elinor 
Ostrom, Richard B. Norgaard, David Policansky, and Bernard D. Goldstin, 17-41. 
Washington, DC: Island Press.  
______. 2007a. ―Collective Action Theory.‖ In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 186-208. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
______. 2007b. ―A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas.‖ PNAS 104(39): 
15181-87.  
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-
Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor, and Harini Nagendra. 2006. ―Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and 
People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.‖ PNAS 103(51): 
19224-31.   
Ostrom, Elinor, (2008) ―Design Principles of Robust Property-Rights Institutions: What 
Have We Learned?‖ Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana 
University; Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity Arizona State 
University, forthcoming May 2009 in Property Rights and Land Policies, ed. K. 
Gregory Ingram and Yu-Hong Hong (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy). 
Ostrom, Elisnor. 2009. ―Engaging Impossibilities & Possibilities.‖ In Arguments for a 
Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, ed. Kaushik Basu and Ravi 
Kanbur. New York: Oxford University Press: 522–41.  
Passon, D. and A. Temirkulov, A. 2004. ―Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in 
Batken Oblast.‖ Kyrgyzstan, Batken: German Technical Cooperation and 
Analysis Research Consulting. 
Platteau, Jean-Philippe and Frederic Gasparat. 2003. ―The Risk of Resource 
Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development.‖ World Development 
31(10):1687-1703. 
Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 2008. ―Managing the commons: the role of social norms and 
beliefs.‖ In The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists and 
Anthropologists, ed. B. Pranab and I. Ray. Maidan MA: Wiley Blackwell.  
Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 2004. ―Monitoring Elite Capture in Community-Driven 
Development.‖ Development and Change 35(2):223-46.   
Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2009. ―The Great Himalayan Watershed: Water Shortages, Mega-
Projects and Environmental Politics in China, India and Southeast Asia.‖ The 
Asia-Pacific Journal 30(2).  
Poteete, Amy R. and Elinor Ostrom. 2004. In pursuit of comparable concepts and data 
about collective action. Agricultural Systems 82 (3): 215-232.  
Rao, Vijayendra. 2008. ―Symbolic public goods and the coordination of collective action: 
a comparison of local development in India and Indonesia.‖ In The Contested 
Commons: Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists, ed. B. 
Pranab and I. Ray. Maidan MA: Wiley Blackwell.   
Rasanayagam, J. 2002. ―Spheres of Communal Participation: Placing the State within 
Local Modes of Interaction in Rural Uzbekistan.‖ Central Asian Survey, 21: 55-
70. 
242 
 
Ray, Isha. 2008. ―Cooperative conversations: outcomes and processes in economics and 
anthropology.‖ In The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists 
and Anthropologists, ed. B. Pranab and I. Ray. Maidan MA: Wiley Blackwell.  
Reeves, Madeline. 2010. ―A Weekend in Osh.‖ London Review of Books 32(13): 17-18.  
Ruddle, K., and F.R. Hickey. 2008. ―Accounting for the mismanagement of tropical 
nearshore fisheries.‖ Environment, Development, and Sustainability 10(5):565-
589.  
Ruttan, Lore. 2008. ―Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective 
Action and Collective Goods Provisioning.‖ World Development 36 (5): 969-985.  
Sarker, A., and T.Itoh. 2001. ―Design Principles in Long-Enduring Institutions of 
Japanese Irrigation Common-Pool Resources.‖ Agricultural Water Management 
48(2): 89-102.  
Schoeberlein-Engel, John. 1994. ―Identity in Central Asia: Construction and Contention 
in the Conceptions of ―Ozbek,‖ ―Tajik,‖ ―Muslim,‖ ―Samarguandi‖ and other 
groups.‖ PhD diss., Harvard University, Cambridge.  
______. 2000. ―Between Two Worlds.‖ Harvard International Review 22(1):56-61.  
Sehring, Jenniver. 2005. ―Water User Associations (WUAs) in Kyrgyzstan. A Case Study 
on Institutional Reform in Local Irrigation Management.‖ ZEU Discussion Paper 
No. 24. 
______. 2007. ―Irrigation Reform in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.‖ Irrigation Drainage 
Systems 21: 277-290. 
______. 2009. The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neopatrimonial States: A 
Comparative Analysis of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Germany: VS Verlag. 
Sievers, E.W. 2002.‖Water, Conflict, and Regional Security in Central Asia.‖ New York 
University Environmental Law Journal 10: 356-402. 
Steins, Nathalie A. and Victoria M. Edwards. 1999. ―Collective Action on Common Pool 
Resource Management: The Contribution of a Social Constructivist Perspective to 
Existing Theory.‖ Society and Natural Resources 12:539-57.  
Stock, James and Mark Watson. 2007. Introduction to Econometrics. Pearson Higher 
Education.  
Sundberg, J. 1998. ―NGO Landscapes in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala.‖ 
Geographical Review 88(3):388-412.  
Tang, Shui Yan. 1994. ―Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit 
between Rule Systems and Resource Use.‖ In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool 
Resources, ed. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, 225-45. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Temirkulouv, Azamat. 2006. ―Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the 
Kyrgyz Republic.‖ Forum Berliner Osteuropa Info: 94-100 
Thurman, J.M. 1999. ―Modes of Organization in Central Asian Irrigation: The Ferghana 
Valley, 1876 to Present.‖ unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Central 
Eurasian Studies, Indiana University.  
Ul Hassan, Mehmood., R. Starkloff and N. Nizamedinkhodjaeva. 2004. “Inadequacies in 
the Water Reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic: An Institutional Analysis.‖ 
International Water Management Institute. Research report 81. 
243 
 
Ul Hassan, Mehmood and Murat Yakubov. 2007. ―Mainstreaming Rural Poor in Water 
Resources Management: Preliminary Lessons of a Bottom-Up WUA 
Development Approach in Central Asia.‖ Irrigation and Drainage 56: 261-276. 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). 2009. 
Water in a Changing World. The United National World Water Development 
Report 3. Paris, France: UNESCO.  
Wade, Robert. 1988. Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in 
South India. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
